be proved, by a train of undoubted propofitions, each of them ranged in a proper order, and connected with one another, which is termed demonftration; then we do not call that faith, but knowlege. If there be only probable arguments for the truth of any propofition, we call that opinion. If a propofition is fupported by credible teftimony, the affent to that is properly called faith. If it be the teftimony of man, it is human faith; if it be the teftimony of God, it is divine faith.

But, in all these cafes, it is impoffible to affent to that, of which we have no ideas. For that would be to believe we know not what. And, if we have credible testimony, or fome other good arguments, then we have a reafon for believing; otherwise we believe we know not why. And we ought, in all fuch cafes, to fufpend our belief, or withhold our affent.

Pyrrho faid, I think I clearly apprehend your meaning, which I would expreffe in mine own way; and I defire you would fet me right; if, in any particular, I have mistaken you.

There are two parts in every propofition, a fubject and a predicate; which are united in an affirmative, or feparated in a negative, propofition. Now we must have the ideas affixed to the words, which expreffe the subject, and the predicate; or understand the

Subject;

fubject; and what is affirmed, or denied, concerning that fubject. And we muft, likewife, have the teftimony of God, or of fome credible perfon, for joining those two ideas together, in an affirmative propofition; or separating them in a negative propofition. And, without understanding the words, and having that, or fome other, reafon, for affenting to the propofition which they expreffe, we can neither understand, nor believe any thing about them.

Theophilus acknowleged, that Pyrrho had fpoken exactly agreeable to his fentiments, on this fubject.

But Pyrrho was a man given to argue on all fides; in order to have a full view of the fubject, or to fee what could be alleged for, or against, any opinion. He therefore, told Theophilus, that the matter muft not drop thus. For, though they feemed to be agreed; there were several, who would not fall in fo readily with their conclufion; and therefore he defired they might further debate the matter. Theophilus afked him what he had to fay against a thing, which feemed fo plane and obvious?

Pyrrho answered, that he had often heard divines fay, that, in Scripture, feveral doctrines are reprefented as myfteries; and that feemed inconfiftent with the notion now advanced, viz. that we must understand things before we can believe them.

Theophilus,

Theophilus, with great coolneffe, faid, I acknowlege freely that the New Teftament often fpeaks of myfteries; but then that world, in Scripture, never fignifies what is incomprehenfible, or unintelligible.

I have carefully examined the sense of the word [mystery,] in all the places, where it is ufed, in the New Teftament. And I am well satisfied, it never fignifies an unintelligible truth; but a fact, which was formerly a fecret, but is now made known. And, when made known, it is very plane and easy to be understood. Accordingly, the apostle speaks of a very plane and intelligible fact; when he declares, that the Chriftians, who fhall be "found alive at Chrift's fecond coming, shall "not die; but be fuddenly changed into im"mortal, without dying." And, in delivering that truth, he fais, Behold, I show you a mystery. And, in other places, the fame apoftle talks of making known the mystery of the gospel. The truth of the cafe is, the Gofpel is not an hiden, but a reveled myftery; made known to the world, to inlighten their understandings, to lead them to the practice of univerfal righteoufneffe; and thereby, to their true dignity, perfection and happineffe.

In the next place, Pyrrho alleged, that Divines had often afferted, "that we may, "and ought to, believe things above reafon, though not contrary to it." Theophilus

Theophilus replied, that there were two fenses, in which this propofition may be interpreted. The one is, that faith, or what is reveled as the object of faith, contains fome things which human reafon alone, and of itfelf, could not have found out; but if known, at all, must be difcovered by revelation. For inftance," that men are to be raised from "the dead; that Jefus Chrift is to judge the "world." And in this fenfe, I fuppofe, all, who acknowlege divine revelation, are agreed, that fome of the objects of faith are above human reafon; or (in other words) that there are fome things difcovered in the Bible, which could not have been known to men, unleffe they had been communicated by divine revelation.

But there is another fenfe, in which faith has, by fome, been affirmed to be above reafon; viz. that men may, and ought to, believe things, which they cannot understand, or comprehend. And, in this fenfe, I look upon the affertion to be groundleffe and falfe: And that, in this fenfe, Faith can no more be above reason, than it can be contrary to it.

Pyrrho proceded, in his objections, and faid, There are numberleffe things, which excede our capacity; or which are unintelligible and incomprehenfible to us, at least in the prefent ftate; and yet we firmly believe them; though we do not understand them; and therefore it is plane we may believe things which we do not understand.

Theophilus

Theophilus defired Pyrrho to name one of those many propofitions, which he believed, though he did not understand it.

Pyrrho replied that, as to giving an account of his own faith, he defired to be excufed; and that he was not a Divine, fufficiently learned and profound, readily to mention fuch a propofition. He intimated further, that he was reprefenting the sentiments of others; and that he had frequently met with this objection.

Theophilus acknowleged that there are many things, which we do not understand. But then (fais he) as long as we do not underftand them, they are the objects, not of our faith, but of our ignorance. For, as long as we understand them not, the affenting to them, is, in effect, affenting to nothing; and that is, in reality, no affent at all.

Well but, Theophilus, (faid Pyrrho) will you not allow that there are many things, which we actually and firmly believe; though we cannot comprehend how they are effected; or do not understand the mode, or manner, of their existence, with all their relations, connections, and circumftances? For instance, we believe that God made the world; though we do not know how he made it. We believe that the foul and body of man are united, and mutually influence one another; though we do not know how they are united, or how body and fpirit can have

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