flow in its operation to overcome this law. Another cause is not lefs powerful. The mind is exhausted with pleasure as well as with pain. Exquifite pleasure is extremely fatiguing; occafioning, as a naturalift would fay, great expence of animal fpirits *. And therefore, of fuch the mind cannot bear fo frequent gratification as to fuperinduce a habit. If the thing which raifes the pleasure return before the mind have recovered its tone and relish, difguft enfues instead of pleafure.

A habit never fails to admonifh us of the wonted time of gratification, by raifing a pain for want of the object and a defire to have it. The pain of want is always firft felt; the defire naturally follows; and upon prefenting the object, both vanish inftantaneously. Thus a man accuftomed to tobacco, feels, at the end of the ufual interval, a confused pain of want, which in its first appearance points at nothing in particular, though it foon fettles upon its accustomed object. The same may be observed in perfons addicted to drinking, who are often in an uneasy restless state before they think of their bottle. In pleafures indulged regularly and at equal intervals, the appetite, remarkably obfequious to cuftom, returns regularly with the ufual time of gratification; and a fight of the object in the interim, has scarce any power to move it. This pain of want arifing from habit, seems directly oppofite to that of fatiety. Singular it must appear, that frequency of gratification fhould produce effects fa oppofite as are the pains of excess and of want,

The

*Lady Eafy, upon her husband's reformation, expreffes to her friend the following fentiment. "Be fatisfy'd; Sir Charles has made me happy, even to a "pain of joy."

The appetites that refpe&t the preservation and propagation of our fpecies, are attended with a pain of want fimilar to that occafioned by habit. Hunger and thirft are uneafy fenfations of want, which always precede the defire of eating or drinking and a pain for want of carnal enjoyment precedes the defire of a proper object. The pain da being thus felt independent of an object, cannot be cured but by gratification. An ordinary paffion, in which defire precedes the pain of want, is in a different condition. It is never felt but while the object is in view; and therefore by removing the object out of thought, it vanifheth with its defire and pain of want *.

These natural appetites above mentioned, differ from habit in the following particular, They have an undetermined direction toward all objects of gratification in general; whereas an habitual appetite is directed upon a particular object. The attachment we have by habit to a particular woman, differs widely from the natural paffion which comprehends the whole fex; and the habitual relish for a particular dish, is far from being the fame with a vague appetite for food. Notwithstanding this difference, it is still remarkable, that nature hath inforced the gratification of certain natural appetites effential to the fpecies, by a pain of the fame fort with that which habit produceth.

The pain of habit is lefs under our power, than any other pain for want of gratification. Hunger and thirst are more eafily endured, efpecially at first, than an unusual intermiffion of any habitual pleasure. We often hear perfons declaring, they would forego fleep or food, rather than snuff or any other habitual trifle. We must not however conclude, that the gratification of an habitual appetite affords the fame delight with the gratification of one

See chap. 2. part. 3.

that

Va

na

to

that is natural. Far from it: the pain of want only is greater.

The flow and reiterated acts that produce a habit, ftrengthen the mind to enjoy the habitual pleafure in greater quantity and more frequency than originally; and by this means a habit of intempe rate gratification is often formed. After unbounded acts of intemperance, the habitual relifh is foon restored, and the pain for want of enjoyment returns with fresh vigor.

The causes of the pleasant emotions hitherto in view, are either an individual, fuch as a companion, a certain dwelling-place, certain amusements, &c.; or a particular fpecies, fuch as coffee, mutton, or any particular food. But habit is not confined to these. A conftant train of trifling diverfions, may form fuch a habit in the mind, as that it cannot be eafy a moment without amusement. Variety in the objects prevents a habit as to any one in particular; but as the train is uniform with refpe&t to amufement in general, the habit is formed accordingly; and this fort of habit may be denominated a generic babit, in opposition to the former, which may be called a specific babit. A habit of a town-life, of country sports, of folitude, of reading, or of bufinefs, where fufficiently varied, are instances of generic habits. It ought to be remarked, that every specific habit hath a mixture of the generic. The habit of one particular fort of food, makes the taste agreeable; and we are fond of this taste where-ever found. A man deprived of an habitual object, takes up with what most resembles it: deprived of tobacco, any bitter herb will do, rather than want. The habit of drinking punch, makes wine a good refource. A man accustomed to the sweet society and comforts of matrimony, being unhappily deprived of his beloved object, inclines the fooner to a fecond choice. In general,

the

Ch. XIV. the quality which the most affects us in an habitual object, produceth, when we are deprived of it, a strong appetite for that quality in any other object.

The reafons are affigned above, why the causes of intenfe pleasure become not readily habitual. But now I must obferve, that thefe reafons conclude only against specific habits. With regard to any particular object, that is the cause of a weak. pleasure, a habit is formed by frequency and uniformity of reiteration, which in the cafe of an intenfe pleasure cannot obtain without fatiety and difguft. But it is remarkable, that fatiety and difguft have no effect, except as to that thing which occafions them. A furfeit of honey produ ceth not a lothing of fugar; and intemperance with one woman, produceth no difrelish of the fame pleasure with others. Hence it is easy to account for a generic habit in any ftrong pleasure. The difguft of intemperance, is confined to the object by which it is produced. The delight we had in the gratification of the appetite, inflames the ima-gination, and makes us, with avidity, fearch for the fame gratification in what ever other object it can be found. And thus frequency and uniformity in gratifying the fame paffion upon different objects, produceth at the long run a habit. In this manner, a man acquires an habitual delight in high and poignant fauces, rich drefs, fine equipage, crowds of company, and in whatever is commonly termed pleaJure. There concurs at the fame time to introduce this habit, a peculiarity obferved above, that reiteration of acts enlarges the capacity of the mind, to admit a more plentiful gratification than originally, with regard to frequency as well as quantity.

Hence it appears, that though a specific habit can only take place in the cafe of a moderate pleafure, yet that a generic habit may be formed with

respect

respect to every fort of pleasure, moderate or immoderate, that can be gratified by a variety of objects indifferently. The only difference is, that any particular object which causes a weak pleasure, runs naturally into a specific habit; whereas a particular object that caufes an intenfe pleasure, is altogether incapable of fuch a habit. In a word, it is but in fingular cafes that a moderate pleasure produces a generic habit, an intenfe pleasure, on the other hand, cannot produce any other habit.

The appetites that refpect the prefervation and propagation of the fpecies, are formed into habit in a peculiar manner. The time as well as measure of their gratification, are much under the power of cuftom; which, by introducing a change upon the body, occafions a proportional change in the appetites. Thus, if the body be gradually formed to a certain quantity of food at regular times, the appetite is regulated accordingly; and the appetite is again changed, when a different habit of body is introduced by a different practice. Here it would feem, that the change is not made upon the mind, which is commonly the cafe in paffive habits, but only upon the body.

When rich food is brought down by ingredients of a plainer tafte, the compofition is fufceptible of a specific habit. Thus the fweet taste of sugar, rendered lefs poignant in a mixture, may, in courfe of time, produce a specific habit for fuch mixAs moderate pleafures, by becoming more intenfe, tend to generic habits; fo intenfe pleafures, by becoming more moderate, tend to fpecific habits.

ture.

The beauty of the human figure, by a special recommendation of nature, appears to us fupreme, amid the great variety of beauteous forms beftowupon animals. The various degrees in which individuals enjoy this property, render it an

ed

object