relaxing the fpirits *. Organic pleasure, which hath no relish but while we are in vigour, is ill qualified for that office: but the finer pleasures of fenfe, which occupy without exhaufting the mind, are excellently well qualified to restore its ufual tone after fevere application to study or business, as well as after fatiety from fenfual gratification. Our first perceptions are of external objects, and our first attachments are to them. Organic pleasures take the lead. But the mind, gradually ripening, relifheth more and more the pleasures of the eye and ear; which approach the purely mental, without exhaufting the fpirits; and exceed the purely fenfual, without danger of fatiety. The pleasures of the eye and ear have accordingly a natural aptitude to attract us from the immoderate gratification of fenfual appetite. For the mind, once accustomed to enjoy a variety of external objects without being confcious of the organic impreffion, is prepared for enjoying internal objects where there cannot be an organic impreffion. Thus the author of nature, by qualifying the human mind for a fucceffion of enjoyments from the lowest to the higheft, leads it by gentle fteps from the most groveling corporeal pleasures, for which folely it is fitted in the beginning of life, to those refined and fublime pleafures which are fuited to its maturity. This fucceffion, however, is not governed by unavoidable neceffity. The God of nature offers it to us, in order to advance our happiness; and it is fufficient, that he hath enabled us to complete the fucceffion. Nor has he made our task difagreeable or difficult. On the contrary, the transition B 2 is * Du Bos judiciously obferves, that filence doth not tend to calm an agitated mind; but that foft and flow mufic hath a fine effect. is fweet and easy, from corporeal pleasures to the more refined pleasures of fense; and not lefs fo, from these to the exalted pleasures of morality and religion. We ftand therefore engaged in honour, as well as intereft, to fecond the purposes of nature, by cultivating the pleasures of the eye and ear, thofe efpecially that require extraordinary culture, fuch as are infpired by poetry, painting, fculpture, mufic, gardening, and architecture. This chiefly is the duty of the opulent, who have leifure to improve their minds and their feelings. The fine arts are contrived to give pleasure to the eye and the ear, difregarding the inferior fenfes. A tafte for thefe arts is a plant that grows naturally in many foils; but, without culture, fcarce to perfection in any foil. It is fufceptible of much refinement; and is, by proper care, greatly improved. In this refpect, a taste in the fine arts goes hand in hand with the moral fenfe, to which indeed it is nearly allied. Both of them difcover what is right and what is wrong. Fafhion, temper, and education, have an influence upon both, to vitiate them, or to preferve them pure and untainted. Neither of them are arbitrary or local. They are rooted in human nature, and are governed by principles common to all men. The principles of morality belong not to the prefent undertaking. But as to the principles of the fine arts, *A tafte for natural objects is born with us in perfection. To relish a fine countenance, a rich landscape, or a vivid colour, culture is unneceffary. The obfervation holds equally in natural founds, fuch as the finging of birds, or the murmuring of a brook. Nature here, the artificer of the object as well as of the percipient, hath fuited them to each other with great accuracy. But of a poem, a cantata, a picture, and other artificial productions, a true relish is not commonly attained without study and practice. arts, they are evolved, by ftudying the fenfitive part of human nature, and by learning what objects are naturally agreeable, and what are naturally difagreeable. The man who afpires to be a critic in thefe arts, muft pierce ftill deeper. He must clearly perceive what objects are lofty, what low, what are proper or improper, what are manly, and what are mean or trivial. Hence a foundation for judging of taste, and for reasoning upon it. Where it is conformable to principles, we can pronounce with certainty, that it is correct; otherwife, that it is incorrect, and perhaps whim fical. Thus the fine arts, like morals, become a rational science; and, like morals, may be cultiva ted to a high degree of refinement. Manifold are the advantages of criticism, when thus ftudied as a rational fcience. In the firft place, a thorough acquaintance with the principles of the fine arts, redoubles the entertainment these arts