Of felf, every one hath a direct perception; of other things, we have no knowledge but by means of their attributes. Hence it is, that of felf, the perception is more lively than of any other thing. Self is an agreeable object; and, for the reafon now given, must be more agreeable than any other object. Is not this fufficient to account for the pre

valence of felf-love?

In the foregoing part of this chapter, it is fuggefted, that fome circumftances make beings or things fit objects for defire, others not. This hint must be purfued. It is a truth afcertained by univerfal experience, that a thing which in our apprehenfion is beyond reach, never is the object of defire. No man, in his right fenfes, defires to walk. in the air, or to descend to the centre of the earth.. We may amufe ourselves in a reverie, with building caftles in the air, and wifhing for what can never happen. But fuch things never move defire. And indeed a defire to act would be altogether abfurd, when we are confeious that the action is beyond our power. In the next place, though the difficulty of attainment with refpect to things within reach, often inflames defire; yet where the profpect of attainment is faint and the event extremely uncertain, the object, however agreeable, feldom raifeth any ftrong defire. Thus, beauty, or othe good qualities, in a woman of rank, feldom raises love in any man greatly her inferior. In the third place, different objects, equally within reach,. raise emotions in different degrees; and when defire accompanies

what arife from felf-love. Man, for aught appears, might poffibly have been fo framed, as to be fufceptible of no paffions but what have self for their object. But man thus framed, would be ill fitted for fociety. Much better is the matter ordered, by enduing him with paffions directed entirely to the good of others, as well as with paffions directed entirely to his own good,

companies any of thefe emotions, its ftrength, as is natural, is proportioned to that of its caufe. Hence the remarkable difference among defires directed upon beings inanimate, animate and rational. The emotion caufed by a rational being, is out of measure ftronger than any caused by an animal without reafon; and an emotion raised by fuch an animal, is stronger than what is caused by any thing. inanimate. There is a feparate reason why defire, of which a rational being is the object, fhould be the strongest. Defire directed upon fuch a being, is gratified many ways, by loving, ferving, benefiting, the object; and it is a well known truth, that our defires naturally fwell by exercise. Defire directed upon an inanimate being, fufceptible neither of pleasure nor pain, is not capable of a higher gratification than that of acquiring the property. Hence it is, that though every feeling which raifeth defire, is ftrictly speaking a paffion; yet commonly thofe feelings only are denominated paffions, of which fenfible beings capable of pleasure and pain are the objects.

SECT. II. Causes of the emotions of joy and forrow. HIS fubject was purposely referved for a fepa

THIS rate fection, because it could not, with per

ipicuity, be handled under the general head. An emotion involving defire is termed a paffion; and when the defire is fulfilled, the paffion is faid to be gratified. The gratification of every paffion must be pleasant, or in other words produce a pleafant emotion; for nothing can be more natural, than that the accomplishment of any wish or defire fhould affect us with joy. I cannot even except the cafe where a man, through remorfe, is defirous to chastise and punish himself. The joy of gratification is properly called an emotion; because it makes us happy in our prefent fituation, and is ul

timate in its nature, not having a tendency to any thing beyond. On the other hand, forrow muft be the refult of an event contrary to what we defire; for if the accomplishment of defire produce joy, it is equally natural that disappointment should produce forrow.

An event fortunate or unfortunate, that falls out by accident without being foreseen or thought of, and which therefore could not be the object of defire, raiseth an emotion of the fame kind with that now mentioned. But the cause must be different; for there can be no gratification where there is no defire. We have not however far to feek for a cause. A man cannot be indifferent to an event that affects him or any of his connections. If it be fortunate, it gives him joy; if unfortunate, it gives him forrow.

In no fituation doth joy rife to a greater height, than upon the removal of any violent diftrefs of mind or body; and in no fituation doth forrow rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of what makes us happy. The fenfibility of our nature ferves in part to account for thefe effects. Other caufes also concur. We can be under no violent diftrefs without an anxious defire to be free from it; and therefore its removal is a high gratification. We cannot be poffeffed of any thing that makes us happy, without wifhing its continuance; and therefore its removal by croffing our wishes must create forrow. Nor is this all. The principal of contrast comes in for its fhare. An emotion of joy arifing upon the removal of pain, is increased by contraft when we reflect upon our former diftrefs. An emotion of forrow upon being deprived of any good, is increased by contraft when we reflect upon our former happiness.

Jaffier. There's not a wretch that lives on common charity, But's

But's happier than me. For I have known
The luscious sweets of plenty: every night
Have flept with foft content about my head,,
And never wak'd but to a joyful morning.
Yet now must fall like a full ear of corn,
Whose blossom 'scap'd, yet's wither'd in the ripen-
ing.

Venice preferv'd, act 1. fc. 1.

It hath always been reckoned difficult to account for the extreme pleasure that follows a ceffation of bodily pain; as when one is relieved from the rack, or from a violent fit of the stone. What is faid, explains this difficulty in the eafieft and fimpleft manner. Ceflation of bodily pain is not of itself a pleasure; for a non-ens or a negative can neither give pleafure nor pain. But man is fo framed by nature as to rejoice when he is eased of pain, as well as to be forrowful when deprived of any good.. This branch of our conftitution, is chiefly the caufe of the pleafure. The gratification of defire comes in as an acceffory caufe; and contraft joins its force, by increafing the fenfe of our prefent happiness. In the cafe of an acute pain, a peculiar circumftance contributes its part. The brifk circulation of the animal fpirits. occafioned by acute pain, continues after the pain is vanifhed, and produceth a very pleasant feeling. Sicknefs hath not that effect, because it is always attended with a depreffion of fpirits.

Hence it is, that the gradual diminution of acute pain, occafions a mixt emotion, partly pleasant, partly painful. The partial diminution produceth joy in proportion; but the remaining pain balanceth our joy. This mixt feeling, however, hath no long endurance. For the joy that arifeth upon the diminution of pain, foon vanifheth; and leaveth in

the

the undisturbed poffeffion, that degree of pain which remains.

What is above obferved about bodily pain, is equally applicable to the diftreffes of the mind; and accordingly it is a common artifice, to prepare us for the reception of good news by alarming our fears.

SECT. III. Sympathetic emotion of virtue, and its

cause.

NE feeling there is, that merits a deliberate view, for its fingularity, as well as utility. Whether to call it an emotion or a paffion, feems uncertain. The former it can fcarce be, because it involves defire; and the latter it can scarce be, because it has no object. But this feeling and its nature will be beft understood from examples. A fignal act of gratitude, produceth in the spectator love or esteem for the author. The spectator hath at the fame time a feparate feeling; which, being mixed with love or esteem, the capital emotion, hath not been much adverted to. It is a vague feeling of gratitude, which hath no object; but which, however, difposes the fpectator to acts of gratitude, more than upon ordinary occafions. Let any man attentively confider his own heart when he thinks warmly of any fignal act of gratitude, and he will be confcious of this feeling, as diftinct from the efteem or admiration he has for the grateful perfon. It merits our utmoft attention, by unfolding a curious piece of mechanism in the nature of man.. The feeling is fingular in the following respect, that it involves a defire to perform acts of gratitude, without having any particular object; though in this ftate the mind, wonderfully difpofed toward an object, neglects no object upon which it can vent itfelf. Any act of kindnefs or good-will that would not be regarded upon another occafion, is greedily feized;