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cannot be connected in fo easy a manner, When two fubftantives happen to be connected, as cause and effect, as principal and acceffory, or in any other manner, such connection cannot be expreffed by contiguity folely; for words muft often in a period be placed together which are not thus related. The relation betwixt fubftantives, therefore, cannot otherwise be expreffed than by particles denoting the relation. Latin indeed and Greek, by their declenfions, go a certain length to express such relations, without the aid of particles. The relation of property, for example, betwixt Cæfar and his horfe is, expreffed by putting the latter in the nominative cafe, the former in the genitive; equus Cæfaris. The like in English, Cafar's horfe. But in other inftances, declenfions not being used in the English language, relations of this kind are commonly expreffed by prepofitions.

This form of connecting by prepofitions, is not confined to fubftantives. Qualities, attributes, manner of exifting or acting, and all other circumstances, may in the fame manner be connected with the substantives JAVOL. II.

O o

to

to which they relate. This is done artificially by converting the circumftance into a substantive, in which condition it is qualified to be connected with the principal fubject by a prepofition, in the manner above defcribed. For example, the adjective wife being converted into the substantive wisdom, gives opportunity for the expreffion" a man of "wisdom," instead of the more fimple expreffion, a wife man. This variety in the expreffion, enriches language. I obferve befide, that the using a prepofition in this case, is not always a matter of choice. It is indispensable with respect to every circumftance that cannot be expreffed by a fingle adjective or adverb.

Το pave the way for the rules of arrangement, one other preliminary must be dif cuffed, which is, to explain the difference betwixt a natural ftyle, and that where tranfpofition or inverfion prevails. There are, it is true, no precife boundaries betwixt thefe two; for they run into each other, like the fhades of different colours. No perfon however is at a loss to distinguish them in their extremes: and it is neceffary to make

the

the diftinction; because though fome of the rules I fhall have occafion to mention are common to both, yet each has rules peculiar to itself. In a natural ftyle, relative words are by juxtapofition connected with those to which they relate, going before or after, according to the peculiar genius of the language. Again, a circumftance connected by a prepofition, follows naturally the word with which it is connected. But this ar rangement may be varied, when a different order is more beautiful. A circumftance may be placed before the word with which it is connected by a prepofition; and may be interjected even betwixt a relative word and that to which it relates. When fuch liberties are frequently taken, the style becomes inverted or transposed.

But as the liberty of inversion is a capital point in handling the prefent fubject, it will be neceffary to examine it more narrowly, and in particular to trace the feveral degrees in which an inverted style recedes more and more from that which is natural. And first, as to the placing a circumftance before the word with which it is connected, I observe,

that it is the easiest of all inverfion, even so eafy as to be confiftent with a style that is properly termed natural. Witness the following examples.

In the fincerity of my heart, I profess, &c.

By our own ill management,' we are brought to fo low an ebb of wealth and credit, that, &c.

On Thursday morning there was little or nothing tranfacted in Change-alley.

At St Bride's church in Fleetftreet, Mr Woolfton, (who writ against the miracles of our Saviour), in the utmost terrors of confcience made a public recantation.

The interjecting a circumftance betwixt a relative word and that to which it relates, is more properly termed inverfion; because, by a violent disjunction of words intimately connected, it recedes farther from a natural ftyle. But this liberty has also degrees; for the disjunction is more violent in some cases than in others. This I muft alfo explain: and to give a juft notion of the difference, I must crave liberty of my reader to enter a

little more into an abstract fubject, than would otherwise be my choice.

In nature, though a substance cannot exift without its qualities, nor a quality without a fubftance; yet in our conception of these, a material difference may be remarked. I cannot conceive a quality but as belonging to fome subject: it makes indeed a part of the idea which is formed of the fubject. But the oppofite holds not. Though I cannot form a conception of a subject devoid of all qualities, a partial conception may however be formed of it, laying aside or abstracting from any particular quality. I can, for example, form the idea of a fine Arabian horse without regard to his colour, or of a white horse without regard to his fize. Such partial conception of a subject, is ftill more easy with respect to action or motion; which is an occafional attribute only, and has not the fame permanency with colour or figure. I cannot form an idea of motion independent of a body; but there is nothing more eafy than to form an idea of a body at rest. Hence it appears, that the degree of inverfion depends greatly

on