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Mr Froude's observations upon the course Disraeli adopted after Russia had renewed the policy which, when confronted by the vacillation and timidity of the Coalition Cabinet, resulted in a deplorable and disastrous war, are more conspicuously Carlylese than any other portion of his book. They are inconsistent with his views upon Lord Aberdeen's policy in 1853-55, and upon Mr Gladstone's policy in 1871. He says in so many words that he preferred the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman empire to the former; while he denounced the imbecility and ingloriousness of the latter. It would appear to result from this, that a firm adherence to the existing treaties of 1856 and 1871, coupled with express notice to Russia of the circumstances which would lead to our armed intervention, would meet with his approval. It was, on his own showing, superior in every way to the vacillation of Lord Aberdeen; it avoided the imbecility and disgrace of submitting to the residue of that treaty, which had been violated in part in 1871, being torn up and flung in our faces in 1876, notwithstanding its ratification five years earlier. The policy of Disraeli, 1876-78, was simple, easily understood, and firmly carried out. It resulted in peace with honour. The basis of it was a loyal adherence to Mr Gladstone's ratifying treaty of 1871-a refusal to allow a great treaty to be a second time in five years trampled upon and disregarded. Mr Froude is extremely indignant at the way in which Russia tore up the Black Sea clauses in 1871; but as to the large remainder of the ratified treaty, he deals with Disraeli's policy as if no such instrument existed. What have we to do

with Russian aggression? he says. The Asiatic subjects of the Queen are 200 millions, the Asiatic subjects of the Czar are 40 millions. The balance of aggression is on our side. The world smiles when we complain of Russian aggression. It was absurd to talk of Turkey as the bulwark of civilisation against barbarism. Disraeli's motives are represented to have been, a knowledge that his party would go with him; that the scum and froth would be on his side ; that the policy was traditional, and supposed to be consistent with English interests; that the Turks had befriended his own race, whilst the Russians had been their bitterest enemies; that he desired to pose as the arbiter of Europe. In all this there is not one word of the treaties-not a syllable as to the disgrace of allowing them a second time to be, as he says, "torn up and flung in our faces"; not a syllable as to the necessity of upholding that ratified treaty of 1871, which formed the sole excuse for Russia being allowed to retire from those clauses which she found to be irksome. The glory and the success of Disraeli's policy consisted in this, that while he abstained from taking any part in the Russo - Turkish war, and kept his country clear of a second Crimean entanglement, he nevertheless compelled Russia to submit her Treaty of San Stefano, which she had extorted from Turkey, to the consideration of the Powers which had signed the He treaties of 1856 and 1871. compelled her to remodel that treaty, and to submit to the arrangements effected in lieu of it by the celebrated Treaty of Berlin. In doing so he vindicated the public law of Europe, and the faith and validity of international treaties. He took precaution for

the future. He planted Austria on the road between Russia and Constantinople. It results that if, and as, the Turkish empire falls to pieces, the inheritance does not necessarily fall to Russia, but that it will be replaced by international arrangements, for which the Berlin Conference forms a binding precedent. The key-note of this policy was not resistance to Russian aggression, or the vindication of the integrity of Turkey. The maintenance of the faith and efficacy of treaties, and the vindication of the public law of Europe against wanton and high-handed violation, were the objects aimed at and the results secured. The detractors from that policy, including Mr Froude, never seem to comprehend that it lies on them to show that any other policy would have been successful without a war as in 1853, or without eternal disgrace as in 1871.

If Mr Froude is inconsistent in his observations upon ministerial policy when regarded from the different periods of the Crimean war, the repudiation of the Black Sea clauses, and the vindication of public treaties by Disraeli, he is not the less so in pronouncing a Carlylese benediction on Mr Gladstone's opposition to Disraeli's powerful and successful vindication of his rival's treaty. 'Mr Gladstone himself was much more consistent. He tried to reproduce in the nation the same divided counsels and vacillating purpose which thirty years previously he had powerfully assisted to effect in Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet. No one has ever heard from Mr Gladstone a word of regret for his course of conduct on either occasion, and on both occasions it was consistent.

