ture was in its height of glory. The Corinthian came next in vogue: and in Greece, the buildings of that order appear moftly to have been erected after the Romans got footing there. At laft came the Compofite with all its extravagancies, where proportion is facrificed to finery and crowded orna

ment.

But what tafte is to prevail next? for fashion is in a continual flux, and tafte, muft vary with it. After rich and profufe ornaments become familiar, fimplicity appears by contraft lifeless and infipid. This would be an unfurmountable obftruction, fhould any man of genius and tafte endeavour to restore ancient fimplicity..

In reviewing what is faid above, I am under fome apprehenfion of an objection, which, as it may poffibly occur to the reader, ought to to be obviated.. A mountain, it will be obferved, is an agreeable object, without fo much as the the appearance of regularity; and a chain of mountains ftill more agreeable, without being arranged in any order. But thefe facts confidered in a proper light, afford not an objection. Regularity, order, and unifor mity, are intimately connected with beauty; and in this view only, have I treated them. Every regular object, for example, muft in refpect of its regularity be beautiful. But I have not said, that regularity, order, and uniformity, are effential to beauty, fo that it cannot exist without them. The contrary appears in the beauty of colour. Far less have I faid, that an object cannot be agreeable in any respect independent of thefe qualities. Grandeur, as diftinguished from beauty, requires very little regularity. This will appear more fully when that article is handled. In the mean time, to show the difference betwixt beauty and grandeur with re- fpect to regularity, I fhall give a few examples. Imagine a fmall body, let it be a globe, in a conti

G5

nual

nual flux of figure, from the most perfect regularity till there remain no appearance of that quality. The beauty of this globe, depending on its regular figure, will gradually wear away with its regularity; and when it is no longer regular, it no longer, will appear beautiful. The next example fhall be of the fame globe, gradually enlarging its fize, but retaining its figure. In this body, we at first perceive the beauty of regularity only. But fo foon as it begins to fwell into a great fize, it appears agreeable by its greatness, which joins with the beauty of regularity to make it a delightful object. In the last place, let it be imagined, that the figure as well as the quantity of matter are in a continual flux; and that the body, while it increases in fize, becomes lefs and lefs regular, till it lofes altogether the appearance of that quality. In this cafe, the beauty of regularity wearing off gradually, gives place to an agreeableness of a different fort, viz. that of greatnefs and at laft the emotion arifing from greatnefs will be in perfection, when the beauty of regularity is gone. Hence it is, that in a large object the want of regularity is not much regarded by the fpectator who is ftruck with its grandeur. Afwelling eminence is agreeable, though not strictly regular. A towering hill is delightful, if it have but any diftant resemblance of a cone. A fmall furface ought to be smooth; but in a wide extended plain, confiderable inequalities are overlooked. This obfervation holds equally in works of art. The flighteft irregularity in a houfe of a moderate fize hurts the eye; while the mind, ftruck with the grandeur of a fuperb edifice, which occupies it totally, cannot bear to defcend to its irregularities unlefs extremely grofs. In a large volume we pardon many defects that would make an epigram intolerable. In short, the obfervation holds in general, that beauty is connected with regularity in great objects

objects as well as in fmall; but with a remarkable difference, that in paffing from small to great, regularity is lefs and lefs required.

