Social Foundations of Limited Dictatorship: Networks and Private Protection During Mexico's Early Industrialization

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Stanford University Press, 2008 - Business & Economics - 246 pages

This innovative new book contributes simultaneously to two different disciplinary fields: comparative political economy and Mexican history. It does so by attempting to explain why Mexico--contrary to the predictions of several dominant theories of economic growth--enjoyed a comparatively high rate of economic growth and development under the highly authoritarian dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911). In conducting a detailed political analysis of Diaz's rule, Armando Razo introduces network analysis to the study of institutions and growth, and shows how dictators can maintain their power with credible growth-enhancing policies.

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Contents

Network Theory of Private Protection
21
Political Institutions and Consolidated Dictatorship
54
Private Policies
80
Copyright

5 other sections not shown

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About the author (2008)

Armando Razo is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. He is the co-author, with Steve Haber and Noel Maurer, of The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929 (2003).

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