Ch. X. we are in high fpirits: for in high spirits, felf conceit difplays itself with more than ordinary vigor.

Having with wary steps traced an intricate road, not without danger of wandering; what remains to complete our journey, is to account for the final caufe of congruity and propriety, which make fo great a figure in the human conftitution. One final caufe, regarding congruity, is pretty obvious. The fenfe of congruity, as one of the principles of the fine arts, contributes in a remarkable degree to our entertainment. This is the final cause affigned above for our fenfe of proportion *, and need not be enlarged upon here. Congruity indeed with refpect to quantity, coincides with proportion. When the parts of a building are nicely adjusted to each other, it may be faid indifferently, that it is agreeable by the congruity of its parts, or by the proportion of its parts. But propriety which regards voluntary agents only, can never in any inftance be the fame with proportion. A very long nofe is difproportioned, but cannot be termed improper. In fome inftances, it is true, impropriety coincides with difproportion in the fame fubject,. but never in the fame refpect. I give for an example a very little man buckled to a long toledo. Confidering the man and the fword with respect to fize, we perceive a disproportion. Confidering the fword as the choice of the man, we perceive an improprie

ty.

The fenfe of impropriety with refpect to mistakes, blunders, and abfurdities, is happily contri-ved for the good of mankind. In the fpectators it is productive of mirth and laughter, excellent recreation in an interval from bufinefs. The benefit is ftill more extenfive. It is not agreeable to be the fubject of ridicule; and to punish with ridicule the man who is guilty of an absurdity, tends to put him more upon his guard in time coming. Thus even * See chap. 3.

the

the most innocent blunder is not committed with impunity; becaufe, were errors licenfed where they do no hurt, inattention would grow into a habit, and be the occafion of much hurt.

The final cause of propriety as to moral duties, is of all the moft illuftrious. To have a juft notion of it, the two forts of moral duties must be kept in view, viz. those that refpect others, and those that refpect ourselves. Fidelity, gratitude, and the forbearing injury, are examples of the first fort; temperance, modefty, firmness of mind, are examples of the other. The former are made duties by means of the moral fenfe; the latter by means of the fenfe of propriety. Here is a final cause of the fenfe of propriety, that muft roufe our attention. It is undoubtedly the intereft of every man, to regulate his behaviour fuitably to the dignity of his nature, and to the station allotted him by Proviyidence. Such rational conduct contributes in every refpe&t to happiness: it contributes to health and plenty it gains the efteem of others: and, which is of all the greatest bleffing, it gains a juftly-founded self-esteem. But in a matter fo effential to our wellbeing, even felf-intereft is not relied on. The fenfe of propriety fuperadds the powerful authority of duty to the motive of intereft. 'The God of nature,

in all things effential te our happiness, hath obfervred one uniform method. To keep us fteady in our conduct, he hath fortified us with natural princimples and feelings. These prevent many aberrations, which would daily happen were we totally furrenidered to fo fallible a guide as is human reason. The fenfe of propriety cannot justly be confidered in another light, than as the natural law that regulates. our conduct with refpect to ourselves; as the fenfe of juftice is the natural law that regulates our conduct with refpect to others. I call the fenfe of propriety a law, because it really is fo, not lefs.

than

than the fenfe of justice. If by law be meant a rule of conduct that we are confcious ought to be obeyed, this definition, which I conceive to be ftrictly accurate, is applicable undoubtedly to both. The fenfe of propriety includes this confciousness ; for to fay an action is proper, is, in other words, to fay, that it ought to be performed; and to fay it is improper, is, in other words, to fay, that it ought to be forborn. It is this very confciousness of ought and fhould, included in the moral fenfe, that Jefr makes juftice a law to us. This confciousness of duty, when applied to propriety, is perhaps not fo vigorous or strong as when applied to justice; but the difference is in degree only, not in kind: and we ought, without hesitation or reluctance, to fubmit equally to the government of both.

