CH. VIII.

REMUNERATION BY PART-PROFITS.

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point of view, it may be seen that the principle of cooperation can never be generally adopted, for should it tend to do so, capital would become so very cheap, that the disadvantages of working without the largest practicable application of it, would become too severe to allow the working co-operators to survive in the competition.

Without, however, it being necessary for the labourer to dissociate himself thus far from the advantages which capital when fully employed must always present, he may benefit by its employment most amply, receiving, at the same time, full remuneration for his daily labour. That is to say, he may receive in addition to his nominal wages -which may be the current rate-a sum in the form of part-profits of the business in which he is engaged, for the effect of his knowing that he shall receive such will cause. him naturally to apply himself more regularly and earnestly to his work than he would otherwise do, and it will also cause his interest to lie in detecting and reporting any idling in others engaged in the same business. By these means the position of the employer would be improved, for his capital would undoubtedly be rendered more productive, and therefore he would be enabled to grant such a bonus to his labourers, not only without loss but with additional profit to himself. It is, however, not easy generally to carry out such a system in practice, and in many businesses it is impracticable. With some, however, an adequate measure of success depends very largely upon such a mode of payment being adopted. Thus in the case of whale-fishing, there are rates paid to each class of men engaged according to the produce of the fishing additional to a fixed though low rate of wages, and these in a successful year represent a hundred per cent. of additional remuneration. But though the whaling vessels may return home 'clean that is to say, when the fishing has proved a failure-the men do not lose any portion of

their wages, they simply do not gain their percentages. In this way, there is created a very great inducement to the exercise of watchfulness, diligence, and enterprise.

In many businesses, however, this mode of remuneration cannot be practised, for the profits may, in periods of bad trade, or in cases of contracts where contractors miscalculate, be converted into losses, when it would be found impossible to deduct anything from the wages of the labourer, so as to make up the deficit caused by these losses. Where, however, this system of dividing part-profits can be practically carried out, its influence upon the interests of both employer and employed must be beneficial. A modification of the same principle as that embraced in the distribution of a proportion of the profits amongst the employed, is that of piece-work, which is more extensively adopted and better known than the other. It differs in its action from that of payment of part-profits in two particulars-namely, that the capitalist cannot have the same reliance on the quality of work performed by his workmen, wherefore its operation cannot be so beneficial to him, and that the workman may altogether disregard the performances of his neighbour, when he is remunerated strictly according to his own only; in these respects, as compared with the other system, the employer is not so much, and the employed is more, benefited.

A manufacturer, employer of a thousand men, in various parts of England, thus testifies regarding his experience of piece-work :- I have never known a change from day work to piece-work where the workman has not done 50 per cent. more work in the same time, and increased his wages in the same proportion. In the great majority of cases, the skilful and industrious workman has doubled his wages.' In some trades, indeed, such as that of jewellers for instance, the adoption of this system seems indispensable.

See Times, January 16, 1876.

CII. VIII. OBJECTIONS TO PIECE-WORK CONSIDERED. 321

Sundry objections to the system of piece-work, however, have been frequently raised. It is said, for instance, that men are apt to overtask themselves, and to ruin their constitutions when working for themselves. But that objection may be as well made to the manner in which all men work when they have a great object in view, whether it be to benefit themselves or others; but what does it amount to? It says that when men in their eagerness are foolish enough to forget the fact that they possess only a limited strength, they will cause damage to that strength of a temporary or permanent kind. But men in general will not act thus foolishly, and some experience of the effects of overwork will soon produce a sufficient carefulness in the future. Men do not, as a matter of fact, unless exceptionally, act so as to break down their strength at piece-work; and, as a rule, they are very much more likely gradually to fortify that strength. It is also said that men will give way to intemperance when they receive high wages as the payment of piece-work. Probably this objection is a more valid one than the other; but it presupposes that men as a rule will betake themselves to gross and immoral enjoyments, instead of refined ones, whenever their material condition rapidly improves. That, however, depends upon the natural inclinations of the individuals concerned; if the men, to start with, have been totally untutored, no doubt the possibility of indulgence may verge into a probability. The very reason, however, that they have been so totally untutored lies in the fact that their parents have, mayhap, lived in hovels, sent their children to no school, and brought them up in an atmosphere of improvidence and recklessness. But these conditions are the result of poverty-stricken and depressing circumstances, out of which probably their children may enjoy the best opportunities of rising, by obtaining the remuneration of piece

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work, and they would otherwise presumably perpetuate their untutored condition. Mr. Brassey says, in his 'Work and Wages,' that these objections of over-exertion and drunkenness have not, at any rate, been felt on railways; and, so far as my own experience goes, the most self-respecting, energetic, and powerful navvies are those who generally combine to work together in piece-work gangs successfully.

If

Then, again, it is objected that those who labour by the piece perform so much more work than they would do otherwise, that there must consequently be so much less work left for others to do, and that, therefore, these others will be in a measure deprived of employment. But when such an objection is made, it is forgotten that the effect of doing more work is to multiply or improve the articles on which the work is bestowed, so that they become cheaper. The community is, therefore, able to purchase more of them than formerly, and thus a greater demand arises for the articles made by piece-work. this system were then to become universal, or even very general, no one would be a greater gainer than the workman himself; for, first, he would receive the enhanced wages due to piece-work, and, second, he would receive for the same sum of money a greater value of commodities (being the production of piece-work) than before. There can be no objection to piece-work on the ground that the remuneration due to it cannot be easily determined, and that therefore the workman is likely to suffer from the payment of too low a rate; for there must be less difficulty in determining a standard of payment for a piece of work at which generally many men of varying abilities will be engaged, than in determining the day wages of such differently qualified labourers. A council of conciliation would therefore find its business simplified by the general adoption of the system of piece-work, as

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there would not then exist the same difficulty in arranging a fixed scale of payment for different individuals, who have such varied capacities.

It should, for these reasons, be the policy of trades unions to encourage piece-work, wherever it is found to be practicable. But, as Mr. William Thomas Thornton remarks, with regard to both overtime and piece-work, the great unionist error consists in interfering paternally with individual liberty in matters which chiefly concern individual interests, and in insisting on things being done which, unless done cheerfully, had better not be done at all. The error is one of a sort to which leading unionists, and working class leaders generally, are peculiarly prone. A favourite notion of theirs is that whatever seems to them right to be done people ought to be made to do; and a most pestilent notion it is to be entertained by the foremost men of a class who have just been formally invested with the power of making people do whatever they please.'

'1

We have thus very cursorily reviewed the chief means by which the working classes may escape from the very unsettled and unsatisfactory conditions that exist in consequence of the antagonistic relations of capital and labour, and we have endeavoured to estimate these means fairly, with the view of ascertaining which of them should afford the most permanent and important benefits. We have come to the conclusion that courts of conciliation of a permanent character are most likely, of all means, to reduce the present disagreements between capitalist and labourer to a minimum; and, on the other hand, that of all forms of remuneration, first, that by piece-work, and, second, that by payment of part profits in supplement of wages, should be the most advantageous to everyone, but to the workman in particular. The various systems of 1 On Labour, p. 338.