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be extreme, the pity hath a mixture of horror. Anger I think is fingular; for even where it is moderate and caufeth no difguft, it difpofes not the fpectator to anger in any degree. Covetoufnefs, cruelty, treachery, and other vicious paffions, are fo far from raifing any emotions fimilar to themfelves, to incite a fpectator to imitation, that they have an oppofite effect. They raise abhorrence, and fortify the fpectator in his averfion to fuch actions. When anger is immoderate, it cannot fail to produce the fame effect.

PART. VII. Final caufes of the more frequent emotions and paffions.

IT

Tis a law in our nature, that we never act but by the impulfe of defire; which in other words is faying, that it is paffion, by the defire included in: it, which determines the will. Hence in the conduct of life, it is of the utmost importance, that our paffions be directed upon proper objects, tend to just and rational ends, and with relation to each other be duly balanced. The beauty of contrivance, fo confpicuous in the human frame, is not confined to the rational part of our nature, but is. visible over the whole. Concerning the paffions inparticular, however irregular, headstrong and perverfe, in an overly view, they may appear, I propose to show, that they are by nature adjufted and tempered with admirable wifdom, for the good of fociety as well as for private good. This fubject is. extenfive: but as the nature of the prefent undertaking will not admit a complete difcuffion, it fhall: fuffice to give a few obfervations in general upon the fenfitive part of our nature, without regarding that ftrange irregularity of paffion discovered in fome individuals. Such topical irregularities, if I may ufe

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Ariftotle, poet. chap. 18. § 3. fays, that anger raifeth in the fpectator a fimilar emotion of anger.

Ch. II. the term, cannot fairly be held an objection to the prefent theory. We are frequently, it is true, mifled by inordinate paffion: but we are alfo, and perhaps not lefs frequently, mifled by wrong judg

ment.

In order to a diftinct apprehension of the prefent fubject, it must be premised, that an agreeable object produceth always a pleafant emotion, and a difagreeable object one that is painful. This is a general law of nature, which admits not a single exception.. Agreeablenefs in the object or caufe is indeed fo effentially connected with pleasure in the emotion of its effect, that an agreeable obje&t cannot be better defined, than by its power of producing a pleasant emotion. Difagreeablenefs in the object or caufe, has the fame neceffary connection with pain in the emotion produced by it:

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From this preliminary it appears, that to inquire for what end an emotion is made pleafant or painful, refolves into an inquiry for what end its caufe is made agreeable or disagreeable. And from the moft accurate induction it will be difcovered, that no cause of an emotion is made agreeable or difagreeable arbitrarily; but that these qualities are fo diftributed as to anfwer wife and good purpofes. It is an invincible proof of the benignity of the deity, that we are furrounded with things generally agreeable, which contribute remarkably to our entertainment and to our happiness. Some things are made difagreeable, fuch as a rotten carcafs, because they are noxious. Others, a dirty marth, for example, or a barren heath, are made disagreeable in order to excite our induftry. And with respect to the few things that are neither agreeable nor difagreeable; it will be made evident, that their being left indifferent is not a work of chance but of wisdom. Of fuch I fhall have occafion to give feveral inftances. Having attempted to affign the final causes of e

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motions and paffions confidered as pleafant or painful, we proceed to the final caufes of the defires involved in them. This feems a work of fome difficulty; for the defires that accompany different paffions have very different aims, and feldom or never demand precisely the fame gratification. One paffion moves us to cling to its object, one to fly from it; one paffion impels to action for our own good, and one for the good of others; one paffion prompts us to do good to ourselves or others, and one to do mischief, frequently to others, and fometimes even to ourselves. Deliberating upon this intricate subject, and finding an intimate correfpondence betwixt our defires and their objects, it is natural to think that the former must be regulated in fome measure by the latter. In this view, I begin. with defire directed upon an inanimate object.

