The War of the Rebellion

placed in position in the center of the refused line on the right flank. The enemy resisted these operations of General Osterhaus with some determination.

Deeming it necessary that the left flank of my command should be more fully supported, I directed General Osterhaus to send two regiments to report to General Hazen, commanding Second Division, on the left. At the same time, the two regiments of Osterhaus which covered our right flank were relieved by a brigade of the Sixteenth Corps. At noon the section of artillery, posted within 1,000 yards of the depot, opened with telling effect upon the enemy's troops, although the infantry had not fully completed their extended line. Our position being isolated from the main army and threatening the enemy's communication, we were exposed greatly, and liable to attack at any moment. Considering these facts, I caused my lines to be intrenched with great care, under the supervision of Captain Klostermann, who is one of the most thorough engineer officers I have met in the service. The positions obtained for all the batteries of the corps were the best that could have been selected, and division commanders were very active in their efforts to establish their lines with a view to hold them at all hazards, and inflicting the severest punishment on the enemy should they attack us. At about 3 p. m. August 31 the enemy opened artillery in front of my entire line, keeping up continual fire for about fifteen minutes, when they uncovered their lines and made a sudden and desperate assault on all parts of my line, approaching at points on the left of General Hazen's line (which was the left of my position) within thirty paces. The most determined part of the assault was maintained by General Hazen, the enemy, perhaps, thinking if they could create confusion at that point they could compel my whole line to retire beyond the river. The assault raged severely in front of Harrow and Österhaus, the enemy approaching their lines at the average distance of 50 and 100 paces. The artillery firing of the enemy had prepared my troops for what followed, and when the assault commenced every man was in the trenches and ready for the fray. The most terrible and destructive fire I ever witnessed was directed at the enemy, and in less than one hour he was compelled to retire discomfited and in confusion. The rebel general, Patton Anderson, and his staff, rode fearlessly along his lines in front of the Second Division, and did all that a commander could do to make the assault a success. But few of those who rode with him in that perilous performance of duty returned from the field. Himself, with many of his staff, were seen to fall by the unerring and steady fire of my troops. Prisoners, captured subsequently, state that General Anderson was shot through the abdomen and carried off the field by his troops. I could not help but admire his gallantry, though an enemy. The enemy made two more assaults, but evidently with far less spirit and determination than the first. The withering and destructive fire which they had received in the first onset had dampened their zeal, and destroyed their confidence in being able to defeat us, and they were, consequently, easily repulsed, though not without severe punishment being inflicted on them.

The enemy's loss was greater than in any former engagement, except on the 28th of July, near Atlanta. In front of the Second Division 186 bodies of the enemy were buried between our picketlines. General Hazen captured 99 prisoners, not including 79 wounded, and captured 2 stand of colors. General Hazen esti

mated their wounded at 1,000, though subsequent facts ascertained places it beyond even that. General Harrow reports 56 prisoners captured, not including 60 wounded, and the burial of 12 dead bodies. General Osterhaus estimates their loss in his front at from 400 to 500.

After the enemy had evacuated on the night of the 1st, a staff officer of General Osterhaus discovered, immediately in rear of the point where the most desperate fighting occurred in his front, the graves of 131 bodies, which bore evidence of quite recent interment, and who had evidently been buried with the view to our not discovering them. From the reports of division commanders I do not hesitate to place their loss at 500 killed and from 3,000 to 5,000 wounded, with a loss of 241 prisoners, not including the wounded who fell into our hands. This engagement virtually gave us possession of the railroad at Jonesborough, for it established the fact that our position, within half a mile of the depot and the town, was secure against successful assault. After night-fall the enemy remained quiet. My loss in this engagement was only 154 in killed, wounded, and missing. The enemy's force in the assault was ascertained from prisoners captured to be the corps of Hardee and Lee.

On the 1st of September the Fourteenth Corps being ordered to take position on my left, I was directed to make a demonstration in its favor. I accordingly, at the appointed time, caused all my artillery to open on the intrenched position of the enemy, and made feints at different points on my line as if I intended to assault them in their works. These feints, I think, resulted satisfactorily, as it kept their trenches full in my front, while the Fourteenth Corps charged the enemy on my left. These demonstrations often, through the day, resulted in slight actions, which in every instance resulted in our favor. On the night of the 1st of September the enemy evacuated their position. At daydawn on the morning of the 2d, such had been their watchfulness, the pickets were in the town and skirmishing with those of the enemy just moving out. A great many stragglers from the enemy were picked up and sent to our rear. Receiving orders to move forward on a road leading by the right of the railroad, I placed Harrow's division in advance, and pursued the enemy, with constant skirmishing, five miles to their intrenched position around Lovejoy's Station, and took position on the most elevated ground in the enemy's front, only about from 300 to 500 yards from what appeared their main line, and intrenched Harrow's division on the right and Osterhaus' on the left, keeping Hazen's in reserve. This position was maintained until the night of the 5th, when, in pursuance of Special Field Orders, Nos. 116 and 118, from department headquarters, I withdrew from the position at 8 p. m., and returned that night to my old position at Jonesborough, where I remained until 7 a. m. September 7, when I again withdrew and moved to the vicinity of Morrow's Mill, and there occupied the works the enemy had previously constructed. From this position, at 8 a. m. September 8, I started for East Point, the present place of encampment, where I arrived about 11 a. m. of the same day, and went into position, placing Osterhaus' division on the right, Hazen in the center, and Harrow on the left, connecting on the right with the Left Wing of the Sixteenth Army Corps, covering the Macon railroad. The officers and soldiers of my command have performed the duties of the campaign willingly and earnestly; in no instance has a disposition other than to face the enemy been exhibited. Many of

