Ch. XV. ful paffions that are agreeable. Their external figns, it is true, are difagreeable, and raise in the fpectator a painful emotion. But this painful emotion is not repulsive. On the contrary, it is attractive; and produceth. In the fpectator good-will to the man who is moved by the paffion, and a defire to relieve or comfort him. This cannot be better exemplified than by diftrefs painted on the counte-nance, which inftantaneously infpires the fpectator with pity, and impels him to afford relief. The caufe of this difference among the painful emotions raised by external figns of paffion, may be readily gathered from what is laid: down chapter. Emotions and paffions, part 7.

It is now time to look back to the queftion proposed in the beginning, How we come to under-ftand external figns, fo as readily to afcribe each, fign to its proper paffion? We have feen that this branch of knowledge, cannot be derived originally from fight, nor from experience. Is it then im-. planted in us by nature? The following confiderations will help us to answer this question in the affirmative. In the first place, the external figns of paffion must be natural; for they are invariably the fame in every country, and among the different tribes of men. Pride, for example, is always ex-. preffed by an erect pofture, reverence by proftration, and forrow by a dejected look. Secondly, we are not even indebted to experience for the knowledge that these expreffions are natural and univerfal. We are fo framed as to have an innate con-viction of the fact. Let a man change his habi- tation to the other fide of the globe; he will, from: the accustomed figns, infer the paffion of fear among his new neighbours,, with as little hesitation as he did at home. And upon fecond thoughts, the question may be answered without any preliminaIf the branch of knowledge we have been in

ries.

quiring

quiring about be not derived from fight nor from experience, there is no remaining fource from whence it can be derived but from nature.

We may then venture to pronounce, with some degree of confidence, that man is provided by nature with a sense or faculty which lays open to him every paffion by means of its external expreffions. And I imagine that we cannot entertain any reafonable doubt of this fact, when we reflect, that even infants are not ignorant of the meaning of external figns. An infant is remarkably affected with the paffions of its nurfe expreffed on her countenance: a smile chears it, and a frown makes it afraid. Fear thus generated in the infant, muft, like every other paffion, have an object. What is the object of this paffion? Surely not the frown confidered abstractly, for a child never abftra&ts. The nurfe who frowns is evidently the object. Fear, at the same time, cannot arife but from apprehending danger. But what danger can a child apprehend, if it be not fenfible that the person who frowns is angry? We must therefore admit, that a child can read anger in its nurse's face; and it muft be fenfible of this intuitively, for it has no other means of knowledge. I have no occafion to affirm, that these particulars are clearly, apprehended by the child. To produce clear and distinct perceptions, reflection and experience are requifite. But that even an infant, when afraid, must have some notion of its being in danger, is extremely evident.

That we should be confcious intuitively of a paffion from its external expreffions, is conformable to the analogy of nature. The knowledge of this language is of too great importance to be left upon experience. To reft it upon a foundation fo uncertain and precarious, would prove a great obstacle to the formation of focieties. Wifely therefore is it ordered,

ordered, and agreeably to the fyftem of Providence, that we should have Nature for our inftru&ter.

Manyfold and admirable are the purposes to which the external figns of paffion are made fubfervient by the author of our nature. What are occafionally mentioned above, make but a part. Several final caufes remain to be unfolded; and to this task I apply myself with alacrity. In the first place, the figns of internal agitation that are difplayed externally to every spectator, tend to fix the fignification of many terms. The only effe&ual means to ascertain the meaning of any doubtful word, is an appeal to the thing it reprefents. Hence the ambiguity of words expreffive of things that are not objects of external sense; for in that cafe an appeal is denied. Paffion, ftrictly speaking, is not an object of external fenfe: but its external figns are; and by means of thefe figns, paffions may be appealed to, with tolerable accuracy. Thus the words that denote our paffions, next to those that denote external objects, have the most diftin&t meaning. Words fignifying internal action and the more delicate feelings, are lefs diftin&t. This defect with respect to internal action, is what chiefly occafions the intricacy of logic. The terms of that science are far from being fufficiently afcertained, even after the care and labour bestowed by an eminent writer : to whom however the world is greatly indebted, for removing a mountain of rubbish, and moulding the fubject into a rational and correct form. The fame. defect is remarkable in criticifm, which has for its object the more delicate feelings. The terms that denote these feelings, are not more diftin&t than thofe of logic. To reduce this fcience of criticifm. to any regular form, has never once been attempted.

However rich the ore may be, no critical chymift has been found to give us a regular analysis of

* Locke..

its

its constituent parts, and to distinguish each by its

own name.

In the second place, fociety among individuals is grealty promoted by this univerfal language. The distance and reserve that strangers naturally discover, fhow its utility. Looks and geftures give direct accefs to the heart; and lead us to felect with tolerable accuracy the perfons who may be trufted. It is furprifing how quickly, and for the most part how correctly, we judge of character from external appearances.

Thirdly, after focial intercourse is commenced, thefe external figns contribute above all other means to the ftri&teft union, by diffufing through a whole affembly the feelings of each individual. Language no doubt is the most comprehensive vehicle for communicating emotions: but in expedition, as well as in the power of conviction, it falls fhort of the figns under confideration; the involuntary figns efpecially, which are incapable of deceit. Where the countenance, the tones, the geftures, the actions, join with the words, in communicating emotions, these united have a force irrefiftable. Thus all the agreeable emotions of the human heart, with all the focial and virtuous affections, are, by means of these external figns, not only perceived but felt. By this admirable contrivance, focial intercourse becomes that lively and animating amusement, without which life would at beft be infipid. One joyful countenance spreads chearfulness inftantaneously through a multitude of spectators.

Fourthly, diffocial paffions being hurtful by prompting violence and mifchief, are noted by the moft confpicuous external figns, in order to put us upon our guard. Thus anger and revenge, especially when suddenly provoked, difplay themselves on

the

the countenance in legible characters *. The external figns again of every paffion that threatens danger, raife in us the paffion of fear. Nor is this paffion occafioned by confcioufnefs of danger, though it may be inflamed by fuch confcioufnefs. It is an inftinctive paffion, which operating without reafon or reflection, moves us by a fudden impulfe to avoid the impending danger t

In the fifth place, thefe external figns are made fubfervient in a curious manner to the cause of virtue. The external signs of a painful paffion that is virtuous or innocent, and confequently agreeable, produce indeed a painful emotion. But this emotion is attractive, and connects the spectator with the perfon who fuffers. Difagreeable paffions only, are productive of repulfive emotions involving the spectator's averfion, and frequently his indignation.

This

Thus

Rough and blunt manners, are allied to anger by an internal feeling, as well as by external expreffions, refembling in a faint degree thofe of anger. 'T'herefore fuch manners are easily heightened into anger; and favages for that reafon are prone to anger. rough and blunt manners are unhappy in two refpects. They are first readily converted into anger: and next, the change being imperceptible, because of the fimilitude of external figns, the perfon against whom the anger is directed is not put upon his guard. It is for these reasons a great object in fociety, to correct fuch manners, and to bring on a habit of sweetness and calmness. This temper has two oppofite good effects. Firft it is not eafily provoked to wrath. Next the interval being great betwixt it and real anger, a perfon of this temper who receives an affront, has many changes to go through before his anger be inflamed. Thefe changes have each of them their external fign, and the offending party is put upon his guard, to retire, or to endeavour a reconciliation.

See chap. 2. part 1. fect. 5..