the nobleft means of virtue. To make ufe of the best means to promote virtue, is in itfelf a virtue; and he, who is most virtuous, is the most beloved by the Deity, and may reasonably expect the greateft favor; if not in this prefent world; yet in the future ftate of recompence.

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This, however, ought carefully to be attended to, that a man, continuing in vice, cannot, with any reafon, hope that his prayers will have any influence upon the Deity, as long as they have none upon his own mind and manners.

IV. As to all the things men pray for, fome of them providence infpects; others fate renders neceffary; fome fortune changes; and others art manages, &c.]

As to fate and fortune, they are in reality nothing; that is, no real beings, or fuperintending powers. For fuppofe, by fate, we understand the orderly and regular course of things: That is nothing but what God has fetled in creation, and continues by his providence. It is not like the fate of the beathens, to which Jupiter himself, the fupreme God, was fubject, and which he could not alter. Such a fate, as they imagined, has no exiftence; and, therefore, nothing ought to be ascribed to it. As to fortune; if, by that, we mean fucceffe, or an injoyment of the bleffings of this life; that flows from the divine benignity, and not from any fuch blind, H 4

or

or capricious, principle; as they have reprefented fortune to be. And, as to chance, the parent of fortune, it either stands for a mere idea, or it is a word without any meaning. If it be used for any thing's happening without a cause, it is an idle and groundleffe notion, or a word without any meaning. For nothing (no effect whatsoever) happens, or can happen, without a proper and adæquate cause. But if, by chance, we mean that something comes to paffe, the caufe of which we are ignorant of, or that it is to us an unexpected and unforeseen event, then chance stands for a mere idea, and is used (not to intimate that the thing had no caufe, but) merely to expreffe our ignorance and furprize. It is not any real being, agent, or fuperintending principle; and therefore no more ought to be ascribed to it than to fate; nor has human life any concern with either of them.

As to the other two [viz. the providence of God, and the art and industry of man] they are to be joined together, and ought never to be separated; that is, we are to use our understandings and best indeavors for the acquiring what we want, and look up to the providence of God for fucceffe and a bleffing. For whatever advantages I obtain by my own free indeavors, and right ufe of those powers and faculties I have, I look upon "them to be as much the effects of God's pro"dence and government, as if they were given

66 me

" me immediately by him, without my acting; as he is the author of my being; and "all my powers and faculties (whatever they "are) depend upon him, and are as it were "inftruments of his providence to me, in re

spect of fuch things as may be procured by " them "". And, therefore, the art of man ought by no means to exclude the providence of God; much leffe ought we to pray to art, as if it were fome intelligent principle, or fuperintending power.

V. But the phyfician understands the reason of these things, and regards not the particular members, when they pray, but preferves the whole. This is his care.]

What he has faid above, when he compares God to the general of an army, who will not place any man in an improper ftation; and what he fais here, when he compares him to a wife phyfician, who takes care of the whole, though to the deftruction of some of the leffer parts; - is very fine, and exceding juft; but no argument at all against prayer. For we ought always to pray with fubmiffion to the wisdom of the Deity; and for fucceffe, only as far as it is confiftent with the good of the whole. But furely, it will be most for the good of the whole rational creation, that the virtuous should be finally happy: and prayer is a noble mean to promote virtue, and

• Mr. Woollafton's Religion of nature delineated, &c.

and confequently to prepare men for the higheft and moft perfect happineffe.

VI. But, fuppofe God regards particular things; even then we ought not to pray.]

This philofopher feems to have been dubious about a particular providence; but can there be a general providence, without regarding particular things? Is not the whole made up of the feveral parts? And how can he regard the whole, who attends not to particulars? Befides, upon little and feemingly inconfiderable things, fome of the greatest events depend. And, therefore, to affert that the providence of God is not extended to particular things, is in effect to take the government of the world out of his hands. However, whether a general, or a particular providence be maintained, Providence is an argument for praying, not against it. For, "in many "cafes, the order of events, proceding from "the fetlement of nature, may be as compatible with the due and reasonable fuc

ceffe of my indeavors and prayers (as incon"fiderable a part of the world as I am) as "with any other thing, or phænomenon, how

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great foever." In other cafes, interpofitions may be fuppofed, though I think the plan of providence requires them very feldom. But where neither of thefe will exactly fute the particular cafes of virtuous, or vicious men, it ought to lead us to a view of our

future

future existence, to which the plan of providence doeth moft evidently extend.

VII. That would be the fame thing, as for a fick perfon to afk for medicines, or proper food from his phyfician, &c.]

As to the argument against prayer, which he would here draw from a phyfician's granting medicines, and proper food, to his patient, without his asking for them; it is - it is not, in the leaft, any objection against the reafonableneffe and propriety of praying to God; because the comparison doeth not come up to the cafe in hand. For, when we fend for a phyfician, it is fuppofed that he will take care to reftore our health, without our asking him for proper diet, or phyfic. And Maximus Tyrius does here take it for granted, that our health would not be promoted by fuch a particular request. But to apply to the highest and moft virtuous being, for what we want; and to expect favor from him, according as we excel in virtue, tends greatly to promote our virtue. And confequently this comparifon fails in the main point.

VIII. Are you now a good man? Change your manner of life, cheat and defraud; perfue your intereft, and get money, by turning pander, &c.]

I do not think that the methods, he here: prescribes, are fuch fure ways of acquiring riches, as he feems to have thought them. However, he hath, with great humor and juftnefle,