my officers have during the campaign fully earned promotion, some of them have already obtained it, viz, General Osterhaus and General Walcutt, both heretofore mentioned. My staff officers, one and all, did their duty, and have my hearty thanks for their co-operation and zeal in assisting me to perform all the duties of the campaign. I estimate the loss of the enemy in this campaign caused by my command at about 3,000 killed and 15,000 wounded. We have captured from the enemy 2,030 prisoners, 420 wounded, and received 210 deserters; aggregate, 2,660; 11 stand of colors and about 5,000 stand of small-arms. My losses, including those had in skirmishes and picket advances not mentioned in the body of this report, as shown by the nominal lists accompanying this report, are 650 killed, 3,538 wounded, 633 missing; aggregate, 4,824. It is impossible in this report, covering so much time and so many engagements, to speak of individual acts of heroism and bravery, for they were many and frequent. I respectfully call your attention to the nominal lists of casualties of each division, and the reports of division commanders herewith inclosed; also the maps drawn by Captain Klostermann, which exhibit the different situations of my troops in all the engagements with the enemy, and the route traveled. The report of my chief of artillery is also inclosed with the report of my signal detachment, which is commanded by Lieutenant Edge, as brave an officer as is borne on the rolls of the American Army. He was always prompt and obedient to orders, and in every advance secured the most prominent position from which he could view the movements of the enemy, notwithstanding the danger incurred. His reports often served me to operate successfully against the enemy with precision, when otherwise I might have been in doubt. I desire to call the attention of the Government to the meritorious services of Brig. Gen. C. R. Woods, Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith, Brig. Gen. William Harrow, Brig. Gen. Giles A. Smith, and Brig. Gen. W. B. Hazen, and respectfully recommend their promotion. For the recommendation of officers below the grade of brigadier-general for promotion, I invite attention to the reports of division commanders, which are approved by me.

The whole distance marched by my command is 387 miles, as shown by the maps herewith inclosed, not including the separate marches of detached divisions, which added, make 600 miles. It has rendered unfit for service of the enemy nearly 20,000 men-according to just estimates, 6,000 more than the entire strength of my command when it entered upon the campaign.

The medical officers serving on my staff, Surg. E. O. F. Roler, medical director, and Surg. John M. Woodworth, medical inspector, were unremitting in their efforts to secure the comfort of the wounded and to cause their wounds to be healed so that they might return to duty. A just estimate of their services may be had from the fact that over 1,000 wounded men were returned to duty before the conclusion of the campaign. The duties and business arising in the adjutant-general's department were faithfully and efficiently performed under the direction of Lieut. Col. R. R. Townes, assistant adjutant-general of the corps, and by Captains Whitehead and Wheeler, assistant adjutants-general; Majors Stolbrand, Waterhouse, and Maurice, who acted as chiefs of artillery, respectively-Stolbrand, until captured by the enemy (heretofore mentioned), Waterhouse, until relieved on the 25th of June, Maurice from that date

*All to appear in the Atlas.

until the close of the campaign-fully and efficiently performed the duties assigned them. Maj. Frank C. Gillette, provost-marshal, in addition to the duties of his office, which, upon such a campaign as the past, where prisoners are daily to be cared for, performed duty as an aide-de-camp. Capt. L. E. Yorke performed treble duty of commissary of musters, acting assistant inspector-general, and aidede-camp, and performed them all in such a manner as to leave no room for criticism. Upon Lieut. L. B. Mitchell devolved one of the most important duties that rested upon any officer of the command, that of keeping the command supplied with ammunition. His duty was performed fully and to my entire satisfaction. At no time did he allow the supply to fall below 140 rounds per man of small-arm ammunition, and 200 rounds per gun of artillery ammunition. My personal aides, Maj. John R. Hotaling, Capt. John S. Hoover, Capt. W. B. Pratt, and Captain Cunningham, performed all the duties, both night and day, with a fearlessness and zeal which elicited my hearty commendation, often exposing themselves where duty called them to the most imminent danger. Lieut. Col. J. Condit Smith, chief quartermaster, until he retired from the service on the 30th day of June, performed the duties of his department completely. He was succeeded by Capt. C. F. Emery, who supplied the command with all it needed promptly and efficiently, and soon entitled himself to my confidence. Lieut. Col. Charles A. Morton, chief commissary of subsistence, and Capt. W. A. McLean, assistant chief commissary, never at any time allowed the command to be fed on half rations, but kept full rations always in the hands of division commissaries. Fresh beef was furnished by them as often as necessary. Captain Klostermann, my chief engineer, was untiring in his efforts. to establish systematic lines, both offensive and defensive, to select those most favorable for occupation, and, upon the march, to establish good and practicable routes. He is a most worthy and efficient officer. Lieut. William H. Barlow, acting assistant quartermaster at headquarters, performed every duty assigned him with a promptness which proved efficiency.

Please find accompanying this report the reports of division commanders and lists of casualties, with reports from Major Maurice, chief of artillery, and Lieutenant Edge, chief signal officer, and maps and plans by Captain Klosterman, chief engineer.

JOHN A. LOGAN, Major-General, Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.

Lieut. Col. WILLIAM T. CLARK,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Dept. and Army of the Tennessee.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,

East Point, Ga., September 13, 1864.

I have the honor to recommend for promotion to the rank of brigadier-generals of volunteers the following-named officers, for gallant and meritorious services in the field during this campaign : Col. John M. Oliver, Fifteenth Michigan Volunteer Infantry; Čol. Hugo Wangelin, Twelfth Missouri Volunteer Infantry: Col. Theodore Jones, Thirtieth Ohio Volunteer Infantry; Col. James A. Williamson, Fourth Iowa Volunteer Infantry; Col. William B. Woods, Seventy-sixth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

JOHN A. LOGAN, Major-General, Commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.