of which I have attempted to give fome faint notion. It must however be confeffed, that our paffions, when they happen to swell beyond their proper limits, take on a lefs regular appearance. Reafon may proclaim our duty, but the will influenced by paffion, makes gratification always welcome. Hence the power of paffion, which, when in excefs, cannot be refifted but by the utmoft fortitude of mind. It is bent upon gratification; and where proper objects are wanting, it clings to any object at hand without diftinction. Thus joy inspired by a fortunate event, is diffufed upon every perfon around by acts of benevolence; and refentment for an atrocious injury done by one out of reach, feizes the first object that occurs to vent itself upon. These who believe in prophecies, even with the accomplishment; and a weak mind is difpofed voluntarily to fulfil a prophecy, in order to gratify its with. Shakespear, whom no particle of human nature hath escaped, however remote from common obfervation, defcribes this weakness: K. Henry. Doth any name particular belong But bear me to that chamber, there I'll lie; [end, Second part, Henry IV. act 4. fc. last. I could not deny myself the amusement of the foregoing obfervation, though it doth not properly come under my plan. The irregularities of paffion proceeding from peculiar weakneffes and biaffes, I do not undertake to justify; and of these we have had many examples *. It is fufficient that paffions * Part 5. of the prefent chapter. common common to all and as generally exerted, are made fubfervient to beneficial purposes, I fhall only observe, thet in a polished society inftances of irregular paffions are rare, and that their mifchief doth not extend far. HA CHA P. III. BEAUTY. AVING difcourfed in general of emotions and paffions, I proceed to a more narrow infpection of fome particulars that ferve to unfold the principles of the fine arts. It is the province of a writer upon ethics, to give a full enumeration of all the paffions; and of each feparately to affign the nature, the caufe, the gratification, and the effects. But a treatife of ethics is not my province. 1 carry my view no farther than to the elements of criticifm, in order to fhow that the fine arts are a fubject of reafoning as well as of tafte. An extenfive work would be ill fuited to a defign fo limited; and to keep within moderate bounds, the following plan may contribute. It has already been obferved, that things are the caufes of emotions, by means of their properties and attributes t. This furnifheth a hint for diftribution. Instead of a painful and tedious examination of the feveral paffions and emotions, I propofe to confine my inquiries to fuch attributes, relations, and circumftances, as in the fine arts are chiefly employed to raise agreeable emotions. Attributes of fingle objects, as the most fimple, fhall take the lead; to be followed with particulars that depend on the relations of objects, and are not found in any one object fingly confidered. Dispatching next fome coincident matters, I approach nearer to practice, by applying the principles unfolded in the foregoing parts of the. work. This is a general view of the intended method † Chap, 2. part. 1. fect. I. first note. method; referving however a privilege to vary it in particular inftances, where a different method may be more commodious. I begin with beauty, the most noted of all the qualities that belong to fingle objects. The term beauty, in its native fignification, is appropriated to objects of fight. Objects of the other fenfes may be agreeable, fuch as the founds of mufical inftruments, the fmoothness and softness of fome furfaces: but the agreeablenefs denominated beauty belongs to obje&s of fight. Of all the objects of the external fenfes, an object of fight is the most complex. In the very fimpleft, colour is perceived, figure, and length, breadth and thicknefs. A tree is compofed of a trunk, branches, and leaves. It has colour, figure, fize, and fometimes motion. By means of each of these particulars, feparately confidered, it appears beautiful how much more fo, when they enter all into one complex perception? The beauty of the human figure is extraordinary, being a compofition of numberless beauties arising from the parts and qualities of the object, various colours, various motions, figure, fize, &c.; all uniting in one complex perception, and ftriking the eye with combined force. Hence it is, that beauty, a quality fo remarkable in vifible objects, lends its name to express every thing that is eminently agreeable. Thus, by a figure of fpeech, we fay a beautiful found, a beautiful thought or expreffion, a beautiful theorem, a beautiful event, a beautiful discovery in art or science. But as figurative expreffion is not our prefent theme, this chapter is confined to beauty in its genuine fignification. It is natural to fuppofe, that a perception so various as that of beauty, comprehending fometimes many particulars, fometimes few, fhould occafion emotions equally various. And yet all the various VOL. I. G emotions Ch. III. emotions of beauty, maintain one general character of sweetness and gaiety. A Confidering attentively the beauty of visible objects, we discover two kinds. One may be termed intrinfic beauty, because it is discovered in a single object viewed apart, without relation to any other object. The examples above given, are of that kind. The other may be termed relative beauty, being founded on the relation of objects. The former is a perception of sense merely; for to perceive the beauty of a fpreading oak or of a flowing river, no more is required but fingly an act of vision. The latter is accompanied with an act of understanding and reflection; for of a fine inftrument or engine, we perceive not the relative beauty, until we be made acquainted with its use and destination. In a word, intrinfic beauty is ultimate relative beauty is that of means relating to fome good end or purpose. Thefe different beauties agree in one capital circumftance, that both are equally perceived as fpread upon the object. This will be readily admitted with refpect to intrinfic beauty; but is not fo obvious with respect to the other. The utility of the plough, for example, may make it an object of admiration or of defire; but why should utility make it appear beautiful? A principle mentioned above*, will explain this doubt. The beauty of the effect, by an eafy tranfition of ideas, is transferred to the cause, and is perceived as one of the qualities of the cause. Thus a fubject void of intrinsic beauty, appears beautiful from its utility. An old Gothic tower that has no beauty in itself, appears beautiful, confidered as proper to defend against an enemy. A dwelling-houfe void of all regularity, is however beautiful in the view of convenience; and the want of form or fymmetry in a tree, will *Chap. 2. part 1. fect. 4. not not prevent its appearing beautiful, if it be known to produce good fruit. When these two beauties concur in any object, it appears delightful. Every member of the human body poffeffes both in a high degree. The flender make of a horfe deftined for running, pleafes every tafte; partly from fymmetry, and partly from utility. The beauty of utility, being proportioned accurately to the degree of utility, requires no illuftration. But intrinsic beauty, fo complex as I have faid, cannot be handled diftinctly without being analyzed into its constituent parts. If a tree be beautiful by means of its colour, its figure, its fize, its motion, it is in reality poffeffed of fo many dif ferent beauties which ought to be examined feparately, in order to have a clear notion of the whole. The beauty of colour is too familiar to need explanation. The beauty of figure requires an accurate difcuffion, for in it many circumftances are involved. When any portion of matter is viewed as a whole, the beauty of its figure arifes from regularity and fimplicity. Viewing the parts with relati on to each other, uniformity, proportion, and order, contribute to its beauty. The beauty of motion deserves a chapter by itself; and another chapter is deftined for grandeur, being distinguishable from beauty in a ftrict fenfe. For the definitions of regularity, uniformity, proportion, and order, if thought neceffary, I remit my reader to the appendix at the end of the book. Upon fimplicity I must make a few curfory obfervations, fuch as may be of ufe in examining the beauty of fingle objects. A multitude of objects crowding into the mind at once, disturb the attention, and pafs without making any impreffion, or any lafting impreffion. In a group, no fingle object makes the figure it would do apart, when it occupies the whole atten G 2 tion. |