qualities are perceived as adhering to objects; the latter are felt as existing within us. But a paffion or emotion, befide being felt, is frequently made an object of thought or reflection: we examine it; we inquire into its nature, its caufe, and its effects. In this view it partakes the nature of other obje&s: it is either agreeable or difagreeable. Hence clearly appear the different fignifications of the terms under confideration, as applied to paffion. When a paffion is termed pleafant or painful, we refer to the actual feeling: when termed agreeable or disagreeable, it is confidered as an object of thought or reflection. A paffion is pleasant or painful to the person in whom it exifts it is agreeable or difagreeable to the perfon who makes it a fubject of contemplation. When the terms thus defined are applied to particular emotions and paffions, they do not always coincide. And in order to make this evident, we must endeavour to ascertain, firft, what passions and emotions are pleasant what painful, and next, what are agreeable what difagreeable. With refpect to both, there are general rules, which, fo far as I gather from induction, admit not any exceptions. The nature of an emotion or paffion as pleasant or painful, depends entirely on its caufe. Ấn agreeable object produceth always a pleasant emotion; and a difagrecable object produceth always a painful emotion*. Thus a lofty oak, a generous action, a valuable discovery in art or fcience, are agreeable objects that unerringly produce pleafant emotions. A ftinking puddle, a treacherous action, an irregular ill-contrived edifice, being disagreeable objects, produce painful emotions. Selfish paffions are pleafant; for they arife from felf, an agreeable object or cause. A focial paffion directed upon an agreeable *See part 7. of this chapter. agreeable object is always pleasant: directed upon an object in diftrefs, is painful. Lastly, all diffocial paffions, fuch as envy, refentment, malice, being caufed by difagreeable objects, cannot fail to be painful. It requires a greater compass to evolve the general rule that concerns the agreeablenefs or difagreeableness of emotions and paffions. An action conformable to the common nature of our fpecies, is perceived by us to be regular and good †; and confequently every fuch action appears agreeable to us. The fame obfervation is applicable to paffions and emotions. Every feeling that is conformable to the common nature of our fpecies, is perceived by us to be regular and as it ought to be; and upon that account it must appear agreeable. By this general rule we can ascertain what emotions are agreeable what difagreeable. Every emotion that is conformable to the common nature of man, ought to appear agreeable. And that this holds true with respect to pleasant emotions, will readily be admitted. But why should painful emotions be an exception, when they are not lefs natural than the other? The propofition holds true in both. Thus the painful emotion raised by a monstrous birth or brutal action, is not lefs agreeable upon reflection, than the pleasant emotion raised by a flowing river or a lofty dome. With refpect to paffions as oppofed to emotions, it will be obvious from the foregoing propofition, that their agreeableness or difagreeablenefs, like the actions of which they are productive, muft be regulated entirely by the moral fenfe. Every action vicious or improper is difagreeable to a fpectator, and fo is the paffion that prompts it. Every action virtuous or proper is aE 4 greeable * See the place above cited. Effays on the principles of morality and natural religion, part 1. eff. 2. chap. 1. > greeable to a fpectator, and so is the paffion that prompts it. This deduction may be carried a great way farther; but to avoid intricacy and obfcurity, I make but one other step. A paffion, which, as aforesaid, becomes an object of thought to a spectator, may have the effect to produce a paffion or emotion in him; for it is natural that a focial being should be affected with the paffions of others. Paffions or emotions thus generated, fubmit in common with others, to the general law above mentioned, viz. that an agreeable object produces a pleafant emotion, and a difagreeable object a painful emotion. Thus the paffion of gratitude, being to a spectator an agreeable object, produceth in him the pleafant paffion of love to the grateful perfon. Thus malice, being to a fpectator a disagreeable object, produceth in him the painful paffion of hatred to the malicious perfon. We are now prepared for examples of pleasant paffions that are disagreeable, and of painful paffions that are agreeable. Self-love, fo long as confined within juft bounds, is a paffion both pleafant and agreeable. In excefs it is disagreeable, though it continues to be ftill pleafant. Our appetites are precifely in the fame condition. Again, vanity, though pleafant, is disagreeable. Refentment, on the other hand, is, in every ftage of the paffion, painful; but is not difagreeable unless in excefs. Pity is always painful, yet always agreeable. But however diftin&t thefe qualities are, they coincide, I acknowledge, in one clafs of paffions. All vicious paffions tending to the hurt of others, are equally painful and difagreeable. The foregoing diftin&tions among paffions and emotions, may ferve the common affairs of life, but they are not fufficient for the critical art. The qualities of pleafant and painful are too familiar to carry carry us far into human nature, or to form an accurate judgement in the fine arts. It is further neceffary, that we be made acquainted with the feveral modifications of thefe qualities, with the modifications at leaft that make the greateft figure.. Even at firft view every one is fenfible, that the pleasure or pain of one paffion differs from that of another. How diftant the pleasure of revenge from that of love? So diftant, as that we cannot without reluctance admit them to be any way related. That the fame quality of pleasure should be fo differently modified in different paffions, will not be furprising, when we reflect on the boundless variety of pleasant founds, tastes, and smells, daily felt. Our difcernment reaches differences ftill more nice, in objects even of the fame fenfe. We have no difficulty to diftinguifh different fweets, different fours, and different bitters. Honey is fweet, and fo is fugar; and yet they never pass the one for the other. Our fenfe of finelling is fufficiently acute, to diftinguish varieties in fweet-fmelling flowers without end. With refpect to paffions and emotions, their different feelings have no limits; for when we attempt the more delicate modifications, they elude our fearch, and are scarce difcernible. In this matter, however, there is an analogy betwixt our internal and external fenfes. The latter generally are fufficiently acute for all the ufeful purposes of life, and fo are the former. Some perfons indeed, nature's favourites, have a wonderful acutenefs of fenfe, which to them unfolds many a delightful fcene totally hid from vulgar eyes. But if fuch refined pleasure be refused to the bulk of mankind, it is however wifely ordered that they are not fenfible of the defect; and it detracts not from their happiness that others fecretly are more happy. With relation to the fine arts only, this qualification feems effential; and there it is termed delicacy of tafte.. Should E 5 Should an author of fuch a tafte attempt to defcribe all thofe differences and fhades of pleasant and painful emotions which he himself feels, he would foon meet an invincible obstacle in the poverty of language. No known tongue hitherto has reached fuch perfection, as to exprefs clearly the more delicate feelings. A people must be thoroughly refined, before their language become fo comprehenfive. We must therefore reft fatisfied with an explanation of the more obvious modifications. In forming a comparison betwixt pleasant paffions of different kinds, we conceive fome of them to be grofs, fome refined. Those pleasures of external sense that are felt as at the organ of fenfe, are conceived to be corporeal or grofs. The pleafures of the eye and ear are felt to be internal; and for that reafon are conceived to be more pure and refined. The focial affections are conceived by all to be more refined than the selfish. Sympathy and humanity are reckoned the finest temper of mind; and for that reason, the prevalence of the focial affections in the progress of fociety, is held to be a refinement in our nature. A favage is unqualified for any pleasure but what is thoroughly or nearly felfish: therefore a favage is incapable of comparing selfish and social pleasure. But a man after acquiring a high relish of the latter, lofes not thereby a tafte for the former. This man can judge, and he will give preference to focial pleasures as more sweet and refined. In fact they maintain that character, not only in the direct feeling, but alfo when we make them the fubject of reflection. The focial paffions are by far more agreeable than the selfish, and rife much higher in our esteem. See the introduction. Refined |