ing hope, and conducts the soul, by way of the cross, to immortality and eternal life. This dispensation of atonement is manifested through Christ, for the reconciliation of all things to God, in his glorious kingdom of holiness and happiness.

In this general view of atonement, we come to our last inquiry proposed in this treatise, viz.

The Consequences of Atonement to Mankind.

In this last inquiry, we must be a little more lengthy, than in either of the former, but we hope not too tedious. What we shall contend for, as the consequences of atonement, is the universal holiness and happiness of mankind, in the final issue of the Redeemer's process.

Before we proceed to notice the direct proofs of the doctrine of the final holiness and happiness of all men, we shall notice some opposing doctrines and arguments, and endeavour to obviate them by scripture and reason.

The first that we notice, is found in a proposition frequently stated, by modern divines, thus, "God, in the great and infinite plan of moral government, consults the greatest possible good to the whole system; and in order for the greatest possible happiness to be produced, it was necessary, that some of Gods rational creatures should be eternally miserable: Agreeably to which, all men cannot be saved." This is the only ground, on which an objection can be stated against universal holiness and happiness, while we admit the existence of an Infinite Supreme.

We cannot go into an examination of any authorities, on which the above statement is supposed to

stand; for we know of none: All we can do, is to examine the statement itself. It is argued, agreeably to this proposition, that the infinite and inconceivable miseries of the wicked, in the world to come, will enhance the happiness of the glorified in heaven.

Against these statements we argue, if, in order for the greatest possible happiness to exist, the greatest possible misery must, also exist, we wish to reverse the subject: Then the proposition would stand thus, in order for the greatest possible evil to exist, the greatest possible good must exist. Then, if God, in his universal plan, has produced as much good as was possible, he has also produced as much evil as possible, which renders the statement that he consulted the greatest possible evil, as just, as that he consulted the greatest possible good. Of course, there is no more propriety in calling him good, than there is in calling him bad!

If it be said we carry this evil, or misery, too far, even beyond our opponent's meaning, we will endeavor to show him, according to his own statement, that we do not. He says, every degree of misery in hell, will produce many degrees of happinesss in heaven; if so, if the wretched be not made as miserable as possible, the blessed cannot be made as happy as possible; if they are not made as happy as possible, they must experience some want; and, of course, some misery themselves. On the other hand, if the wretched be not as miserable as possible, they must have in posses sion some remaining convenience: Then, neither the greatest possible happiness, nor the greatest possible misery is produced.

Almighty God being put to the necessity of making some of his rational offspring eternally miserable, in

order to make the rest forever happy, may be represented by a parent who has ten children; but only provisions enough to preserve the lives of five until he can get more. In this awful dilemma, he sits down to consult the greatest possible good; says to himself, if I divide my provisions equally among my children, all must surely starve to death; but by neglecting five, I can save the lives of the other five, which he finally concludes to do. But we ask the rational, we petition the reasonable, we request the impartial to guess the feelings of a father, on such an occasion! Before him, are ten children, all in the image of himself; he sees his own eyes roll in their heads, hears his own voice on their tongues, while his own blood frolics through their veins; how could he make the division? how could he decide on one, for a victim? Would he not rather give his own flesh to be their meat, and his own blood to be their drink, and fervently pray for plenty! But is the Almighty poor? Has he not enough and to spare? When the prodigal came home, did the father turn away his brother, so that he might have a plenty for him? Is there not fulness enough in God to satisfy the wants of all his creatures? Why the necessity then, of making some miserable eternally? Our opponent will say, the blessed are happified, in consequence of the misery of the wretched. But what reason can be given for such an idea? How do we look on a person, in this world, who manifests joy and happiness in the misery of one of his fellow creatures? Do we say, he manifests a godlike disposition? Surely, no. From whence came charity; from heaven. If souls in heaven possess it, they cannot be happy, in consequence of the misery of any rational being.

Again, if a soul in heaven derive happiness, from

seeing, say one half, or two thirds, of the human race in misery, would he not yet enjoy more, providing the whole, except himself, were in the same torment? If it be granted that he would, then, in order for a soul to be made as happy as possible, the whole human race, except that one, must be endlessly as miserable as possible! If it be argued, that it is not the number or multitudes of individuals who are made miserable, that thus constitutes or enhances the happiness of the blessed, but that it is the nature, justice and intenseness of this misery, which is necessary for the above purpose, it makes it very plain, that the eternal misery of one would produce as much good, as of ten thousand or more.

We have now got so far, even on our opponent's ground, as to see, that there is no need of more than one soul's being endlessly miserable; and it still further appears to me, that the misery of one may be dispensed with, without departing from what my opponent has acknowledged; and that, by letting each individual of the human race, for a moment, or any limited time, experience the nature of the misery contended for; and then giving them a memory to retain it fresh in mind forever; this must of necessity produce the effect as well, and without the expense of a single soul. We do not think it would absolutely require omniscient wisdom to concert a better plan than the one we are opposing.

Suppose we alter the circumstance of the father and his ten children: Suppose the father has provisions enough for the whole, and his object, in the bestowing of it upon them, is to cause the greatest possible happinesss among his children. Which way would good sense and parental affection choose, either to feed five

to the full, and starve the rest to death, that their dying groans might give the others a better appetite, and their food a good relish, or to let them all be hungry enough to relish their food well, and all alike partake of it?

We will take notice of a certain passage of scripture in this place, which some have endeavored to accommodate to the argument which we are disputing; see Rev. xiv. 10, 11. "The same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation; and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever: and they have no rest day nor night who worship the beast and his image, and whosoever receiveth the mark of his name." It is not because we are afraid of wounding this beast, or of affronting its rider, that we do not enter into a particular explanation of the passage recited; but because it deserves the labor of more time than we have now to spare. However, the idea of my opponent is easily refuted; and this is as much as the reader ought to expect, in this work. The common idea is, that the punishment here spoken of, is altogether in eternity, and not in this world of mortality; that it being in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb, it indicates that it affords pleasure in those heavenly mansions where they dwell.

First, we request the reader to observe, that the verbs, ascendeth, have, worship, and receiveth, are all in the same tense, which at least favors the idea, that the sulphurous smoke of this torment ascendeth up, at the same time that the tormented worship the beast.