OF CRITICISM. CHAP. I. Perceptions and ideas in a train. A MAN while awake is fenfible of a continued train of objects paffing in his mind. It requires no activity on his part to carry on the train: nor has he power to vary it by calling up an object at will. At the fame time we learn from daily experience, that a train of thought is not merely cafual. And if it depend not upon will, nor upon chance, we must try to evolve by what law it is governed. The fubject is of importance in the science of human nature; and I promife beforehand, that it will be found of great importance in the fine arts. It *For how fhould this be done? What object is it that we are to call up? If this question can be answered, the object is already in the mind, and there is no occafion to exert the power. If the question cannot be anfwered, I next demand, how it is poffible that a voluntary power can be exerted without any view of an object to exert it upon? We cannot form a conception of fuch a thing. This argument appears to me fatisfactory if it need confirmation, I urge experience. Whoever makes a trial will find, that objects are linked together in the mind, forming a connected chain; and that we have not the command of any object independent of the chain, : It appears that the relations by which things are linked together, have a great influence in directing the train of thought; and we find by experience, that objects are connected in the mind precifely as they are externally. Beginning then with things external, we find that they are not more remarkable by their inherent properties than by their various relations. We cannot any where extend our view without perceiving things connected together by certain relations. One thing perceived to be a caufe, is connected with its feveral effects; fome things are connected by contiguity in time, others by contiguity in place; fome are connected by refemblance, fome by contraft; fome go before, fome follow. Not a fingle thing appears folitary, and altogether devoid of connection. The only difference is, that fome are intimately connected, fome more flightly; fome near, fome at a distance. Experience as well as reafon may satisfy us, that the train of mental perceptions is in a great meafure regulated by the foregoing relations. Where a number of things are linked together, the idea of any one fuggefts the reft; and in this manner is a train of thoughts compofed. Such is the law of fucceffion; whether an original law, or whether directed by fome latent principle, is doubtful; and probably will for ever remain fo. This law, however, is not inviolable. It fometimes happens, though rarely, that an idea prefents itfelf to the mind without any connection, fo far at leaft as can be discovered. But though we have not the abfolute command of ideas, yet the will hath a confiderable influence in directing the order of connected ideas. There are few things but what are connected with many others. By this means, when any thing becomes an object, whether in a direct furvey, or ideally ideally only, it generally fuggefts many of its connections. Among thefe a choice is afforded. We can infift upon one, rejecting others; and we can even infift upon what has the flighteft connection. Where ideas are left to their natural courfe, they are generally continued through the strongest connections. The mind extends its view to a fon more readily than to a fervant, and more readily to a neighbour than to one living at a distance. This order may be varied by will, but ftill within the limits of connected objects. In short, every train of ideas must be a chain, in which the particular ideas are linked to each other. We may vary the order of a natural train; but not fo as to diffolve it altogether, by carrying on our thoughts in a loose manner without any connection. So far doth our power extend; and that power is fufficient for all ufeful purposes. To give us more power, would probably be detrimental instead of being falutary. Will is not the only caufe that prevents a train of thought from being continued through the ftrongest connections. Much depends on the prefent tone of mind; for a fubject that accords with this tone is always welcome. Thus, in good fpirits, a chearful fubject will be introduced by the flighteft connection; and one that is melancholy, not lefs readily in low fpirits. Again, an interefting fubject is recalled, from time to time, by any connection indifferently, ftrong or weak. This is finely touched by Shakespear, with relation to a rich cargo at sea. My wind, cooling my broth, Would blow me to an ague, when I thought Vailing Vailing her high top lower than her ribs, And not bethink me ftrait of dangerous rocks? Merchant of Venice, act 1. fc. 1.. Another cause clearly diftinguishable from that now mentioned, hath alfo a confiderable influence over the train of ideas. In fome minds of a fingular frame, thoughts and circumftances crowd upon each other by the flightest connection. I afcribe this to a defect in the faculty of difcernment. A person who cannot accurately diftinguish betwixt a flight connection and one that is more folid, is equally affected with both. Such a perfon muft neceffarily have a great command of ideas, because they are introduced by any relation indifferently; and the flighter relations, being without number, muft furnish ideas without end. This doctrine is,, in a lively manner, illuftrated by Shakespear.. Falstaff. What is the grofs fum that I owe thee?? Hoftefs. Marry, if thou wert an honest man, thyfelf and thy money too. Thou didst fwear to me on a parcel-gilt goblet, fitting in my Dolphin chamber, at the round table, by a fea-coal fire, on Wednesday in Whitfun-week, when the Prince broke thy head for likening him to a singing man of Windfor, thou didft fwear to me then, as I was washing thy wound, to marry me, and make me my Lady thy wife. Canft thou deny it? Did not Goodwife Keech, the butcher's wife, come in then, and call me Goffip Quickly? Coming in to borrow a mefs of vinegar; telling us he had a good 3 dish of prawns; whereby thou didst defire to eat fome; whereby I told thee they were ill for a green wound? And didft not thou, when fhe was gone. down stairs, defire me to be no more fo familiarity with fuch poor people, faying, that ere long they fhould call me Madam? And didft thou not kiss me, and bid me fetch thee thirty fhillings? I put thee now to thy book-oath, deny it if thou canft. Second part, Henry IV. act 2. fc. 2. On the other hand, a man of accurate judgment cannot have a great flow of ideas. The flighter relations making no figure in his mind, have no power to introduce ideas. And hence it is, that accurate judgement is not friendly to declamation or copious eloquence. This reafoning is confirmed by experience; for it is a noted obfervation, That a great or comprehenfive memory is feldom connected with a good judgement. As an additional confirmation, I appeal to another noted obfervation, That wit and judgement are feldom united. Wit confifts chiefly in joining things by diftant and fanciful relations, which furprife because they are unexpected. Such relations, being of the flightest kind, readily occur to that perfon only who makes every relation equally welcome. Wit, upon that account, is, in a good meafure, incompatible with folid judgement; which, neglecting trivial relations, adheres to what are fubftantial and permanent. Thus memory and wit are often conjoined: folid judgement seldom with either. : The train of thought depends not entirely upon relations another cause comes in for a fhare; and that is the fenfe of order and arrangement. To things of equal rank, where there is no room for a preference, order cannot be applied; and it must be indifferent in what manner they be furveyed; witness the fheep that make a flock, or the trees |