fo contribute; for an ardent emotion, which is not fufceptible of increase, cannot have a long course. But their fhort duration is occafioned chiefly by that of their caufes. We are foon reconciled to an object, however unexpected; and novelty foon degenerates into familiarity.

Whether these emotions be pleasant or painful, is not a clear point. It may appear ftrange, that our own feelings and their capital qualities fhould afford any matter for a doubt. But when we are ingroffed by any emotion, there is no place for fpeculation; and when fufficiently calm for fpeculation, it is not eafy to recal the emotion with fufficient accuracy. New objects are fometimes terrible, fometimes delightful. The terror which a tyger infpires is greatest at firft, and wears off gradually by familiarity. On the other hand, even women will acknowledge, that it is novelty which pleafes the most in a new fashion. At this rate, it fhould be thought, that wonder is not in itself pleafant or painful, but that it affumes either quality according to circumftances. This doctrine, however plausible, must not pafs without examination. And when we reflect upon the principle of curiofity and its operations, a glimpse of light gives fome faint view of a different theory. Our curiofity is never more thoroughly gratified, than by new and fingular objects. That very gratification is the emotion of wonder, which therefore, according to the analogy of nature, ought always to be pleafant*. And indeed it would be a great defect in human nature, were the gratification of fo ufeful a principle unpleasant. But upon a more strict fcrutiny, we fhall not have occafion to mark curiofity as an exception from the general rule. A new object, it is true, that hath a threatning appearance, adds to our terror by its novelty. But from this VOL. I. experiment

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* See chap. 2. part 1. fect. 2.

experiment it doth not follow, that novelty is in itfelf difagreeable. It is perfectly confiftent, that we fhould be delighted with an object in one view, and terrified with it in another. A river in flood fwelling over its banks, is a grand and delightful object; and yet it may produce no fmall degree of fear when we attempt to crofs it. Courage and magnanimity are agreeable; and yet when we view thefe qualities in an enemy, they ferve to increase our terror. In the fame manner, novelty has two effects clearly diftinguishable from each other. A new object by gratifying curiofity, must always be agreeable. It may, at the fame time, have an oppofite effect indirectly, which is, to infpire terror. For when a new object appears in any degree dangerous, our ignorance of its powers and qualities affords ample fcope for the imagination to dress it in the most frightful colours*. Thus the first fight of a lion at fome distance, may at the fame instant produce two oppofite feelings, the pleasant emotion of wonder, and the painful paffion of terror. The novelty of the object, produces the former directly, and contributes to the latter indirectly. Thus, when the subject is analyzed, we find, that the power which novelty hath indirectly to inflame. terror, is perfectly confiftent with its being in every cafe agreeable. The matter may be put in a ftill clearer light by varying the fcene. If a lion be firft feen from a place of fafety, the spectacle is altogether agreeable without the leaft mixture of terror. If again the first fight put us within reach of this dangerous animal, our terror may be fo great as quite to exclude any sense of novelty. But this fact proves not that wonder is painful: it proves only that wonder may be excluded by a more powerful paffion. And yet it is this fact, which, in fuperficial

*See chap. iv. Effays on the principles, of morality and narural religion, part 2. eff. 6.

perficial thinking, has thrown the subject into obfcurity. I prefume we may now boldly affirm, that wonder is in every cafe a pleafant emotion. This is acknowledged as to all new objects that appear inoffenfive. And even as to objects that appear offenfive, I urge that the same must hold so long as the spectator can attend to the novelty.