Any pleasure we have in an agreeble object of this kind, is enjoyed by the continuance of the pleafant impreffion it makes upon us; and accordingly the defire involved in the pleafant emotion tends to that end, and is gratified by dwelling upon the agreeable. object. Hence fuch an object may be properly termed attractive. Thus a flowing river, a towering hill, a fine garden, are attractive objects. They fix the attention of the fpectator, by infpiring pleasant emotions, which are gratified by adhering to thefe objects and enjoying them. On the other hand, a difagreeable object of the fame kind, raises in us a painful emotion including a defire to turn from the object, which relieves us of courfe from the pain; and hence fuch an object may be properly termed repulfive. A monftrous birth, for example, a rotten carcafs, a confufion of jarring founds, are repulfive. They repel the mind, by infpiring painful or unpleafant emotions, which are gratified by flying from fuch objects. Thus in general, with regard to inanimate objects, the de

fire included in every pleasant paffion tends to prolong the pleasure, and the defire included in every painful paffion tends to put an end to the pain. Here the final caufe is evident. Our defires, so far, are modelled in fuch a manner as to correfpond precifely to the fenfitive part of our nature, prone to happiness and averse to mifery. These operations of adhering to an agreeable inanimate object, and flying from one that is difagreeable, are performed in the beginning of life by means of defire impelling us, without the intervention of reafon or reflection. Reafon and reflection directing felf-love, become afterward motives that unite their force with defire; because experience informs us, that the adhering to agreeable objects and the flying from those that are difagreeable, contribute to our happiness.

Senfible Beings confidered as objects of paffion, lead us into a more complex theory. A fenfible being that is agreeable by its attributes, infpires us. with a pleasant emotion; and the defire included

in this emotion has as evidently different means of gratification. A man regarding himself only, may be fatisfied with viewing and contemplating this being,. precifely as if it were inanimate; or he may defire: the more generous gratification of making it happy. Were man altogether felfish, it would be con-formable to his nature, that he thould indulge the pleafant emotion without making any acknowledgement to the perfon who gives him pleasure, more than to a pure air or temperate clime when he enjoys thefe benefits. But as man is endued with a principle of benevolence as well as of felfifhnefs, he is prompted by his nature to defire the good of every fenfible being that And gives him pleasure. the final caufe of defire fo directed, is illuftrious. It contributes to a man's own happinefs, by affording him more means of gratification than he can have when his defire terminates upon himself alone;

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and at the fame time it tends eminently to improve the happiness of those with whom he is connected. The directing our defires in this manner, occafions a beautiful coalition of felf-love with benevolence; for both are equally promoted by the fame internal impulfe, and by the fame external conduct. And this confideration, by the way, ought to filence those minute philofophers, who, ignorant of human nature, teach a most disgustful doctrine, That to ferve others unless with a view to our own good, is weakness and folly; as if felf love only contributed to happiness and not benevolence. The hand of God is too vifible in the human frame, to permit us to think feriously, that there ever can be any jarring or inconfiftency among natural principles, thofe especially of felf-love, and benevolence, which regulate the bulk of our actions.

Next in order come fenfible Beings that are in affliction or pain. It is difagreeable to behold a perfon in diftrefs; and therefore this object must raise in the fpectator an uneafy emotion. Were man purely a selfish being, he would be prompted by his nature to turn from every object, animate or inanimate, that gives him uneafinefs. But the principle of benevolence gives an oppofite direction to his defire. It impels him to afford relief; and by relieving the perfon from distress, his defire is fully gratified. Our benevolence to a perfon in diftrefs is inflamed into an emotion of fympathy, fignifying in Greek the painful emotion that is raifed in us by that perfon. Thus fympathy, though a painful emotion, is in its nature attractive. And with refpect to its final caufe, we can be at no lofs. It not only tends to relieve a fellow-creature from pain, but in its gratification is greatly more pleafant than if it were repulfive.

We in the last place bring under confideration perfons hateful by vice or wickednefs. Imagine a wretch

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