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exift till the object have once at leaft been prefented. It is no lefs clearly diftinguishable from paffion, which, depending on the real or ideal prefence of its object, vanishes with its object: whereas affection is a lafting connection; and, like other connections, fubfifts even when we do not think of the perfon. A familiar example will clear the whole. I have from nature a difpofition to gratitude, which, through want of an object, happens never to be exerted; and which therefore is unknown even to myfelf. Another who has the fame difpofition, meets with a kindly office which makes him grateful to his benefactor: an intimate connection is formed between them, termed affection, which, like other connections, has a permanent existence, though not always in view. The affection for the most part lies dormant, till an opportunity offer for exerting it in that circumitance it is converted into the paffion of gratitude; and the opportunity is greedily feized of testifying gratitude in the warmest manner.


32. Averfion, I think, is oppofed to affection; not to defire, as it commonly is. We have an affection to one perfon; we have an averfion to another: the former difpofes us to do good to its object, the latter to do ill.

33. What is a fentiment? It is not a perception; for a perception fignifies the act by which we become confcious of external objects. It is not confcioufnefs of an internal action, fuch as thinking, fufpending thought, inclining, refolving, willing, &c. Neither is it the conception of a relation among objects; a conception of that kind being termed opinion. term fentiment is appropriated to fuch thoughts as are prompted by paflion.


34 Attention is that ftate of mind which prepares one to receive impreffions. According to the degree of attention, objects make a strong or weak impref

fion. Attention is requifite even to the fimple act of feeing the eye can take in a confiderable field at one look: but no object in the field is feen dif tinctly, but that Gingly, which fixes the atten. tion in a profound reverie that totally occupies the attention, we fcarce fee what is directly before us. In a train of perceptions, the attention being divided among various objects, no particular object makes fuch a gure as it would do fingle and apart, Hence, the filinefs of night contributes to terror, there being nothing to divert the attention :

Horror ubique animos, fimul ipfa filentia terrent.

Eneid, ii,

Zara. Silence and folitude are ev'ry where !
Through all the gloomy ways and iron doors
That hither lead, nor human face nor voice
Is feen or heard. A dreadful din was wont
To grate the fenfe, when enter'd here from groans,
And howls of flaves condemn'd, from clink of chains,
And crash of rusty bars and creaking hinges;

And ever and anon the fight was dath'd
With frightful faces and the meagre looks
Of grim and ghally executioners.
Yet more this illness terrifies my foul
Than did that fcene of complicated horrors.
Mourning Bride, aft 5. fc. 8.

And hence it is, that an object feen at the termina, tion of a confined view, is more agreeable than when leen in a group with the furrounding objects:

The crow doth fing as fweetly as the lark
When neither is attended; and, I think,


Bacon, in his Natural Hiftor, makes the following obfervations, $, unds are meliora ed by the intention of the fenfe, where the common Jeniei collected most to the particular fenfe of hearing and the fight fufpended. Therefore funds are fweeter, as well as greater, in the night than in the day; and I fuppofe they are fweeter to blind men than to others and it is manifeft, that between fleeping and waking, when all the fenfes are bound and fufpended, mufic is far fweeter than when one is fully waking.

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The nightingale, it fhe fhould fing by day,
When ev'ry goofe is cackling, would be thought
No better a musician than the wren.

Merchant of Venice.

35. In matters of flight importance, attention is moftly directed by will; and for that reason, it is our own fault if trifling objects make any deep impreffion. Had we power equally to withhold our attention from matters of importance, we might be proof against any deep impreffion. But our power fails us here: an interefting object feizes and fixes the attention beyond the poffibility of control; and while our attention is thus forcibly attached to one object, others may folicit for admittance; but in vain, for they will not be regarded. Thus a fmall misfortune is scarce felt in prefence of a greater :

Lear. Thou think'ft 'tis much, that this contentious ftorm

Invades us to the fkin; fo 'tis to thee;
But where the greater malady is fix'd,

The leffer is fearce felt. Thou'dit fhun a bear;

But if thy flight lay tow'rd the roaring fea,

Thou'dit meet the bear i' th' mouth. When the mind's


The body's delicate the tempeft in my mind
Doth from my fenfes take all feeling elfe,
Save what beats there.