The distinction betwixt primary and fecondary qualities in matter, feems now fully established. Heat and cold, though feeming to exist in bodies, are discovered to be effects caused by these bodies in a fenfitive being. Colour, which the eye reprefents as fpread upon a fubftance, has no exiftence, but in the mind of the fpectator. Perceptions of this kind, which, by a delufion of fenfe, are attributed to external fubjects, are termed fecondary qualities, in contradiftinction to figure, extention, folidity, which are primary qualities, and which are not separable, even in imagination, from the fubjects they belong to. This fuggefts a curious inquiry, Whether beauty be a primary or only a fecondary quality of objects? The queftion is cafily determined with refpect to the beauty of colour? for if colour be a fecondary quality, exifting no where but in the mind of the fpectator, its beauty must be of the fame kind. This conclufion must alfo hold with refpect to the beauty of utility, which is plainly a conception of the mind, arifing not merely from fight, but from reflecting that the thing is fitted for fome good end or purpofe. The question is more intricate with refpect to the beauty of regularity. If regularity be a primary quality, why not also its beauty? That this is not a good confequence, will appear from confidering, that beauty, in its very conception, refers to a percipient; for an object is faid to be beautiful, for no other reafon but that it appears fo to a spectator. The fame piece of matter which to man appears beautiful, may poffibly to another being appear ugly. Beauty therefore, which for its existence depends upon the percipient as much as upon the object perceived, cannot be an inherent property of either. What else then can it

be,

Ch. III. be, but a perception in the mind occafioned by certain objects? The fame reasoning is applicable to the beauty of order, of uniformity, of grandeur. Accordingly, it may be pronounced in general, that beauty in no cafe whatever is a real quality of matter. And hence it is wittily obferved by the poet, that beauty is not in the countenance, but in the lover's eye. This reafoning is undoubtedly folid: and the only cause of doubt or hesitation is, that we are taught a different leffon by fenfe. By a fingular determination of nature, we perceive both beauty and colour as belonging to the object, and, like figure or extenfion, as inherent properties. This mechanism is uncommon; and when nature, to fulfil her intention, chufeth any fingular method of operation, we may be certain of fome final caufe that cannot be reached by ordinary means. It appears to me, that a perception of beauty in external objects, is requifite to attach us to them. Doth not this mechanifm, in the first place, greatly promote industry, by prompting a defire to poffefs things that are beautiful? Doth it not further join with utility, in prompting us to embellish our houses and enrich our fields? Thefe however are but flight effects, compared with the connections. which are formed among individuals in fociety, by means of this fingular mechanifm. The qualifications of the head and heart, are undoubtedly the moft folid and most permanent foundations of fuch connections. But as external beauty lies more in view, and is more obvious to the bulk of mankind than the qualities now mentioned, the fenfe of beauty poffeffes the more univerfal influence in forming these connections. At any rate, it concurs in an eminent degree with mental qualifications, to produce focial intercourfe, mutual good-will, and confequently mutual aid and fupport, which are the life of fociety.

It must not however, be overlooked, that this fense doth not tend to advance the interests of fociety, but when in a due mean with respect to ftrength. Love in particular arifing from a fenfe of beauty, lofes, when exceffive, its fociable character. The appetite for gratification, prevailing over affection for the beloved object, is ungovernable; and tends violently to its end, regardless of the mifery that must follow. Love in this state is no longer a sweet agreeable paffion. It becomes painful like hunger or thirst; and produceth no happiness but in the inftant of fruition. This difcovery fuggefts a moft important leffon, that moderation in our defires and appetites, which fits us for doing our duty, contributes at the fame time the moft to happiness. Even focial paffions, when moderate, are more pleasant than when they fwell beyond proper bounds.

CHAP. IV. Grandeur and Sublimity.

Nubed us from the other animals by an

ATURE hath not more remarkably distin

erect pofture, than by a capacious and afpiring mind, inclining us to every thing great and elevated. The ocean, the fky, or any large object, feizes the attention, and makes a strong impreffion +. Robes of state are made large and full to draw respect. We admire elephants and whales for their magnitude, notwithstanding their unwieldinefs.

*See chap. 2. part 1. fect. 1.

The

+ Longinus obferves, that nature inclines us to admire, not a small rivulet, however clear and tranfparent, but the Nile, the Ifter, the Rhine, or ftill more the ocean. The fight of a fmall fire produceth no emotion; but we are ftruck with the boiling furnaces of Etna, pouring out whole rivers of liquid flame. Treatife of the Sublime, chap. 29.