bers of thefe prefaces are but loosely connected. 'They look more like a number of maxims or obfervations than a connected difcourfe. An episode in a narrative poem being in effect an acceffory, demands not that ftrict union with the principal fubject which is requifite betwixt a whole and its conftituent parts. The relation however of principal and acceffory being pretty intimate, an epifode loosely connected with the principal fubject will never be graceful. I give for an example the descent of Æneas into hell, which employs the fixth book of the Æneid. The reader is not prepared for this important event. No cause is affigned, that can make it appear necessary or even natural, to fufpend, for so long a time, the principal action in its most interesting period. To engage Æneas to wander from his courfe in fearch of an adventure fo extraordinary, the poet can find no better pretext, than the hero's longing to vifit the ghost of his father recently dead. In the mean time the story is interrupted, and the reader lofes his ardor. An epifode fo extremely beautiful is not at any rate to be difpenfed with. It is pity however, that it doth not arife more naturally from the fubje&t. I muft obferve at the fame time, that full juftice is done to this incident, by confidering it to be an epifode; for if it be a conftituent part of the principal action, the connection ought to be ftill more intimate. The fame objection lies against that elaborate description of Fame in the Æneid. Any other book of that heroic poem, or of any heroic poem, has as good a title to that description as the book where it is placed. In a natural landscape, we every day perceive a multitude of objects connected by contiguity folely. Objects of fight make an impreffion fo lively, as that a relation, even of the flightest * Lib. 4. lin. 173. kind, kind, is relished. This however ought not to be imitated in defcription. Words are so far fhort of the eye in liveliness of impreffion, that in a defcription the connection of objects ought to be carefully ftudied, in order to make the deeper impreffion. For it is a known fact, the reason of which is fuggefted above, that it is easier by words to introduce into the mind a related object, than one which is not connected with the preceding train. In the following paffage, different things are brought together without the flightest connection, if it be not what may be called verbal, i. e. taking the fame word in different meanings. Surgamus: folet effe gravis cantantibus umbra. Juniperi gravis umbra: nocent et frugibus umbræ. Ite domum faturæ, venit Hefperus, ite capellæ. Virg. Buc. 10. 75. of an The metaphorical or figurative appearance object, is no good caufe for introduing that object in its real and natural appearance. A relation fo flight can never be relished. Diftruft in lovers is too warm a fun; But yet 'tis night in love when that is gone. Part 2. Conquest of Granada, act 3. The relations among objects have a confiderable influence in the gratification of our paffions, and even in their production. But this fubject is referved to be treated in the chapter of emotions and paffions *. There is perhaps not another inftance of a building fo great erected upon a foundation fo flight in appearance, as that which is erected upon the relations of objects and their arrangement. Relations make no capital figure in the mind: the bulk of them * Part 1. fect. 4. are are tranfitory, and fome extremely trivial. They are however the links that, uniting our perceptions into one connected chain, produce connection of action, becaufe perceptions and actions have an intimate correfpondence. But it is not fufficient for the conduct of life that our actions be linked together, however intimately it is befide neceffary that they proceed in a certain order; and this alfo is provided for by an original propenfity. Thus order and connection, while they admit fufficient variety, introduce a method in the management of affairs. Without them our conduct would be fluctuating and defultory; and we would be hurried from thought to thought, and from action. to action, entirely at the mercy of chance. CHA P. II. Emotions and Paffions. Th HE fine arts, as obferved above*, are all of them calculated to give pleasure to the eye or the ear; and they never defcend to gratify the tafte, touch, or fmell. At the fame time, the feelings of the eye and ear, are of all the feelings of external fenfe, thofe only which are honoured with the name of emotions or passions. It is alfo obferved above t, that the principles of the fine arts are unfolded by studying the fenfitive part of human nature, in order to know what objects of the eye and ear are agreeable, what difagreeable. Thefe obfervations how the ufe of the prefent chapter. We evidently must be acquainted with the nature and caufes of emotions and paffions, before we can judge with any accuracy, how far they are under the power of the fine arts. The critical art is thus fet in a fine point of view. The inquifitive mind beginning with criticism, the most agreeable of all amusements, and finding no obstruction in its progrefs, advances. far into the fenVOL. I. * Introduction. C + Introduction. fitive S fitive part of our nature; and gains infenfibly a thorough knowledge of the human heart, of its defires, and of every motive to action; a fcience which of all that can be reached by man, is to him of the greatest importance. Upon a fubject fo extensive, all that can be expected here, is a general or flight survey. Some emotions indeed more peculiarly connected with the fine arts, I propofe to handle in separate chapters; a method that will shorten the general survey confiderably. And yet, after this circumfcription, fo much matter comes under even a general view of the paffions and emotions, that, to avoid confusion, I find it neceffary to divide this chapter into many parts in the first of which are handled the causes of those emotions and paffions that are the most common and familiar; for to explain every paffion and emotion, however fingular, would be an endless work. And though I could not well take up lefs ground, without feparating things intimately connected: yet, upon examination, I find the caufes of our emotions and paffions to be fo numerous and various, as to make a fubdivifion alfo neceffary by fplitting this first part into feveral fections. Human nature is a complicated machine, and must be fo to answer all its purposes. There have indeed been published to the world, many fyftems of human nature, that flatter the mind by their fimplicity. But thefe, unluckily, deviate far from truth and reality. According to fome writers, man is entirely a selfish being: according to others, univerfal benevolence is his duty. One founds morality upon fympathy folely, and one upon utility. If any of these fyftems were of nature's production, the present subject might be foon difcuffed. But the variety of nature is not so easily reached; and for confuting fuch Utopian fyftems without the intricacy of reafoning, it appears the beft best method to enter into human nature, and to fet before the eye, plainly and candidly, facts as they really exist. PART I. Caufes evolved of the emotions and robinco paffions. SECT. I. Difference betwixt emotion and paffion. action. HESE branches are fo interwoven, as to make it neceffary that they be handled together. It is a fact univerfally admitted, that no emotion nor paffion ever ftarts up in the mind, without a known caufe. If I love a person, it is for good qualities or good offices: if I have refentment against a man, it must be for fome injury he has done me, and I cannot pity any one, who is under no distress of body or of mind. The circumstances now mentioned, if they cause or occafion a paflion, cannot be entirely indifferent: if they were, they could not move us in any degree. And we find upon examination, that they are not indifferent. Looking back upon the foregoing examples, the good qualities or good offices that attract my love, are antecedently agreeable. If an injury were not difagreeable, it would not occafion any refentment against the author; nor would the paffion of pity be raised by an object in diftrefs, if that obje&t did not give us pain. These feelings antecedent to paffion, and which feem to be the caufes of paffion, fhall be diftinguished by the name of emotions. What is now faid about the production of paffion, refolves into a very simple propofition, That we love what is pleafant, and hate what is painful. And indeed it is evident, that without antecedent emoti C 2 ons |