King Lear, a&t 3. fc. 5.

36. Genus, fpecies, modification, are terms invented to diftinguish beings from each other. Individuals are diftinguifhed by their qualities: a number of individuals confidered with refpect to qualities that dif tinguish them from others, is termed a fpecies a plu rality of fpecies confidered with refpect to their diftin. guifhing qualities, is termed a genus. That quality which diftinguifheth one genus, one fpecies, or even one individual, from another, is termed a modifica tion thus the fame particular that is termed a prop erty

erty or quality when confidered as belonging to an individual, or a clafs of individuals, is termed a modifi cation when confidered as diftinguishing the individual or the clafs from another: a black fkin and foft. curled hair, are properties of a negro: the fame circumstances confidered as marks that diftinguish a negro from a man of a different fpecies, are denominated modifications.

37. Objects of fight, being complex, are diftinguishable into the feveral particulars that enter into the compofition: thefe objects are all of them coloured; and they all have length, breadth, and thicknefs. When I behold a fpreading oak, I distinguish. in that object, fize, figure, colour, and fometimes motion in a flowing river I diftinguish colour, figure, and conftant motion; a dye has colour, black fpots, fix plain furfaces, all equal and uniform. Objects of touch have all of them extenfion: fome of them are felt rough, fome fmooth: fome of them are hard, fome foft. With refpect to the other fenfes, fome of their objects are fimple, fome complex: a found, a tafte, a smell, may be fo fimple as not to be diftinguifhable into parts others are perceived to be compounded of different founds, different taftes, and different fmells.

38. The eye at one look can grafp a number of objects, as of trees in a field, or men in a crowd: thefe objects having each a feparate and independent exiftence,. are diftinguishable in the mind, as well as in reality; and there is nothing more cafy than to abftract from fome and to confine our contemplation to others. A large oak with its fpreading branches fixes our attention upon itself, and abftract us from the fhrubs that furround it. In the fame manner, with refpect to compound founds, taftes, or fmells, we can fix our thoughts upon any one of the component parts, abftracting our attention from the reft. The power of

of abstraction is not confined to objects that are feparable in reality as well as mentally; but also takes place where there can be no real feparation: the fize, the figure, the colour of a tree, are infeparably connected, and have no independent exiftence; the fame of length, breadth, and thickness: and yet we can mentally confine our obfervations to one of thefe, abftracting from the reft. Here abftraction takes place where there cannot be a real feparation.

39. Space and time have occafioned much metaphyfical jargon; but after the power of abstraction is explained as above, there remains no difficulty about them. It is mentioned above, that fpace as well as place enter into the perception of every vifible object: a tree is perceived as exifting in a certain place, and as occupying a certain fpace. Now, by the power of abftraction, fpace may be confidered abftractedly from the body that occupies it; and hence the abstract term fpaze. In the fame manner, existence may be confidered abftractedly from any particular thing that exifts; and place may be confidered abstractedly from any particular thing that may be in it. Every feries or fucceffion of things, fuggefts the idea of time; and time may be confidered abftractedly from any feries of fucceffion. In the fame manner, we acquire the abftract term motion, reft, number, and a thousand other abstract terms; an excellent contrivance for improving fpeech, as without it fpeech would be wofully imperfect. Brute animals may have fome obfcure notion of thefe circumftances, as connected with particular objects: an ox probably perceives that he takes longer time to go round a long ridge in the plough, than a fhort one; and he probably perceives when he is one of four in the yoke, or only one of two. But the power of abftraction is not beflowed on brute animals; because to them it would be altogether ufelefs, as they are incapable of fpecch.

40. This

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