ven foreign to luxuries and to foreign curiofities, which appear rare in proportion to their original distance.

The next degree of novelty, mounting upward, is found in objects of which we have fome information at second hand. For defcription, though it contribute to familiarity, cannot altogether remove the appearance of novelty when the object itself is prefented. The first fight of a lion occafions fome wonder, after a thorough acquaintance with the correcteft pictures or statues of that animal.

A new object that bears fome diftant resemblance to a known fpecies, is an inftance of a third degree of novelty. A strong resemblance among individuals of the fame fpecies, prevents almost entirely the effect of novelty; unless distance of place or fome other circumftance concur. But where the resemblance is faint, fome degree of wonder is felt; and the emotion rifes in proportion to the faintness of the refemblance.

The highest degree of wonder arifeth from unknown objects that have no analogy to any species we are acquainted with. Shakespear in a fimile introduces this fpecies of novelty.

As glorious to the fight

As is a winged messenger from heaven
Unto the white upturned wondring eye
Of mortals, that fall back to gaze on him
When he bestrides the lazy-pacing clouds,
And fails upon the bofom of the air.

Romeo and Juliet.

One example of this fpecies of novelty deferves peculiar attention; and that is, when an object altogether new is feen by one perfon only, and but for once. Thefe circumftances heighten remarkably the emotion. The fingularity of the condition

of

of the fpectator concurs with the fingularity of the object, to inflame wonder to its highest pitch.

In explaining the effects of novelty, the place a being occupies in the fcale of existence, is a circumftance that must not be omitted. Novelty in the individuals of a low clafs, is perceived with indifference, or with a very flight emotion. Thus a pebble, however fingular in its appearance, fcarce moves our wonder. The emotion rifes with the rank of the object; and, other circumstances being. equal, is ftrongeft in the higheft order of existence. A strange animal affects us more than a strange ve getable; and were we admitted to view fuperior beings, our wonder would rise proportionably; and accompanying Nature in her amazing works, be completed in the contemplation of the Deity.

However natural the love of novelty may be, it is a matter of experience, that thofe who relifh novelty the most, are careful to conceal its influence. This relish, it is true, prevails in children, in idle. people, and in men of a weak mind. And yet, after all, why fhould one be afhamed for indulging a natural propensity? A diftinction will explain this dif ficulty. No man is afhamed to own, that he loves to contemplate new or ftrange objects. He neither condemns himfelf nor is cenfured by others, for this appetite. But every man ftudies to conceal, that he loves a thing or performs an action, merely for its novelty. The reafon of the difference will fet the matter in a clear light. Curiofity is a natural principle directed upon new and fingular objects, in the contemplation of which its gratification confifts, without leading to any end other than knowledge. The man therefore who prefers any thing merely because it is new, hath not this principle for his juftification; nor indeed any good principle. Vanity is at the bottom, which easily prevails upon those who have no tafte, to prefer things

odd, rare, or fingular, in order to diftinguish themfelves from others. And in fact, the appetite for novelty, as above mentioned, reigns chiefly among perfons of a mean tafte, who are ignorant of refined and elegant pleasures.

The gratification of curiofity, as mentioned above, is distinguished by a proper name, viz. wonder; an honour denied to the gratification of any other principle, emotion or paffion, fo far as I can recollect. This fingularity indicates fome important final cause, which I endeavour to unfold. An acquaintance with the various things that may affect us, and with their properties, is effential to our well being. Nor will a flight or fuperficial acquaintance be fufficient. It ought to be fo deeply ingraved on the mind, as to be ready for use upon every occafion. Now, in order to a deep impreffion, it is wifely contrived, that things fhould be introduced to our acquaintance, with a certain pomp and folemnity productive of a vivid emotion. When the impreffion is once fairly made, the emotion of novelty, being no longer neceffary, vanish eth almost instantaneously; never to return, unless where the impreffion happens to be obliterated by length of time or other means; in which cafe the fecond introduction is nearly as folemn as the first.

Defigning wisdom is no where more legible than in this part of the humán frame. If new objects did not affect us in a very peculiar manner, their impreffions would be fo flight as fcarce to be of any use in life. On the other hand, did objects continue to affect us as deeply as at first, the mind would be totally ingroffed with them, and have no room left either for action or reflection.

The final caufe of furprife is ftill more evident than of novelty. Self-love makes us vigilantly at

tentive

tentive to self-prefervation. But felf-love, which operates by means of reafon and reflection, and impells not the mind to any particular object or from it, is a principle too cool for a fudden emergency. An object breaking in unexpectedly, affords no time for deliberation; and, in this cafe, the agitation of furprise is artfully contrived to rouse self-love into action. Surprise gives the alarm, and if there be any appearance of danger, our whole force is inftantly fummoned up to fhun or to prevent it.

CHA P. VII. Rifible Objects..

UCH is the nature of man, that his powers

and faculties are foon blunted by exercise. The returns of fleep, fufpending all activity, are not alone fufficient to preferve him in vigor. During his waking hours, amufement by intervals is requifite to unbend his mind from ferious occupation. The imagination, of all our faculties the most active, and not always at reft even in fleep, contributes more than any other cause to recruit the mind and restore its vigor, by amufing us with gay and Judicrous images; and when relaxation is necessary, fuch amusement is much relished. But there are other fources of amufement befide the imagination.. Many objects, natural as well as artificial, may be distinguished by the epithet of risible, because they raife in us a peculiar emotion expreffed externally by laughter. This is a pleafant emotion; and being allo mirthful, it moft fuccefsfully unbends the mind and recruits the fpirits.

Ludicrous is a general term, fignifying, as we may conjecture from its derivation, what is playfome, fportive, or jocular. Ludicrous therefore feems the genus, of which rifible is a fpecies, limited as above to what makes us laugh.

However eafy it may be, concerning any partiI s cular

cular object, to fay whether it be rifible or not; it feems difficult, if at all practicable, to establish beforehand any general character by which objects of this kind may be diftinguished from others. Nor is this a fingular cafe. Upon a review, we find the fame difficulty in most of the articles already handled. There is nothing more eafy, viewing a particular object, than to pronounce that it is beautiful or ugly, grand or little but were we to attempt general rules for ranging objects under different claffes, according to thefe qualities, we should find ourselves utterly at a lofs. There is a separate caufe which increases the difficulty of diftinguishing risible objects by a general character. All men are not equally affected by rifible objects; and even the fame perfon is more difpofed to laugh at one time than another. In high fpirits a thing will make us laugh outright, that will fcarce provoke a fmile when we are in a grave mood. We muft therefore abandon the thought of attempting general rules for diftinguishing rifible objects from others. Rifible objects however are circumfcribed within certain limits, which I fhall fuggeft, without pretending to any degree of accuracy. And, in the first place, I obferve, that no object is rifible but what appears flight, little, or trifling. For man is fo conftituted as to be feriously affected with every thing that is of importance to his own intereft or to that of others. Secondly, with refpect to the works both of nature. and of art, nothing is rifible but what deviates from the common nature of the fubject: it must be fome particular out of rule, fome remarkable defect or excefs, a very long visage, for example, or a very fhort one. Hence nothing juft, proper, decent, beautiful, proportioned or grand, is rifible. real diftrefs raises pity, and therefore cannot be rifible. But a flight or imaginary diftrefs, which moves not pity, is rifible. The adventure of the fulling

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