Whether furprise be in itself pleafant or painful, is a queftion not lefs intricate than the former. It is certain, that furprise inflames our joy when unexpectedly we meet with an old friend: and not lels our terror, when we ftumble upon any thing noxious. To clear this point, we must trace it step by step. And the first thing to be remarked is, that in fome inftances an unexpected object overpowers the mind fo as to produce a momentary stu pefaction. An unexpected object, not less than one that is new, is apt to found an alarm and to raise terror. Man, naturally a defenceless being, is happily fo conftituted as to apprehend danger in all doubtful cafes. Accordingly, where the object is dangerous, or appears fo, the fudden alarm it gives, without preparation, is apt, totally to unhinge the mind, and for a moment to fufpend all the faculties, even thought itself *. In this state a man is quite helpless; and if he move at all, is as likely to run upon the danger as from it, Surprise carried 'to this height, cannot be either pleasant or painful; because the mind, during fuch momentary ftupefaction, is in a good measure, if not totally, infenfible. If we then inquire for the character of this emotion, it must be where the unexpected object or event produceth lefs violent effects. And while the mind remains fenfible of pleasure and pain, is it not natural to fuppofe, that furprife, like wonder, fhould have an invariable character? I am incli

Hence the Latin names for furprise, torpor, animi

Stupor.

ned however to think, thet furprize has no invariable character, but affumes that of the object which aifes it. Wonder is the gratification of a natural principle, and upon that account must be pleasant. There, novelty is the capital circumstance, which, for a time, is intitled to poffefs the mind entirely in one unvarjed tone. The unexpected appearance of an object, feems not equally intitled to produce an emotion diftinguishable from the emotion, pleafant or painful, that is produced by the object in its ordinary appearance. It ought not naturally to have any effect, other than to fwell that emotion, by making it more pleafant or more painful than it commonly is. And this conjecture is confirmed by experience, as well as by language, which is built upon experience. When a man meets a friend unexpectedly, he is faid to be agreeably furprised; and when he meets an enemy unexpectedly, he is faid to be difagreeably furprifed. It appears then, that the fole effect of furprife is to fwell the emotion raised by the object. And this effect can be clearly explained. A tide of connected perceptions, glides gently into the mind, and produceth no preturbation. An object on the other hand breaking in unexpectedly, founds an alarm, roufes the mind out of its calm ftate, and directs its whole attention upon the object, which, if agreeable, becomes doubly fo. Several circumftances concur to produce this effect. On the one hand, the agitation of the mind and its keen attention, prepare it in the most effectual manner for receiving a deep impreffion. On the other hand, the object by its fudden and unforeseen appearance makes an impreffion, not gradually as expected objects do, but as at one ftroke with its whole force. The circumstances are precisely fimilar, where the object is in itself difagreeable.

The pleasure of novelty is easily distinguished from that of variety. To produce the latter, a plurality

plurality of objects is neceffary. The former ari fes from a circumftance found in a fingle object. Again, where objects whether coexiftent or in fuc ceffion, are fufficiently diverfified, the pleasure of variety is complete, though every single object of the train be familiar. But the pleasure of novelty, directly oppofite to familiarity, requires no diverfi→ acation..

The

There are different degrees of novelty, and its effects are in proportion. The lowest degree is found in objects that are furveyed a second time af→ ter a long interval. That in this cafe an object takes on fome appearance of novelty, is certain from experience. A large building of many parts variously adorned, or an extenfive field embellished with trees, lakes, temples, ftatues, and other ornaments, will appear new oftener than once. memory of an object fo complex is foon loft; of its parts at least, or of their arrangement. But experience teaches, that even without any decay of remembrance, abfence alone will give an air of novelty to a once familiar object; which is not furpri fing, because familiarity wears off gradually by abfence. Thus a perfon with whom we have been intimate, returning after a long interval, appears like a new acquaintance. Diftance of place contributes to this appearance, not lefs than diftance of time. A friend after a fhort abfence in a remote country, has the fame air of novelty as if he had returned after a longer interval from a place nearer home. The mind forms a connection betwixt him and the remote country, and bestows upon him the angularity of the objects he has feen. When two things equally new and fingular are prefented, the fpectator balances betwixt them. But when told that one of them is the product of a distant quarter of the world, he no longer hefitates, but clings to this as the more fingular. Hence the preference gi

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ven