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exist till the object have once at least been presented. It is no less clearly distinguishable from paffion, which, depending on the real or ideal presence of its object, vanishes with its object : whereas affcction is a lasting connection; and, like other connections, fubfifts even when we do not think of the perfon. A familiar example will clear the whole. I have from nature a disposition to gratitude, which, through want of an object, happens never to be exerted; and which therefore is unknown even to myself. Another who has the same disposition, meets with a kindly office which makes him grateful to his benefactor : an intimate connection is formed between them, termed affection, which, like other connections, has a permanent existence, though not always in view. The affection for the most part lies dormant, till an opportunity offer for exerting it : in that circumilance it is converted into the passion of gratitude ; and the opportunity is greedily seized of testifying gratitude in the warmest manner.
32. Aversion, I think, is opposed to affection ; not to desire, as it commonly is. We have an affection to one person ; we have an averfion to another : the former disposes us to do good to its object, the latter to do ill.
33. What is a sentiment ? It is not a perception ; for a perception fignifies the act by which we become conscious of external objects. It is not consciousness of an internal action, such as thinking, suspending thought, inclining, resolving, willing, &c. Neither is it the conception of a relation among objects; a conception of that kind being termed opinion. The term sentiment is appropriated to such thoughts as are prompted by pailion.
34. Attention is that state of mind which prepares one to receive impressions. According to the degree of attention, objects make a strong or weak impres
fion. Attention is requisite even to the simple act
Mourning Bride, acl 5. sc. 8. And hence it is, that an obje& feen at the terminas tion of a confined view, is more agreeable than when leen in a group with the surrounding objects :
The cro v doth fing as swectly as the lark
* Bacon, in his Natural Histor", snakes the following observations, Sunds are meliora ed by the intention of the lenle, where the common finie i colleaed most to the particular sense of hearing and he fighe fufpend. d. Therefore s unds are sweeter, as well as greater, in the night than in the day; and I fuppose they are sweeter to blind men than to olliers : and it is manifon, thar between sleeping and waking, when all the ten'es are bound and suspended, muls issur füccer than when one iş fully waking.
The nightingale, if the should fing by day,
Merchant of Venice.
35. In matters of flight importance, attention is mostly directed by will ; and for that reason, it is our own fault if thifing objects make any deep impression. Had we power equally to withhold our attention from matters of importance, we might be proof against any deep impression. But our power fails us here : an interesting object seizes and fixes the attention beyond the pollibility of control ; and while our attention is thus forcibly attached to one object, others may folicit for admittance ; but in vain, for they will not be regarded. Thus a small misfortune is scarce felt in presence of a greater :
Lear. Thou think'st 'tis much, that this contentious
36. Genus, Species, modification, are terms invented to distinguish beings from each other. Individuals are distinguished by their qualities : a number of individuals considered with respect to qualities that dif. tinguish them from others, is termed a species : a p!urality of species considered with respect to their distir. guishing qualities, is termed a genus. That quality which distinguisheth one genus, one species, or even one individual, from another, is termed a modifica. #1.12 ; thus the fame particular that is termed a prope
erty or quality when considered as belonging to an individual, or a class of individuals, is termed a modification when considered as distinguishing the individual or the class from another : a black skin and foft curled hair, are properties of a negro : the same circumstances considered as marks that distinguish a negro from a man of a different species, are denominated modifications.
37. Objects of sight, being complex, are distin. guishable into the several particulars that enter into the composition : these objects are all of them coloured ; and they all have length, breadth, and thickness. When I behold a spreading oak, I distinguish. in that object, size, figure, colour,
colour, and sometimes motion : in a flowing river I distinguish colour, figure, and constant motion ; a dye has colour, black spots, six plain surfaces, all equal and uniform. Objects of touch have all of them extension : some of them are felt rough, some smooth : some of them are hard, some foft. With respect to the other senses, some of their objects are simple, some complex : a found, a taste, a smell, may be so fimple as not to be distinguishable into parts : others are perceived to be compounded of different sounds, different tastes, and different smells.
38. The eye at one look can grasp a number of objects, as of trees in a field, or menin a crowd: these objects having each a separate and independent existencc,, are distinguishable in the mind, as well as in reality; and there is nothing more easy than to abstract from some and to confine our contemplation to others. A large oak with its spreading branches fixes our attention upon itself, and abstract us from the fhrubs that surround it. In the same manner, with respect to compound sounds, tastes, or smells, we can fix our thoughts upon any one of the component parts, abstracting our attention from the rest. The
of abstraction is not confined to objects that are feparable in reality as well as mentally ; but also takes place where there can be no real separation : the size, the figure, the colour of a tree, are inseparably connected, and have no independent existence; the fame of length, breadth, and thickness : and yet we can mentally confine our observations to one of these, abftracting from the rest. Here abstraction takes place where there cannot be a real separation.
39. Space and time have occafioned much metaphysical jargon ; but after the power of abstraction is explained as above, there remains no difficulty about them. It is mentioned above, that space as well as place enter into the perception of every visible object : a tree is perceived as existing in a certain place, and as occupying a certain space. Now, by the power of abstraction, space may be considered abstractedly from the body that occupies it; and hence the abstract term space. In the same manner, existence may be confidered abstractedly from any particular thing that exists ; and place may be confidered abitractedly from any particular thing that may be in it. Every feries or succession of tħings, suggests the idea of time; and time may be considered abstractedly from any series of succession. In the fame manner, we acquire the abstract term motion, rest, number, and a thousand other abstract terms ; an excellent contrivance for improving speech, as without it speech would be wofully imperfect. Brute animals may have some obscure notion of these circumstances, as connected with particular objects : an ox probably perceives that he takes longer time to go round a long ridge in the plough, than a short one ; and he probably perceives when he is one of four in the yoke, or only one of two.
But the power of abstraction is not bestowed on brute animals ; because to them it would be altogether uleless, as they are incapable of speech.