Inquiring first to what fubjects the terms dignity and meanness are appropriated, we foon difcover, that they are not applicable to any thing inanimate. The most magnificent palace ever built, may be lofty, may be grand, but it has no relation to dignity. The most diminutive fhrub may be little, but it is not mean. These terms must belong to fenfitive beings, probably to man only; which will be evident when we advance in the inquiry.

Of all objects, human actions produce in a spectator the greatest variety of feelings. They are in themselves grand or little with refpect to the author, they are proper or improper with refpect to thofe affected by them, juft or unjuft. And I must now add, that they are alfo diftinguished by dignity and meannefs. It may poffibly be thought, that with respect to human actions, dignity coincides with grandeur, and meannefs with littleness. But the difference will be evident upon reflecting, that we never attribute dignity to any action but what is virtuous, nor meanness to any but what in fome degree is faulty. But an action may be grand without being virtuous, or little without being faulty. Every action of dignity creates refpect and efteem for the author; and a mean action draws upon him contempt. A A man is always admired for a grand action, but frequently is neither loved nor esteemed for it: neither is a man always contemned for a low or little action.

As it appears to me, dignity and meannefs are founded on a natural principle not hitherto mentioned. Man is endued with a fenfe of the worth and excellence of his nature. He deems it to be more perfect than that of the other beings around him; and he feels that the perfection of his nature confifts in virtue, particularly in virtue of the highest rank. To exprefs this fenfe, the term dignity is appropriated. Further, to behave with dignity,

dignity, and to refrain from all mean actions, is felt to be, not a virtue only, but a duty: it is a duty every man owes to himfelf. By acting in this manner, he attracts love and esteem. By acting meanly or below himself, he is disapproved and contemned,

According to the defcription here given of dignity and meanness, they will be found to be a species of propriety and impropriety. Many actions may be proper or improper, to which dignity or meanness cannot be applied. To eat when one is hungry is proper, but there is no dignity, in this action. Revenge fairly taken, if against law, is improper, but it is not mean. But every action of dignity is alfo proper, and every mean action is also improper.

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This fenfe of the dignity of human nature, reaches even our pleafures and amufements. If they enlarge the mind by raifing grand or elevated emotions, or if they humanize the mind by exercifing our fympathy, they are approved as fuited to our nature: if they contract the mind by fixing it on trivial objects, they are contemned as low and mean. Hence in general, every occupation, whether of use or amufement, that correfponds to the dignity of man, obtains the epithet of manly; and every occupation below his nature, obtains the epithet of childish.

To those who study human nature, there is a point which has always appeared intricate. How comes it that generofity and courage are more valued and bestow more dignity, than good-nature, or even juftice, though the latter contribute more than the former, to private as well as to public happiness? This question bluntly proposed, might puzzle a cunning philofopher; but by means of the foregoing obfervations will eafily be folved. Human virtues, like other objects, obtain a rank

in our estimation, not from their utility, which is a fubject of reflection, but from the direct impreffion they make on us. Juftice and good-nature are a fort of negative virtues, that make no figure um lefs when they are tranfgreffed. Courage and generofity producing elevated emotions, enliven greatly the fenfe of a man's dignity, both in himfelf and in others; and for that reafon, courage and generofity are in higher regard than the other virtues mentioned. We describe them as grand and elevated, as of greater dignity, and more praiseworthy.

This leads us to examine more directly emotions and paffions with refpect to the prefent fubject. And it will not be difficult to form a fcale of them, beginning at the meanett, and afcending gradually to thofe of the highest rank and dignity. Pleasure felt as at the organ of fenfe, named corporeal pleafure, is perceived to be low; and when indulged to excefs, beyond what nature demands, is perceived alfo to be mean. Perfons therefore of any delicacy, diffemble the pleasure they have in eating and drinking. The pleasures of the eye and ear, which have no organic feeling*, are free from any fenfe of meanness; and for that reafon are indulged without any shame. They even arife to a certain degree of dignity, when their objects are grand or elevated. The fame is the cafe of the fympathetic paffions. They raise the character confiderably, when their objects are of importance. A virtuous perfon behaving with fortitude and dignity under the moft cruel misfortunes makes a capital figure; and the fympathifing fpectator feels in himfelf the fame dignity. Sympathetic distress at the fame time never is mean: on the contrary, it is agreeable to the nature of a focial being, and has the general approbation. The rank that love poffettes

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* See the Introduction.

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in this scale, depends in a great measure on its object.It poffeffes a low place, when founded on external properties merely; and is mean when bestowed upon a perfon of a rank much inferior without any extraordinary qualification. But when founded on the more elevated internal properties, it affumes a confiderable degree of dignity. The fame is the cafe of friendship. When gratitude is warm, it animates the mind; but it fcarce rifes to dignity. Joy beftows dignity when it proceeds from an elevated cause.

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So far as I can gather from induction, dignity is not a property of any difagreeable paffion. One is flight, another fevere, one depreffes the mind, another rouses and animates it; but there is no elevation, far lefs dignity, in any of them. Revenge, in particular, though it inflame and fwell the mind, is not accompanied with dignity, not even with elevation. It is not however felt as mean or groveling, unlefs when it takes indirect measures for its gratification. Shame and remorfe, though h they fink the fpirits, are not mean. Pride, a difagreeable paffion, bestows no dignity in the eye of a fpectator. Vanity always appears mean; and extremely fo where founded, as commonly happens, on trivial qualifications.

I proceed to the pleasures of the understanding, which poffefs a high rank in point of dignity. Of this every one will be fenfible, when he confiders the important truths that have been laid open by fcience; fuch as general theorems, and the general laws that govern the material and moral worlds. The pleasures of the understanding are fuited to man as a rational and contemplative being; and they tend not a little to ennoble his nature. Even to the the Deity he ftretches his contemplations, which, in the difcovery of infinite power wifdom and benevolence, afford delight of the most exalted

kind. Hence it appears, that the fine arts ftudied • as a rational science, afford entertainment of great dignity; fuperior far to what they afford as a fubject of tafte merely.

But contemplation, though in itself valuable, is chiefly respected as fubfervient to action; for man is intended to be more an active than a contemplative being. He accordingly shows more dignity in action than in contemplation. Generofity, magnanimity, heroifm, raise his character to the highest pitch. These best exprefs the dignity of his nature, and advance him nearer to divinity than any other of his attributes. boin.olh

By every production that fhows' art and contrivance, our curiofity is excited upon two points; first how it was made, and next to what end. Of the two, the latter is the more important inquiry, because the means are ever fubordinate to the end; and in fact our curiofity is always more inflamed by the final than by the efficient caufe. This preference is no where more vifible, than in contemplating the works of nature. If in the efficient caufe, wifdom and power be difplayed, wisdom is not lefs confpicuous in the final caufe; and from it only can we infer benevolence, which of all the divine attributes is to man the most important. Having endeavoured to affign the efficient caufe of dignity and meannefs, and to unfold the principle on which they are founded, we proceed to explain the final caufe of the dignity or meannefs bestowed upon the feveral particulars above mentioned, beginning with corporeal pleatures. Thefe, fo far as ufeful, are like juftice fenced with fufficient fanctions to prevent their being neglected. Hunger and thirft are painful fenfations and we are incited to animal love by a vigorous propenfity. Were they dignified over and above with a

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