The Reflexive Nature of ConsciousnessCombining phenomenological insights from Brentano and Sartre, but also drawing on recent work on consciousness by analytic philosophers, this book defends the view that conscious states are reflexive, and necessarily so, i.e., that they have a built-in, implicit awareness of their own occurrence, such that the subject of a conscious state has an immediate, non-objectual acquaintance with it. As part of this investigation, the book also explores the relationship between reflexivity and the phenomenal, or what-it-is-like, dimension of conscious experience, defending the innovative thesis that phenomenal character is constituted by the implicit self-awareness built into every conscious state. This account stands in marked contrast to most influential extant theories of phenomenal character, including qualia theories, according to which phenomenal character is a matter of having phenomenal sensations, and representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is constituted by representational content. (Series A) |
Contents
HigherOrderism | 5 |
Some semantics of consciousness | 11 |
A formula for state consciousness | 33 |
Consciousness and selfawareness | 59 |
A onestate alternative | 103 |
1 | 137 |
11 | 148 |
The nature of phenomenal character | 155 |
| 173 | |
| 174 | |
| 183 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
A-conscious according argued awareness of one's belief Bennett and Hacker blindsighter brain Brentanian model Brentano Carruthers chapter claim Clyde cocktail party effect cognitive cognitive science colours concept confabulated conscious experience conscious mental consciously perceives creature consciousness Dennett differences in phenomenal distinction Dretske Dretske's driver dunlin example experiential extra-mental object fact feel first-person follows Gennaro higher-order thought HOT theory implicit self-awareness implicitly aware intentional object intentionality intransitive intrinsic feature introspection judgement Kriegel lack phenomenal character least locution look Lycan means mental act Nelkin non-conscious occur one's implicit awareness one's visual experience pain perceptual experience phase of inattentiveness phenomenological philosophers position possible psychological quale qualia reason reflect representational content representational theory representationalism representationalists Rosenthal Sartre scious seems self-awareness involved sensation sense spontaneously report super-blindsighter super-blindsighter's suppose Symmetry Argument thesis things tion uncon unconscious mental virtue what-it-is-like Woodruff Smith Zahavi