and stronger, and confequently the pain of want. The refult is, that when the habit has acquired its greateft vigor, the pleasure of gratification is gone. And hence it is, that we often fioke and take fnuff habitually, without so much as being confcious of the operation. We muft except gratification after the pain of want; because gratification in that cafe is at the height when the habit is ftrongeft. It is of the same kind with the joy one feels upon being delivered from the rack, the caufe of which is explained above*. This pleafure however is but occafionally the effect of habit; and however exquifite, is guarded against as much as poffible, by preventing want.

With regard to the pain of want, I can discover no difference betwixt a generic and fpecific habit the pain is the fame in both. But these habits differ widely with respect to the pofitive pleasure. I have had occafion to obferve, that the pleasure of a specific habit decays gradually till it become imperceptible. Not fo the pleasure of a ge

Chap. 2, part 1, fect. 2.

neric habit. So far as I can difcover, this pleasure suffers little or no decay after it comes to its height. The variety of gratification preserves it entire. However it may be with other generic habits, the observation I am certain holds with respect to the pleasures of virtue and of knowledge. The pleasure of doing good has fuch an unbounded scope, and may be fo variously gratified, that it can never decay. Science is equally unbounded; and our appetite for knowledge has an ample range of gratification, where discoveries are recommended by novelty, by variety, by utility, or by all of them.

Here is a large field of facts and experi ments, and several phenomena unfolded, the causes of which have been occafionally suggested. The efficient caufe of the power of custom over man, a fundamental point in the prefent chapter, has unhappily evaded my keeneft fearch; and now I am reduced to hold it an original branch of the human constitution, though I have no better reason for my opinion, than that I cannot refolve it into any other principle. But with respect VOL. II.

to

to the final cause, a point of still greater importance, I promise myself more fuccefs. It cannot indeed have efcaped any thinking person, that the power of cuftom is a happy contrivance for our good. Exquifite pleafure produceth fatiety: moderate pleasure becomes ftronger by cuftom. Business is our province, and pleasure our relaxation only. Hence, fatiety is neceffary to check exquifite pleasures, which otherwife would ingrofs the mind, and unqualify us for bufinefs. On the other hand, habitual increase of moderate pleasure, and even converfion of pain into pleasure, are admirably contrived for disappointing the malice of Fortune, and for reconciling us to whatever course of life may be our lot:

How use doth breed a habit in a man!
This fhadowy defert, unfrequented woods,
I better brook than flourishing peopled towns.
Here I can fit alone, unfeen of any,
And to the nightingale's complaining notes
Tune my diftreffes, and record my woes.

Two Gentlemen of Verona, act 5. Sc. 4.

The foregoing distinction betwixt intense

and

and moderate, holds in pleasure only, not in pain, every degree of which is softened by time and custom. Cuftom is a catholicon for pain and diftrefs of every fort; and of this regulation the final caufe is fo evident as to require no illuftration.

Another final caufe of custom will be highly relished by every person of humanity; and yet has in a great measure been overlooked. Custom hath a greater influence than any other known principle, to put the rich and poor upon a level. Weak pleasures, which fall to the fhare of the latter, become fortunately ftronger by custom; while voluptuous pleasures, the lot of the former, are continually lofing ground by fatiety. Men of fortune, who poffefs palaces, sumptuous gardens, rich fields, enjoy them less than paffengers do. The goods of Fortune are not unequally distributed : the opulent possess what others enjoy.

And indeed, if it be the effect of habit to produce the pain of want in a high degree while there is little pleasure in enjoyment, a voluptuous life is of all the least to be envied. Those who are accustomed

to high feeding, eafy vehicles, rich furnis ture, a crowd of valets, much deference and flattery, enjoy but a small share of happinefs, while they are expofed to manifold diftreffes. To fuch a man, inslaved by ease and luxury, even the petty inconveniencies of a rough road, bad weather, or homely fare on a journey, are ferious evils. He loses his tone of mind, becomes peevish, and would wreak his resentment even upon the common accidents of life. Better far to use the goods of Fortune with moderation. man who by temperance and activity hast acquired a hardy conftitution, is, on the one hand, guarded against external accidents, and is, on the other, provided with great variety of enjoyment ever at command.

A

I shall close this chapter with the difcuffion of a question more delicate than abstruse, viz. What authority cuftom ought to have over our taste in the fine arts? It is proper to be premised, that we chearfully abandon to its authority every thing that na ture leaves to our choice, and where the preference we bestow has no foundation other than whim or fancy. There appears

no