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is not any Circumstance inCafar's Character which gives me a greater Idea of him, than a Saying which Cicero tells us he frequently made use of in private Convefation, That he was fatisfied with his Share of Life and Fame.Se fatis vel ad Naturam, vel ad Gloriam vixiffe. Many indeed have given over their Pursuits after Fame, but that has proceeded either from the Disappointments they have met in it, or from their Experience of the little Pleasure which attends it, or from the better Informations or natural Coldness of old Age; but feldom from a full Satisfaction and Acquiefcence in their present Enjoyments of it.

NOR is Fame only unfatisfying in it felf, but the Defire of it lays us open to many accidental Troubles which thofe are free from who have no fuch tender Regard for it. How often is the ambitious Man caft down and disappointed, if he receives no Praife where he expected it? Nay how often is he mortified with the very Praifes he receives, if they do not rife fo high as he thinks they ought, which they feldom do unless encreased by Flattery, fince few Men have fo good an Opinion of us as we have of ourselves? But if the ambitious Man can be fo much grieved even with Praise it self, how will he be able to bear up under Scandal and Defamation? For the fame Temper of Mind which makes him defire Fame, makes him hate Reproach. If he can be transported with the extraordinary Praises of Men, he will be as much dejected by their Cenfures. How little therefore is the Happinefs of an ambitious Man, who gives every one a Dominion over it, who thus fubjects himself to the good or ill Speeches of others, and puts it in the Power of every malicious Tongue to throw him into a Fit of Melancho ly, and destroy his natural Reft and Repose of Mind? Especially when we confider that the World is more apt to cenfure than applaud, and himself fuller of Imperfections than Virtues.

WE may further observe, that fuch a Man will be more grieved for the Lofs of Fame, than he could have been pleased with the Enjoyment of it. For tho' the Prefence of this imaginary Good cannot make us happy, the Absence of it may make us miferable: Because in the Enjoyment of an Object we only find that Share of Pleafure which it is capable of giving us, but in the Lofs of

it we do not proportion our Grief to the real Value it bears, but to the Value our Fancies and Imaginations fet upon it.

So inconfiderable is the Satisfaction that Fame brings along with it, and fo great the Difquietudes to which it makes us liable. The Defire of it ftirs up very uneafy Motions in the Mind, and is rather enflamed than fatiffied by the prefence of the Thing defired. The Enjoyment of it brings but very little Pleasure, tho' the Lofs or Want of it be very fenfible and afflicting; and even this little Happiness is so very precarious, that it wholly depends on the Will of others. We are not only tortured by the Reproaches which are offered us, but are difappointed by the Silence of Men when it is unexpected; and humbled even by their Praises.

No.257. Tuesday, December 25.

Ουχ εἴδει Διός

Οφθαλμὸς ἐγ' γὺς δ ̓ ἔςι κὶ παρών πόνῳ·

Incert. ex Stob.

HATI might not lofe myfelf upon a Subject of fo

that of it in

a particular Order and Method. I have firft of all confidered the Reasons why Providence may have implanted in our Mind fuch a Principle of Action. I have in the next Place fhewn, from many Confiderations, firft, that Fame is a Thing difficult to be obtained, and eafily loft; Secondly, that it brings the ambitious Man very little Happiness, but fubjects him to much Uneafinefs and Diffatisfaction. I fhall in the laft Place fhew, that it hinders us from obtaining an End which we have Abilities to acquire, and which is accompanied with Fulnefs of Satisfaction. I need not tell my Reader, that I mean by this End, that Happiness which is referved for us in another World, which every one has Abilities

to

to procure, and which will bring along with it Fulness of Joy and Pleasures for evermore.

How the Purfuit after Fame may hinder us in the Attainment of this great End, I fhall leave the Reader to collect from the three following Confiderations.

FIRST, Because the ftrong Defire of Fame breeds feveral vicious Habits in the Mind.

SECONDLY, Because many of thofe Actions which are apt to procure Fame, are not in their Nature conducive to this our ultimate Happiness.

THIRDLY, Because if we fhould allow the fame Actions to be the proper Inftruments, both of acquiring Fame, and of procuring this Happinefs, they would nevertheless fail in the Attainment of this laft End, if they proceeded from a Defire of the first.

THESE three Propofitions are felf evident to those who are verfed in Speculations of Morality. For which Reason I fhall not enlarge upon them, but proceed to a Point of the fame Nature, which may open to us a more uncommon Field of Speculation.

FROM what has been already obferved, I think we may make a natural Conclufion, that it is the greatest Folly to feek the Praife or Approbation of any Being, befides the Supream, and that for these two Reasons, because no other Being can make a right Judgment of us, and esteem us according to our Merits; and because we can procure no confiderable Benefit or Advantage from the Efteem and Approbation of any other Being.