afford. To the man who refigns himself entirely to fentiment or feeling, without interpofing any fort of judgment, poetry, mufic, painting, are mere pastime. In the prime of life, indeed, they are delightful, being fupported by the force of novelty, and the heat of imagination. But they lose their relish gradually with their novelty; and are generally neglected in the maturity of life, which difpofes to more ferious and more important Occupations. To thofe who deal in criticifm as a regular science, governed by juft principles, and giving fcope to judgment as well as to fancy,. the fine arts are a favourite entertainment; and in old age maintain that relish which they produce in the morning of life *. B 3 In ** Though logic may fubfift without rhetoric or poetry, yet fo neceffary to thefe laft is a found and "correct logic, that without it they are no better than "warbling trifles." Hermes, p. 6. In the next place, a philofophic inquiry into the principles of the fine arts, inures the reflecting mind to the most enticing fort of logic. Reafoning upon fubjects fo agreeable tends to a habit; and a habit, ftrengthening the reafoning faculties, prepares the mind for entering into fubjects more difficult and abstract. To have, in this refpect, a juft conception of the importance of criticism, we need but reflect upon the common method of education; which, after fome years fpent in acquiring languages, hurries us, without the leaft preparatory difcipline, into the most profound philofophy. A more effectual method to alienate the tender mind from abftract fcience, is beyond the reach of invention. With refpect to fuch fpeculations, the bulk of our youth contract a fort of hobgoblin terror, which is feldom, if ever, fubdued. Those who apply to the arts, are trained in a very different manner. They are led, step by step, from the easier parts of the operation, to what are more difficult; and are not permitted to make a new motion, till they be perfected in thofe which regularly precede it. The fcience of criticism appears then to be an intermediate link, finely qualified for connecting the different parts of education into a regular chain. This fcience furnisheth an inviting opportunity to exercife the judgment: we delight to reafon upon subjects that are equally pleafant and familiar: we proceed gradually from the fimpler to the more involved cafes and in a due courfe of discipline, custom, which improves all our faculties, beftows acuteness upon thofe of reafon, fufficient to unravel all the intricacies of philofophy. Nor ought it to be overlooked, that the reafonings employed upon the fine arts are of the fame kind with those which regulate our conduct. Mathematical and metaphyfical reafonings have no tendency tendency to improve focial intercourse: nor are they applicable to the common affairs of life. But a juft tafte in the fine arts, derived from rational principles, is a fine preparation for acting in the focial ftate with dignity and propriety. The fcience of criticifm tends to improve the heart not lefs than the understanding. I obferve, in the first place, that it hath a fine effect in moderating the selfish affections. A just taste in the fine arts, by fweetening and harmonizing the temper, is a ftrong antidote to the turbulence of paffion and violence of purfuit. Elegance of tafte procures to a man fo much enjoyment at home, or easily within reach, that in order to be occupied, he is, in youth, under no temptation to precipitate into hunting, gaming, drinking, nor, in middle age, to deliver himself over to ambition; nor, in old age, to avarice. Pride, a difguftful selfish paffion, exerts itself without control, when accompanied Iwith a bad tafte. A man of this ftamp, upon whom the moft ftriking beauty makes but a faint impreffion, feels no joy but in gratifying his ruling paffion by the difcovery of errors and blemishes. Pride, on the other hand, finds in the conftitution no enemy more formidable than a delicate and difcerning tafte. The man upon whom nature and culture have beftowed this bleffing, feels great delight in the virtuous difpofitions and actions of others. He loves to cherish them, and to publish them to the world. Faults and failings, it is true, are to him not lefs obvious: but these he avoids, or removes out of fight, because they give him pain. In a word, there may be other paffions, which, for a feafon, difturb the peace of fociety more than pride but no other paffion is fo unwearied an antagonist to the fweets of focial intercourfe. Pride, tending affiduoufly to its gratification, puts a man perpetually B 4 |