Code of Ethics Adopted July 24, 1889-Minutes 1889, Vol. II, Page 25. The purity and efficiency of judicial administration, which under our system is largely governmental itself, depends as much upon the character, conduct and demeanor of attorneys in their great trust as upon the fidelity and learning of courts or the honesty and intelligence of juries. "There is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the sacred mininstry, in which a high-toned morality is more imperatively necessary than that of the law. There is certainly, without any exception, no profession in which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from the line of strict integrity; in which so many delicate and difficult questions of duty are constantly arising. There are pitfalls and mantraps at every step, and the mere youth, at the very outset of his career, needs often, the prudence of self-denial, as well as the moral courage, which belong commonly to riper years. High moral principle is his only safe guide; the only torch to light his way amidst darkness and obstruction."--Sharswood. No rule will determine an attorney's duty in the varying phases of every case. What is right and proper must, in the absence of statutory rules and an authoritative code, be ascertained in view of the peculiar facts, in the light of conscience, and the conduct of honorable and distinguished attorneys in similar cases, and by analogy to the duties enjoined by statute, and the rules of good neighborhood. The following general rules are adopted by the Virginia State Bar Association for the guidance of its members: Duties of Attorneys to Courts and Judicial Officers. 1. The respect enjoined by law for courts and judicial officers is exacted for the sake of the office, and not for the individual who administers it. Bad opinion of the incumbent, however well founded, cannot excuse the withholding of the respect due to the office while administering its functions. 2. The proprieties of the judicial station, in a great measure, disable the judge from defending himself against strictures upon his official conduct. For this reason, and because such criticisms tend to impair public confidence in the administration of justice, attorneys should, as a rule, refrain from published criticism of judicial conduct, especially in reference to causes in which they have been of counsel, otherwise than in courts of review, or when the conduct of the judge is necessarily involved in determining his removal from or continuance in office. 3. Marked attention and unusual hospitality to a judge, when the relations of the parties are such that they would not otherwise be extended, subject both judge and attorney to misconstruction, and should be sedulously avoided. A self-respecting independence in the discharge of the attorney's duties, which, at the same time, does not withhold the courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only just foundation for cordial, personal and official relations between Bench and Bar. All attempts by means beyond these to gain special personal consideration and favor of a judge are disreputable. 4. Courts and judicial officers, in the rightful exercise of their functions, should always receive the support and countenance of attorneys against unjust criticism and popular clamor; and it is an attorney's duty to give them his moral support in all proper ways, and particularly by setting a good example in his own person of obedience to law. 5. The utmost candor and fairness should characterize the dealings of attorneys with the courts and with each other. Knowingly citing as authority an overruled case, or reading a repealed statute as in existence; knowingly misquoting the language of a decision or text-book; knowingly misstating the contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, or the language or arguments of the opposite counsel; offering evidence which it is known the court must reject as illegal, to get it before a jury under guise of arguing its admissibility, and all kindred practices, are deceits and evasions unworthy of attorneys. Purposely concealing or withholding in the opening arguments positions intended finally to be relied on, in order that opposite counsel may not discuss them, is unprofessional. Courts and juries look with disfavor on such practices, and are quick to suspect the weakness of the cause which has need to resort to them. In the argument of demurrers, admission of evidence, and other questions of law, counsel should carefully refrain from "side-bar" remarks and sparring discourse to influence the jury or by-standers. Personal colloquies between counsel tend to delay, and promote unseemly wrangling, and ought to be discouraged. 6. Attorneys owe it to the courts, and the public whose business the courts transact, as well as to their own clients, to be punctual in attendance on their causes; and whenever an attor ney is late, he should apologize, or explain his absence. 7. One side must always lose the cause; and it is not wise or respectful to the court for attorneys to display temper because of an adverse ruling. Duty of Attorneys to Each Other, to Clients and the Public. 8. An attorney should strive, at all times, to uphold the honor, maintain the dignity and promote the usefulness of the profession; for it is so interwoven with the administration of justice, that whatever redounds to the good of one, advances the |