In the first Place, No other Being can make a right Judgment of us, and esteem us according to our Merits. Created Beings fee nothing but our Outfide, and can therefore only frame a Judgment of us from our exteriour Actions and Behaviour; but how unfit these are to give us a right Notion of each other's Perfections, may appear from feveral Confiderations. There are many Virtues which in their own Nature are incapable of any outward Reprefentation: Many filent Perfections in the Soul of a good Man, which are great Ornaments to human Nature, but not able to difcover themselves to the Knowledge of others; they are tranfacted in private, without Noife or Show, are only visible to the great Searcher of Hearts. What Actions can exprefs the en

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tire Purity of Thought which refines and fanctifies a virtuous Man? That fecret Reft and Contentedness of Mind, which gives him a perfect Enjoyment of his prefent Condition? That inward Pleasure and Complacency, which he feels in doing Good? That Delight and Satisfaction which he takes in the Profperity and Happiness of another? Thefe and the like Virtues, are the hidden Beauties of a Soul, the fecret Graces which cannot be discovered by a mortal Eye, but make the Soul lovely and precious in his Sight, from whom no Secrets are concealed. A. gain, there are many Virtues which want an Opportunity of exerting and fhewing themfelves in Actions. Every Virtue requires Time and Place, a proper Object and a fit Conjuncture of Circumftances, for the due Exercise of it. A State of Poverty obfcures all the Virtues of Liberality and Munificence. The Patience and Fortitude of a Martyr or Confeffor lie concealed in the flourishingTimes. of Chriftianity. Some Virtues are only feen in Afliction, and fome in Profperity; fome in a private, and others in a publick Capacity. But the great Sovereign of the World beholds every Perfection in its Obfcurity, and not only fees what we do, but what we would do. He views ourBehaviour in every Concurrence of Affairs, and fees us engaged in all the Poffibilities of Action. He difcovers the Martyr and Confeffor without the Tryal of Flames. and Tortures, and will hereafter entitle many to the Reward of Actions, which they had never the Opportunity of performing. Another Reafon why Men cannot form a right Judgment of us is, because the fame Actions may be aimed at different Ends, and arife from quite contrary Principles. Actions are of fo mixt a Nature, and fo full of Circumftances, that as Men pry into them more or lefs, or obferve fome Parts more than others, they take different Hints,and put contrary Interpretations on them;, fo that the fame Actions may reprefent a Man as hypocritical and defigning to one, which make him appear a Saint or Hero to another. He therefore who looks upon the Soul through its outward Actions, often fees it through a deceitful Medium, which is apt to difcolour and pervert the Object: So that on this Account alfo, he is the only proper Judge of our Perfections, who does not guefs at the Sincerity of our Intentions from the Good

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nefs of our Actions; but weighs the Goodness of our Actions by the Sincerity of our Intentions.

Bur further; it is impoffible for outward Actions to represent the Perfections of the Soul, because they can never fhew the Strength of thofe Principles from whence they proceed. They are not adequate Expreffions of our Virtues, and can only fhew us what Habits are in the Soul, without discovering the Degree and Perfection of fuch Habits. They are at best but weak Refemblances of our Intentions, faint and imperfect Copies that may acquaint us with the general Defign, but can never exprefs the Beauty and Life of the Original. But the great Judge of all the Earth knows every different State and Degree of human Improvement, from thofe weak Stirrings and Tendencies of the Will which have not yet formed themfelves into regular Purposes and Defigns, to the last entire Finishing and Confummation of a good Habit. He beholds the firft imperfect Rudiments of a Virtue in the Soul and keeps a watchful Eye over it in all its Progrefs, 'till it has received every Grace it is capable of, and appears in its full Beauty and Perfection. Thus we see that none but the fupreme Being can esteem us according to our proper Merits, fince all others must judge of us from our outward Actions, which can never give them a juft Estimate of us, fince there are many Perfections of a Man which are not capable of appearing. in Actions; many which, allowing no natural Incapacity of fhewing themselves, want an Opportunity of doing it; or fhould they all meet with an Opportunity of appearing by Actions, yet thofe Actions may be mifinterpreted, and applied to wrong Principles; or though they plainly discovered the Principles from whence they proceeded, they could never fhew the Degree, Strength -and Perfection of thofe Principles.

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AND. as the Supreme Being is the only proper Judge of our Perfections, fo is he the only fit Rewarder of them. This is a Confideration that comes home to our Intereft, as the other adapts itself to our Ambition. And -what could the most afpiring, or the most selfish Man defire more, were he to form the Notion of a Being to whom he would recommend himself, than fuch a Knowledge as can discover the leaft Appearance of Per

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fection

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