abl

ety,

the

th

foc

bers

be

une

SIOL

at e

But I have more to urge upon this head. It muft, in the next place, be obferved, that to the fense of propriety as well as of justice are annexed eq the fanctions of rewards and punishments; which evidently prove the one to be a law as well as the other. The fatisfaction a man hath in doing his duty, joined with the esteem and good-will of others, is the reward that belongs to both equally. The punishments alfo, though not the fame, are nearly allied; and differ in degree more than in quality. Bly Difobedience to the law of juftice, is punished with remorfe; difobedience to the law of propriety, ty with fhame, which is remorfe in a lower degree. Every tranfgreffion of the law of juftice raises indignation in the beholder; and fo doth every flagrant ofp tranfgreffion of the law of propriety. Slighter improprieties receive a milder punishment: they are always rebuked with fome degree of contempt, and frequently with derifion. In general, it is true, that the rewards and punishments annexed to the fenfe, of propriety, are flighter in degree than thofe annexed to the fenfe of justice. And that this is wifely ordered,

f

of

0

•1

ordered, will appear from confidering, that to the well-being of fociety, duty to others is ftill more effential than duty to ourfelves; for fociety could not fubfift a moment, were individuals not protected from the headstrong and turbulent paffions of their neighbours.

2

Reflecting coolly and carefully upon the fubje& under confideration, the conftitution of man, admirable in all its parts, appears here in a fine light. The final cause now unfolded of the fenfe of propriety, muft, to every difcerning eye, appear delightful; and yet hitherto we have given but a partial view of it. The fenfe of propriety reaches another illuftrious end; which is, to co-operate with the fenfe of juftice in inforcing the performance of focial duties. In fact, the fanctions vifibly contrived to compel a man to be just to himself, are equally serviceable to compel him to be just to others. This will be evident from a fingle reflection, That an action, by being unjuft, ceafes not to be improper. An action never appears more eminently improper, than when it is unjuft. It is obviously becoming and fuitable to human nature, that each man do his duty to others; and accordingly every trangreffion of duty with respect to others is at the fame time a trangreffion of duty with respect to felf. This is an undisguised truth without exaggeration; and it opens a new and delightful view in the moral landscape. The profpect is greatly enriched, by the multiplication of agreeable objects. It appears now, that nothing is overlooked, nothing left undone, that can poffibly contribute to the enforcing focial duty. For to all the fanctions that belong to it fingly, are fuperadded the fanctions of felf-duty. A familiar example fhall fuffice for illuftration. An act of ingratitude confidered in itself, is to the author difagreeable as well at to every fpectator: confidered

by

by the author with relation to himself, it raises h felf-contempt confidered by him with relation to s the world, it makes him afhamed. Again, confidered by others, it raifes their contempt and indige nation against the author. These feelings are all of them occafioned by the impropriety of the action. When the action is confidered as unjust, it occafions another fet of feelings. In the au- t thor it produces remorfe, and a dread of merited punishment; and in others, the benefac- Of tor chiefly, indignation and hatred, directed upon r the ungrateful perfon. Thus fhame and remorfe united in the ungrateful perfon, and indignation united with hatred in the hearts of others, the are the punishments provided by nature for injuf tice. Stupid and infenfible must he be in extreme, who, in a contrivance fo exquifite, perceives not the hand of the Sovereign Architect.

CHA P. XI. Of Dignity and Meanness.

HESE terms are applied to man in point of

T character, fentiment, and behaviour. We

fay, for example, of one man, that he hath a natural dignity in his air and manner; of another, that he makes a mean figure. There is a dignity. in every action and fentiment of fome perfons: the actions and fentiments of others are mean and vulgar. With refpect to the fine arts, fome performances are faid to be manly and suitable to the dignity of human nature: others are termed low, mean, trivial. Such expreffions are common, though they have not always a precife meaning. With refpect to the art of criticism, it must be a real acquifition to afcertain what these terms truly import; which poffibly may enable us to rank every performance in the fine arts according to its dignity.

Inquiring

tem

des

at

hat

me