ftronger emotion, which being accompanied with defire of revenge, is a paffion. Again, external expreffions of diftrefs, produce in the spectator a painful feeling. This feeling is sometimes fo flight as to pass away without any effect, in which cafe it is an emotion. But if the feeling be so strong as to prompt defire of affording relief, it is a paffion, and is termed pity. Envy is emulation in excefs. If the exaltation of a competitor be barely disagreeable, the painful feeling is reckoned an emction. If it produce defire to deprefs him, it is reckoned a paffion.

To prevent mistakes, it must be observed, that defire here is taken in its proper fenfe, viz. that internal impulfe which makes us proceed to action. Defire in a lax fenfe refpects alfo actions and events that depend not on us, as when I defire that my friend may have a fon to reprefent him, or that my country may flourish in arts and fciences. But fuch internal act is more properly termed a wish than a defire.

Having diftinguished paffion from emotion, we proceed to confider paffion more at large, with refpect especially to its power of producing action.

We have daily and conftant experience for our authority, that no man ever proceeds to action, but through the impulfe of fome antecedent defire. So well established is this obfervation, and fo deeply rooted in the mind, that we can scarce imagine a different fyftem of action. Even a child will fay familiarly, What fhould make me do this or that when I have no inclination to it? Taking it then for granted, that the existence of action depends on antecedent defire; it follows, that where there is no defire there can be no action. This opens another fhining diftinction betwixt emotions and paffions. The former, being without defire, are in their nature quiefcent: the latter, involving

C 5

defire,

Ch. II. defire, have a tendency to action, and always produce action where they meet with no obftruction.

Hence it follows, that every paffion must have an object, viz. that being or thing to which our defire is directed, and with a view to which every action prompted by that defire is performed. The object of every paffion is that being or thing which produced it. This will be evident from inducti

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A fine woman, by her beauty, caufes in me the paffion of love, which is directed upon her as its object. A man by injuring me, raifes my refentment; and becomes thereby the object of refentment. Thus the caufe of a paffion, and its object, are the fame in different views. An emotion, on the other hand, being in its nature quiefcent and merely a paffive feeling, must have a caufe; but cannot be faid properly speaking to have an object.

As the defire involved in every paffion leads to action, this action is either ultimate, or it is done as a means to fome end. Where the action is ultimate, reason and reflection bear no part. The action is performed blindly by the impulse of paffion, without any view. Thus one in extreme hunger fnatches at food, without the flighteft reflection whether it be falutary or not: avarice prompts to accumulate wealth without the leaft view of use; and thereby abfurdly converts means into an end fear often makes us fly before we reflect whether we really be in danger and animal love not lefs often hurries to fruition, without a fingle thought of gratification. But for the most part, actions are performed as means to fome end; and in thefe actions reafon and reflection always bear.. a part. The end is that event which is defired; and the action is deliberately performed in order to bring about that end. Thus affection to my friend involves a defire to make him happy; and

the

the defire to accomplish that end, prompts me to perform what I judge will contribute to it.

Where the action is ultimate, it hath a caufe, viz. the impulse of the paffion. But we cannot properly fay it hath a motive. This term is appropriated to actions that are performed as means to fome end; and the conviction that the action will tend to bring about the end defired, is termed a motive. Thus paffions confidered as caufes of action, are diftinguished into two kinds; inftinctive, and deliberative. The firft operating blindly and by mere impulfe, depend entirely upon the fenfitive part of our nature. The other operating. by reflection and by motives, are connected with the rational part.

The foregoing difference among the paffions, is the work of nature. Experience brings on fome variations. By all actions performed through the impulfe of paffion, defire is gratified, and the gratification is pleasant. This leffon we have from experience. And hence it is, that after an action has often been performed by the impulfe merely of paffion, the pleasure refulting from performance, confidered beforehand, becomes a motive, which joins its force with the original impulfe in determining us to act. Thus a child eats by the mere impulfe of hunger a young man thinks of the pleasure of gratification, which is a motive for him to eat and a man farther advanced in life, hath the additional motive that it will contribute to his health.

Inftinctive paffions are diftinguished into two kinds. Where the caufe is internal, they are denominated appetites: where external, they retain the common name of paffions. Thus hunger, thirst, animal love, are termed appetites ; while fear and anger, even when they operate blindly

blindly and by mere impulfe, are termed paffions.

From the definition of a motive above given, it is easy to determine, with the greatest accuracy, what paffions are selfish, what focial. No paffion can properly be termed felfish, but what prompts me to exert actions in order for my own good; nor focial, but what prompts me to exert actions in order for the good of another. The motive is that which determines a paffion to be focial or felfish. Hence it follows, that our appetites, which make us act blindly and by mere impulfe, cannot be reckoned either focial or selfish; and as little the actions they produce. Thus eating, when prompted by an impulfe merely of nature, is neither focial nor selfish. But add a motive, that it will contribute to my pleasure or my health, and it becomes in a measure selfish. On the other hand, when affection moves me to exert actions to the end folely of advancing my friend's happiness, without the flighteft regard to my own gratification, fuch actions are justly denominated focial; and fo is the affection that is their caufe. If another motive be added, that gratifying the affection will contribute to my own happiness, the actions I perform become partly felfish. Animal love when exerted into action by natural impulfe fingly, is neither focial nor felfish: when exerted with a view to gratification and in order to make me happy, it is felfish. When the motive of giving pleasure to its object is fuperadded, it is partly focial, partly felfifh. A juft action when prompted by the love of justice folely, is neither focial nor felfifh. When I perform an act of juftice with a view to the pleafure of gratification, the action is felfish. I pay debt for my own fake, not with a view to benefit my creditor. But let me fuppofe the money has been advanced by a friend without intereft,

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purely

:

purely to oblige me. In this cafe, together with the inclination to do juftice, there arifes a motive. of gratitude, which refpects the creditor folely, and prompts me to act in order to do him good. Here the action is partly focial, partly felfish. Suppofe again I meet with a furprising and unexpected act of generofity, that infpires me with love to my benefactor and the utmost gratitude. I burn to do him good he is the fole object of my defire; and my own pleasure in gratifying the defire, vanifheth out of fight. In this cafe, the action I perform is purely focial. Thus it happens, that when a focial motive becomes ftrong, the action is exerted with a view fingly to the object of the paffion; and the selfish pleasure arifing from gratification is never once confidered. The fame effect of stifling felfish motives, is equally remarkable in other paffions that are in no view focial. Ambition, for example, when confined to exaltation as its ultimate end, is neither focial nor felfish. Let exaltation be confidered as a means to make me happy, and the paffion becomes fo far selfish. But if the defire of exaltation wax ftrong and inflame my mind, the selfish motive now mentioned is no longer felt. A flight degree of refentment, where my chief view in acting is the pleafure arifing to myself from gratifying the paffion, is juftly denominated Selfish. Where revenge flames fo high as to have no other aim but the deftruction of its object, it is no longer selfish. In oppofition to a focial paffion, it may be termed dissocial

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*When this analysis of human nature is confidered, not one article of which can with any fhadow of truth be controverted, I cannot help being furprised at the blindness of fome philofophers, who, by dark and confused notions, are led to deny all motives to action but

what