cule; witness the following example, in which the goddess of Dullness is addreffed upon the subject of modern education.

Thou gav'ft that ripeness, which fo foon began, And ceas'd fo foon, he ne'er was boy nor man; Through school and college, thy kind cloud o'ercaft,

Safe and unfeen the young Æneas paft *;

Thence bursting glorious, all at once let down, Stunn'd with his giddy larum half the town.

Dunciad, b. iv. 287:

The interpofition of the gods in the manher of Homer and Virgil, ought to be confined to ludicrous fubjects, which are much enlivened by fuch interpofition handled in the form of a parody; witness the cave of Spleen, Rape of the Lock, canto 4.; the goddess of Difcord; Lutrin, canto 1.3 and the goddefs of Indolence, canto 2.

Those who have a talent for ridicule, which is feldom united with a tafte for delicate and refined beauties, are quick-fighted in improprieties; and these they eagerly

* Æn. 1. 1. At Venus obfcuro, &c.

lay

lay hold of, in order to gratify their favourite propenfity. The perfons galled have no other refuge but to maintain, that ridicule ought not to be applied to grave subjects. It is yielded, on the other hand, that fubjects really grave and important, are by no means fit for ridicule: but then it is urged, that ridicule is the only proper teft for discovering whether a fubject be really grave, or be made fo artificially by cuftom and fashion. This difpute has produced a celebrated queftion, Whether ridicule be or be not a test of truth? I give this question a place here, because it tends to illuftrate the nature of ridicule.

que

The queftion ftated in accurate terms is, Whether the sense of ridicule be the proper test for distinguishing ridiculous objects from those that are not fo? To answer this ftion with precifion, I muft premife, that ridicule is not a fubject of reasoning, but of fense or tafte*. This being taken for granted, I proceed thus. No perfon doubts that our fenfe of beauty is the true teft of what

See chap. 10. compared with chap. 7.

is beautiful, and our fenfe of grandeur, of what is great or fublime. Is it more doubtful whether our sense of ridicule be the true test of what is ridiculous? It is not only the true teft, but indeed the only test. For this is a fubject that comes not, more than beauty or grandeur, under the province of reafon. If any fubject, by the influence of fashion or custom, have acquired a degree of veneration or esteem to which naturally it is not intitled, what are the proper means for wiping off the artificial colouring, and displaying the fubject in its true light? Reasoning, as observed, cannot be applied. And therefore the only means is to judge by taste. The test of ridicule which separates it from its artificial connections, exposes it naked with all its native improprieties.

But it is urged, that the gravest and most ferious matters may be set in a ridiculous light. Hardly fo; for where an object is neither rifible nor improper, it lies not open in any quarter to an attack from ridicule. But fuppofing the fact, I forefee not any harmful consequence. By the fame sort of reasoning, a talent for wit ought to be condemned, because it may be employed to burlesque

burlesque a great or lofty subject. Such irregular use made of a talent for wit or ridicule, cannot long impofe upon mankind. It cannot stand the teft of correct and delicate tafte; and truth will at last prevail even with the vulgar. To condemn a talent for ridicule because it may be perverted to wrong purpofes, is not a little ridicu lous. Could one forbear to fmile, if a talent for reasoning were condemned because it alfo may be perverted? And yet the conclufion in the latter cafe, would be not lefs juft than in the former; perhaps more juft, for no talent is so often perverted as that of reason.

We had best leave Nature to her own operations. The most valuable talents may be abused, and fo may that of ridicule. Let us bring it under proper culture if we can, without endeavouring to pull it up by the root. Were we destitute of this test of truth, I know not what might be the confequences: I fee not what rule would be left us to prevent splendid trifles paffing for matters of importance, fhow and form for substance, and fuperftition or enthusiasm for pure reli

gion.

VOL. II.

H

CHAP.

58

I

CHAP.

XIII.

W IT.

IT is a quality of certain thoughts and expreffions.

WTM

The term is

never applied to an action or a paffion, and as little to an external object. However difficult it may be in every particular inftance to diftinguith a witty thought or expreffion from one that is not so, yet in general it may be laid down, that the term wit is appropriated to fuch thoughts and expreffions as are ludicrous, and also occafion fome degree of furprise by their fingularity. Wit also in a figurative sense expresses that talent which some men have of inventing ludicrous thoughts or expreffions. We fay commonly, a witty man, or a man of wit.

Wit in its proper fenfe, as fuggested above, is distinguishable into two kinds; wit in the thought, and wit in the words or expreffion. Again, wit in the thought is of

two