But Mr Froude condemns vacillation and indecision on the first occasion,

while he applauds the unsuccessful attempt to introduce them on the second. On the first occasion he sees clearly that the course adopted led to war, but he fails to see that on the second occasion it was only the utter collapse of Mr Gladstone's efforts which enabled us to maintain peace. On Mr Froude's own principles, it would have been far better for Mr Gladstone at the time to have supported Disraeli in a policy which he imperfectly understood, than by opposing and denouncing that policy to repeat the process of this country, saying one thing and appearing to mean another, which Mr Froude (but certainly not Mr Gladstone) says in 1854 led to the Crimean expedition. After all, Mr Froude's chief criticism upon a policy which avoided war, and vindicated the authority and power of this country, is that it was sensational. It seems to us simplicity itself-the maintenance of existing treaties. The only thing sensational about it was that it produced in the minds of every one in England, and of every foreign minister, from Prince Bismark downwards, the unwonted "sensation" that we had, fortunately for us, at a critical time, a man at the head of the British Government who knew his own mind and policy, and was not to be trifled with.

It is in his relation to imperial affairs, whether as Minister or as Opposition leader, that Disraeli's fame will be brightest. Over legislation he exercised all the influence to which the leader of a powerful minority is entitled. But Mr Froude avoids all the details of his parliamentary career. He says that the details of past Parliaments are wearisome and unreal. The arguments used, he says, are insincere. The adulterations of trade pass into Parliament

and become adulterations of human sonal exigencies of Lord Russpeech. A statesman has to defend what he does not approve, and to oppose what he believes to be useful. In the midst of all this spleen against parliamentary life, he does not do justice to Disraeli's parliamentary career, and in that respect the biography is singularly deficient. The most conspicuous feature of that career was his complete mastery of the subject of parliamentary reform. He made

the question his own as completely as it had ever been Lord John Russell's, or as completely as finance has ever belonged to Mr Gladstone, or currency to Sir Robert Peel. He had always been dissatisfied with the Reform Act of 1832, and with the way in which it had been opposed. The result of the Opposition manœuvres at that period was that the Tory party had been deprived of all voice in a great national redistribution of power, and that passion had been evoked to effect a sweeping change, not contemplated by either party in the State. Though the aim of his party was wise government rather than political revolution, Disraeli knew perfectly well that the settlement of 1832 was not and could not be final, and that sooner or later the whole subject would have to be reopened. He refused to follow Peel's example. In place of an uncompromising opposition, he claimed the right of the Tory party to take part, or even to preside over, the passing of a new Reform Bill. By that means delay was ensured; for as the ardour for constitutional change was not fired by unwise resistance, the tenpounders evinced no great hurry to part with the power which they derived from the Act of 1832. When at last the death of Lord Palmerston and the per

VOL. CXLIX.-NO. DCCCCIII.

sell and Mr Gladstone forced the measure to the front, those statesmen discovered to their surprise that though they might render a new Reform Act inevitable, it did not at all follow that they would be allowed to pass it, or even to settle its principles or mould its provisions in a Parliament which they themselves had summoned, and in which they had a majority of seventy. They found that the settlement of the question had passed into the hands and under the control of a man who, to a thorough mastery of his subject, added an unrivalled dexterity as parliamentary leader. The Reform Act of 1867 was Disraeli's foremost achievement in legislation. The principle of payment of rates being the qualification for voting was his own, and in the details of the measure he defeated the Opposition by large majorities.. Thirty-five years had passed since Lord John Russell's Reform Act, and a further measure had become inevitable, from causes and tactics for which Disraeli was not responsible. settlement on the lines which he framed was at least one which was based on an intelligible principle, as distinguished from the policy of granting instalments of indefinite concession, opportunely in the interests of their party, which the Liberals had proposed. What the eventual results of these democratic measures may be (the Act of 1867 was followed in 1884 by applying Disraeli's principle to the counties) no one can foretell.

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Our position is totally different from the state of things in America. There, power is divided and subdivided amongst institutions which all act as checks upon one another, and under penalty of their acts being de

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clared null and void if they exceed their powers. Here, absolute and unlimited power is vested in the constituencies and in the majority of their representatives. There is no limit to the power of Parliament in this country; and the Cabinet, which is practically a committee of that majority, wields a more absolute authority than is reposed in an American President, Senate, and House of Representatives all put together. The fate of the country is at every general election thrown into the caldron, and no one can foretell the result. Mr Froude reechoes the sentiments expressed by Carlyle in his 'Shooting Niagara -and after.' In Carlyle's opinion the English people had gone down the cataract at last. Mr Froude adds, "A quarter of a century has gone by, and the constitution still holds together." No doubt the outlook is an anxious one; more particularly when democratic leaders, instead of openly submitting their measures to public opinion, hide them up their sleeve, confident in nothing but dexterity (alas, how frequently baffled!) of an old parliamentary hand. The best security for the future is that the cleavage between political parties should continue to be, as hitherto, vertical and not lateral, through all classes of the country; and that men of character and station and adequate political knowledge and experience should continue to lead political parties, and not, as in America, abandon the game of politics to professional adven

turers.

