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Let me not think-Frailty, thy name is Woman! A little month! or ere thofe fhoes were old, With which the follow'd my poor father's body, Like Niobe, all tears Why, fhe, ev'n fhe (O heav'n! a beast that wants difcourfe of reafon, Would have mourn'd longer-) married with mine uncle,

My father's brother; but no more like my father,
Than I to Hercules. Within a month!

Ere yet the falt of moft unrighteous tears
Had left the flufhing in her gauled eyes,
She married. Oh, moft wicked fpeed, to poft
With fuch dexterity to incestuous sheets!
It is not, nor it cannot come to good.
But break, my heart, for I must hold my tongue.
Act 1. Jc. 3.

The power of paflion to falfify the computation of time, is the more remarkable, that time, which hath an accurate measure, is lefs obfequious to our defires and wishes, than objects which have no precife ftandard of lefs or more.

Even belief, though partly an act of the judgment, may be influenced by paffion. Good news are greedily fwallowed upon very flender evidence. Our wishes magnify the probability of the event, as well as the veracity of the relater; and we belive as certain what at beft is doubtful.

Quel, che l'huom vede, amor li fa invifibile
El'invifibil fa veder amore.

Quefto creduto fu, che'l mifer fuole

Dar facile credenza a' quel, che vuole.

Orland. Furiof. cant. 1. ft. 56.

For the fame reafon, bad news gain also credit upon the flightest evidence. Fear, if once alarmed, has the fame effect with hope to magnify every circumftance that tends to conviction. Shakespear,

who

who fhows more knowledge of human nature than any of our philofophers, hath in his Cymbeline* reprefented this bias of the mind: for he makes the person who alone was affected with the bad news, yield to evidence that did not convince any of his companions. And Othello † is convinced of his wife's infidelity from circumftances too flight to move an indifferent perfon.

If the news intereft us in fo low a degree as to give place to reafon, the effect will not be quite the fame. Judging of the probabality or improbability of the ftory, the mind fettles in a rational conviction either that is is true or not. But even in this case, it is obfervable, that the mind is not allowed to reft in that degree of conviction which is produced by rational evidence. If the news be in any degree favourable, our belief is augmented by hope beyond its true pitch; and if unfavourable, by fear.

The obfervation holds equally with refpect to future events. If a future event be either much wifhed or dreaded, the mind, to gratify its paffion, never fails to augment the probability beyond truth.

The credit which in all ages has been given to wonders and prodigies, even the most abfurd and ridiculous, is a ftrange phenomenon. Nothing can be more evident than the following propofition, That the more fingular any event is, the more evidence is required. A familiar event daily occurring, being in itself extremely probable, finds ready credit, and therefore is vouched by the slightest evidence. But a strange and rare event, contrary to the course of nature, ought not to be easily believed. It starts up without connection, and without cause, fo far as we can difcover; and to overcome the improbability of fuch an event, the very strongest evidence is required. It is certain, however, that wonders and prodigies are swallowed by the † Act 3. fc. 8.

A&t 2. fc. 6.

the vulgar, upon evidence that would not be fufficient to afcertain the most familiar occurrence. It has been reckoned difficult to explain this irregular bias of the mind. We are now no longer at a lofs about its caufe. The pronenefs we have to gratify our paffions, which difplays itfelf upon fo many occafions, produces this irrational belief. A story of ghosts or fairies, told with an air of gravity and truth, raiseth an emotion of wonder, and perhaps of dread. Thefe emotions tending ftrongly to their own gratification, impofe upon a weak mind, and imprefs upon it a thorough conviction contrary to . all fense and reason.

Opinion and belief are influenced by propenfity as well as by paffion; for the mind is difpofed to gratify both. A natural propenfity is all we have to convince us, that the operations of nature are uniform. Influenced by this propenfity, we often rafhly conceive, that good or bad weather will never have an end; and in natural philofophy, writers, influenced by the fame propenfity, stretch commonly their analogical reasonings beyond just bounds.

Opinion and belief are influenced by affection as well as by propensity. The noted story of a fine lady and a curate viewing the moon through a telefcope is a pleasant illuftration. I perceive, fays the lady, two fhadows inclining to each other, they are certainly two happy lovers. Not at all, replies they curate, they are two steeples of a cathedral.

APPENDIX to part V. Concerning the methods which nature bath afforded for computing time and Space.

Introduce here the fubject propofed, because it affords feveral curious examples of the power of paffion to adjust objects to its gratification; a

leffon

lesson that cannot be too much inculcated, as there is not perhaps another bias in human nature that hath an influence fo univerfal, and that is so apt to make us wander from truth as well as from juftice.

I begin with time; and the queftion fhortly is, What was the measure of time before artificial measures were invented? and, What is the meafure at prefent when these are not at hand? I fpeak not of months and days, which we compute by the moon and fun; but of hours, or in general of the time that runs betwixt any two occurrences when there is not access to the fun. The only natural measure we have, is the train of our thoughts; and we always judge the time to be long or short, in proportion to the number of perceptions that have paffed through the mind during that interval. This is indeed a very imperfect meafure; because in the different conditions of a quick or flow fucceffion, the computation is different. But however imperfect, it is the only meafure by which a perfon naturally calculates time; and this measure is applied on all occafions, without regard to any occafional variation in the rate of fucceffion.

This natural measure of time, imperfect as it is, would however be tolerable, did it labour under no other imperfection than the ordinary variations that happen in the motion of our perceptions. But in many particular circumftances, it is much more fallacious; and in order to explain these diftinctly, I muft analyze the fubject. Time is generally computed at two different periods; one while time is paffing, another after it is past. I fhall confider thefe feparately, with the errors to which each of them is liable. It will be found that thefe errors often produce very different computations of the fame period of time. The computation of time while it is paffing, comes first in order. It is a common and trite obfervation, That to lovers abfence apG

pears

pears immeasurably long, every minute an hour, and every hour a day. The fame computation is made in every cafe where we long for a distant event; as where one is in expectation of good news, or where a profligate heir watches for the death of an old man who keeps him from a great estate. Oppofite to these are inftances not fewer in number. To a criminal the interval betwixt fentence and execution appears miferably fhort; and the fame holds in every cafe where one dreads an approaching event. Of this even a schoolboy can bear witnefs: the hour allowed him for play, moves, in his apprehenfion, with a very swift pace: before he is thoroughly engaged, the hour is gone. A reckoning founded on the number of ideas, will never produce computations fo regularly oppofite to each other; for a flow fucceffion of ideas is not connected with our wishes, nor a quick fucceffion with our fears. What is it then, that, in the cafes mentioned, moves nature to defert her common measure for one very different? I know not that this question ever has been refolved. The falfe reckonings I have suggested are fo common and familiar, that no writer has thought of inquiring for their cause. And indeed, to enter upon this matter at short hand, without preparation, might occafion fome difficulty. But to encounter the difficulty, we luckily are prepared by what is faid above about the power of paffion to fit objects for its gratification. Among the other circumstances that terrify a condemned criminal, the fhort time he has to live is one. Terror, like our other paffions, prone to its gratification, adjufts every one of thefe circumftances to its own tone. It magnifies in particular the fhortness of the interval betwixt the prefent time and that of the execution; and forces upon the criminal a conviction that the hour of his death approaches with a fwift pace. In the fame manner,

among

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