faculties of men are to be exercised, and their virtues tried, increased, and put to the proof, in order to prepare them for a state of recompence. For, in a state of trial, there must be trials, i. e. there must be profperity and adverfity, opportunities, temptations, and diffficulties; otherwise, how fhall mens faculties be exercised, or their virtue increased and put to the proof? The very nature of such a ftate fuppofes various difficulties and hard trials; that they, who behave beft here, may be the most happy hereafter.

Know that virtue foars above

What the world calls misfortune and affliction.
Thefe are not ills; else would they never fall
On heaven's first favorites, and the best of men.
Our God, in bounty, works up ftorms about us,
That give mankind occafion to exert
Their biden ftrength, and throw out into practice
Virtues, which fhun the day, and lie conceal'd
In the fmooth feafons and the calms of life.

ADDISON.

However, I am fully fatisfied, that, even in this life, the virtuous are not fo greatly, nor fo often, miferable; nor the vitious fo commonly fuccessful, and in fo high a degree happy; as men, who judge by external appearance, are apt to imagine. For we are incapable, in many cafes, of judging concerning the virtue or vice, the happineffe or the mifery

of

of other men. The trueft virtue and piety lie most in shade and privacy; and vice wants a shelter, and most commonly feeks one. So, likewife, happineffe and mifery lie very much out of view; and two men, in the fame outward circumftances, may be one of them very happy, and the other very miferable.

But, fuppofe men were commonly happy, or miferable, juft as the world, which fees only their outward circumftances, judges of them; and that fome good men are greatly afflicted, while other bad men triumph in their wickedneffe; all, that can fairly be concluded from this, is, that the plan of providence reaches into another world, and is not terminated within the narrow bounds of this prefent, tranfitory life.

II. To change his mind and repent, is fo far from being worthy of God, that it is unworthy of a good man, &c.]

"That it is unworthy of God to repent,' is a very juft obfervation. He cannot change for the better, and he will not change for the worse. There is an eternal, unalterable difference between good and evil, as much as between light and darkneffe; evil is, at all times, and in all places, deformed and unreasonable, and good is always and everywhere amiable and wife; neither can they, by any art, any will, or any power whatever, become otherwife. Now what good

H 2

and

and evil are in themfelves, fuch they always appear to the divine understanding; that is, the one always wife and right, and the other foolish and wrong. The power of God is fuch, that he is under no controul from any being whatever; neither has he any thing to hope for, or to fear. What motive, therefore, can he, poffibly, have to refuse what is moft amiable and wife, juft and good; or to choose what is odious and deteftable, deformed and bafe? Such a being can have no temptation to bias him from following the dictates of his own perfect understanding. And he, who never chooses wrong, can never have occafion to repent, or change his

mind.

But this cannot justly be faid of the most virtuous man, whofe understanding is finite, and who is surrounded with many and strong temptations to evil.

Maximus Tyrius himself doeth elsewhere, with great juftneffe, make this inquiry, "What man is fo good, as to paffe through "life without a fault"? And, if the best of men offend, certainly it is not unworthy of the best of men fo far to repent and alter their conduct.

III. Now he, who prays, is either worthy to obtain what he prays for, or unworthy; if he is worthy,

2 τίς ἀνὴρ ὅτως ἀγαθὸς, ὡς διελθῶν βίον ἄπλαιςως; Differt. 26.

worthy, he fhall obtain what he wants, though be doth not pray, if he is not worthy, &c.]

This is one of the objections against praying, on which this philofopher has laid the greateft ftreffe; but, when it is examined, it will be found to have no weight in it.

It is readily acknowleged, that he, who continues wicked, cannot reafonably hope to obtain his request, though he should pray; because his vices render him unworthy. But the other affertion [viz. "that the virtuous,

or worthy man, as he calls him, fhall ob"tain what he wants, though he doeth not

pray; nay, that he shall sooner obtain it, "because he doeth not pray;"] procedes upon two fuppofitions, which are both of them groundleffe and falfe. The one is, that fuch as pray, are troublesome to the deity; and the other is, that a man may be as virtuous and worthy, without prayer, as with it. Whereas,

1. "He, who prays, cannot be trouble"fome to the divine being, let him pray ne"ver so often, and never fo importunately."

What notions must they have had of God, to think that fuch perfons, as conftantly worship him, and intenfely pray unto him, can be troublesome to him? His ears are ever open, and his eyes are always upon the children of He is infinitely perfect, and infinitely happy, and therefore cannot be disturbed, or made uneafy, by the most frequent and earnest addreffes of the whole rational creation, fup

men.

H 3

poie

pofe they should addreffe him all at once. Before the world was, the deity was perfect and happy; and, if the whole creation was annihilated all together, he could fuffer nothing by it. The existence and thoughts, the fpeeches and actions, of the creatures, can make no alteration in the divine perfection, nor interrupt his happineffe.

" it."

2. "A man cannot be as virtuous, and as acceptable to God, without prayer, as with Had Maximus Tyrius attended to it, that prayer is a part of natural religion, and one of the best means for promoting virtue; he, furely, would not have made this objection. For confider prayer in this view, and then no man can, with any reason, hope to obtain any favor, though he neglects to pray; much leffe that he shall the fooner fuccede, without prayer, than with it. He infinuates, that the abstaining from prayer, is a fign of modesty and wisdom. But what want of modesty doeth it argue for a man daily to meditate on the highest moral character, the great pattern and ftandard of virtue and all perfection? What folly! daily to proftrate ourfelves before him? to acknowlege our dependence upon him? and the strong and numberleffe obligations, we are under, to fubmiffion, virtue, and a regular obedience?

Repeted meditations upon fuch important fubjects, under an actual fenfe of the prefence and infpection of God, must be one of

the