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Disraeli's success in carrying the Reform Act of 1867 gave him the premiership at the beginning of 1868. But the immediate political consequence was that it obliged Mr Gladstone and the Liberals to

find another battle-cry for the forthcoming general election. This was the first example of the new mode of approaching the enlarged constituencies. Disraeli had made an audacious move with his household suffrage. Mr Gladstone's counterblast must be louder and more audacious if he was to succeed in exciting the public imagination and gain a parliamentary majority. In an evil hour he chose Ireland for the scene of his operations-a subject he had apparently never studied, and in regard to which he could not refer to any antecedent declaration of his own as vindicating his right to deal with it. But a victorious rival was to be supplanted, and the premiership won. He accordingly let loose an agitation the consequences of which he probably never stopped to consider. Mr Froude, with twenty years' experience of it, describes those consequences as far-reaching and uncertain. He fairly remarks (an observation equally applicable to the present Home Rule policy) that to reverse and undo the policy of centuries was a step which ought not to have been ventured without the national consent.

"The electors knew less of Ireland even than Mr Gladstone himself, who

ought to have made them first understand what it was which they were called on to sanction. But," he adds, we all know with what truth, "these are not times for long reflection. A parliamentary leader sees an opportunity. His followers echo him. Sentiment displaces reason, and a majority is the most conclusive of arguments."

In less than three years the glory of Mr Gladstone's Government was gone, but its measures remained, and they did not pacify Ireland. They only aggravated its discon

tent and stimulated agitation. The state of West Meath became so serious that this great Government actually came to Parliament for a secret committee to consider how the Administration was to be carried on. The policy had failed all round. Disraeli pointed with scorn to his rival's immense majority and utter failure.

"Under his influence," he exclaimed, "and at his instance, we have legal

ised confiscation, we have consecrated sacrilege, we have condoned treason, we have destroyed churches, we have shaken property to its foundations; and now he cannot govern one county without coming to parliamentary committee. The right honourable gentleman, after all his heroic exploits, and at the head of his great majority, is making government ridiculous."

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This last sentence ought to be inscribed on Mr Gladstone's memorial statue: its caustic truth sums

up his whole career, heroic legislation, exuberant verbosity, and

ridiculous and disastrous results.

His total failure both at home and

abroad raised a revulsion of feel

ing in favour of Disraeli, who became the general favourite.

"At a decorous and dignified assembly," says Mr Froude, "where royalties were present, and the chiefs of both political parties, I recollect a burst of emotion when Disraeli rose,

which for several minutes prevented him from speaking; the display of feeling being the more intense the lower the strata which it penetrated, the very waiters whirling their napkins with a passion which I never on any such occasion saw exceeded or equalled."

Shortly after this Disraeli was called to supreme power, at the head of a strong Conservative majority which followed him with enthusiasm and confidence. Mr Gladstone retired from public life, in pique and resentment. The un

fortunate part of this great success was that Disraeli was in his seventieth year, and in his very first session of power was seriously weakened by bronchitis and gout. Later on his whole energies were absorbed by the great Eastern question and the vindication of public law. Mr Froude thinks that he stepped aside out of sheer win the hollow rewards of a coronet perversity to create Jingoism, and and a garter. He insists that Dis

raeli had come into office with a free hand, not hampered by a mandate, and that two unsettled problems were ready to his hand of tion of which he might have rensupreme importance, by the soludered his Ministry memorable. One was to reconstitute Irish administration after the havoc passion had been excited, and Irishwrought by his predecessor. Irish men were being led to believe that internal government required reseparation was in the air. organisation, and its land question Act of 1870, a permanent settlerequired readjustment: after the ment was wanted. The other sub

Its

ject was the relation of the colonies and India to the mother country. He ought to have taken steps to strengthen the bonds of good feeling, and to have reconstructed the colonial empire so as to ensure the In short, he should have had Mr continuance of the imperial system. Froude at his elbow all through his administration. Mr Froude accounts for his neglect of those great questions by suggesting that he was growing old, that he wished to signalise his reign by more dazzling exploits, that he wished to regain for England a higher place in the councils of Europe. So he left Ireland, according to his biographer, to simmer in confusion, and satisfied his zeal for the consolidation of the empire

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