to fuch difappointments it must be confeffed, that among our scholars, the Septuagint is a book more talked of than read; in confequence of which, the Old Teftament is feldom ftudied, but in the English version; fo that learned and unlearned are nearly on the fame footing, with regard to this part of our Bible.

With thefe confiderations, as I before said, in my mind, I had the curiofity to difcover what was the real extent of the difcordance between the Greek and Hebrew texts, by making myfelf an exact Collation of them.. This experiment, I thought, would be more ufefully made upon the Pfalms, which is the moft popular, moft interefting, and best known of all the books in the Old Teftament. Being fo fortunate as to know a perfon of the Jewish nation, who is extremely well versed in their Scripture, and in all parts of Jewish learning, I fat down with him to make this trial; the refult of which will be seen in the following pages." P. 23.

We fhall referve for another article fome particular remarks on the Collations them felves, which will lead to original, and, we truft, interefting obfervations on the text.

(To be continued.)

ART. II. Des Caufes qui ont amené l'Ufurpation du Général Bonaparte et qui préparent fa chute.-i. e. On the Caufes which facilitated the Ufurpation of General Bonaparte, and which prepare his Fall. By Sir F. D'Ivernois. 8vo. 378 pp. 8s. De Boffe, Elmly, Dulau, Wright, &c. 1800.

IN no period has any country undergone or caufed so many

revolutions as France, fince the commencement of 1789. Sir Francis D'Ivernois, whofe different works on the finances and internal ftate of that Republic, we have fo often had occafion justly to recommend, has in this work inftituted an enquiry into the two lalt violent fubverfions of the government of that country, which he difcovers to have been derived from the fame caufe as the others which preceded them: he then goes on to fhow, that its exiflence is not yet brought to a termination; but that it threatens the prefent conftitution with the fame ruin in which it has, in a fhort time, overwhelmed fo many others.

This fubverfive caufe he clearly fhows to have been the defit, or inequality of the revenue of the ftate to its expenditure; the melancholy feries of events, which have taken place fince he has written, has deprived his views of the fubject of very little prefent importance; we fhall here, therefore, give a

methodized

methodized analysis of the leading part of his work, the folidity and utility of which ftill remain undiminished.

The annual progrefs of the deficit he thus fhows: in the fifth year of the Republic, the effective receipt of the treafury amounted to 446 millions of livres; of the fixth year, to 384 millions; that of the feventh, was 330 millions; and, of the eighth, to 220 millions (p. 254): the actual expenditure of the feventh year, amounted to 580 millions (p. 137). This evil the Councils could be prevailed upon to put a stop to, only by doubling and trebling taxes, rapidly decreafing in their product before (p. 24); the Directory were, indeed, permitted to fell confifcated lands, to the value of 125. millions; of thefe, the fales amounted to 38 millions of franks only; of which fum, 22 were paid them in their own ordonances or bills, and the available produce of the fale was 16 millions only (p. 26). A plan for the re-establishment of the falt duty was rejected (p. 17). After the fift of the two revolutions here treated of, that of Prairial, the Councils voted, what they denomi-nated, a progreflive loan of 100 millions; to this, the advances of the proprietors of land were regulated by their payments to the land-tax, thofe of the first and fecond clafs, already paid each one third at least of their refpective incomes: on the first, the loan was double the tax, exhaufting the annual receipt of the individuals entirely; and of the fecond, equal, leaving them one third of their income only, for their fubfiftence (p. 79). Opulent individuals, engaged in trade and commerce, were charged at a like exorbitant rate; but in a mode effectively arbitrary every one dreaded to appear rich; all demand for commodities not of the first neceflity inflantly ceased; and the intenfer effect of this blow fell on the populace, who referred it to the right caufe. The utmost receipt of the treasury was 35 millions; but this was purchafed by a fall of all the other' taxes, of 150 (p. 137).

The effects of this perpetually increafing, and perpetually revolutionizing deficit, upon the military exertions, and fhifting conftitutions of the Republic, well deferve attention. The Directory, although their armies were reduced to half the force which they had declared neceffary (p. 46), finding it impoffible to maintain them at home, were obliged to precipitate them, unprovided, upon foreign ftates, and renew the war. Jourdan was directed to lead his troops into Germany, to make good their own fubfiftence, by putting that country under military execution. He declared his force to have been inferior to the attempt, and he was obliged to referve that execution for the departments of France (p. 273) in his retreat. The army of Maflena was confined in a fterile and exhaufted country,

by

by a fuperior enemy; there were troops enough in the South of France to have relieved him, but provifions could not be procured to fubfift them on their march, and his forces fo increased, after the junction (p. 305). The Directory was. obliged to leave the fortified places in Italy without ftores (p. 272); for the defence of Ancona fhowed, that the fuperior celerity of their re-conqueft, to that of their acquifition by Bonaparte, was not to be attributed to their defenders (p. 297): and, at one period, the French cavalry, whofe number was 68,000 men, wanted 40 000 horses to remount them, part of which was fupplied by requifition (p. 275).

To reinforce the reduced army at this juncture, 200,000 confcripts were voted; of many bodies of thefe, two thirds, or more, deferted on their route to their places of rendezvous. Infurrections broke out in many parts of France, particularly the fouth, and they joined the infurgents. To prevent this enormous defertion, a machine was invented, called a quadrille, in which thefe foldiers of liberty were marched by fours, and fo fecured, that they could only move their legs (p. 282) and, to finish the account of this levy, Jourdan informs us, that the greater part of those ordered to reinforce him were not able to join his army, for want of clothes and arms. Nor did the acceffion of Bonaparte to the Confulate hinder the fpirit of defertion, which had been fufpended, from breaking out among an entire regiment of huzzars returned from Italy; the 17th light troops, cavalry or infantry, abandoned their general (p. 299) and when Maffena joined his army, as he brought with him only the affurance that he was come to fhare their diftrefs, instead of money or provifions, a body of 1200 men attempted to march off with their colours and baggage. The general had taken his measures before-hand; they were furrounded, brought back, and one of the corps decimated (p. 301).

the veterans ;

The effects of the deficit on the ftability of government of the Republic, may be very briefly difpatched. At the revolution of Fructidor, in its fifth year, the executive power expelled the heads of the majority of the legislators, because they would not grant them the fubfides necellary to make it good. In the revolution of the feventh year, called that of Prairial, the legislative body expelled the majority of the executive for demanding them (p. 62). The attempt to fupply the deficiency by the progreffive loan, and its failure, cauled the fall of their fucceffors, and introduced the confular conftitution. (p. 157) If the diforder of the finances," faid Arnould, on the 17th of December, after that event, "ruined the an

cient monarchy; their chaotic ftate, fince the revolution, has three times fwallowed up the focial edifice."

An account of the confular revolution, at fome length, is alfo given in this work. That which is commonly received, appears to us involved in inextricable difficulties: for what can be lefs reconcileable with hiftorical credibility, than that a general who had left his army without orders, and in fuch difficulties as to think itself under a neceffity to conclude a convention to fecure its return home, fhould, after fuch a vile and unprincipled defertion, not only on his return be called to no account, but that he fhould be able to poffefs himself of the highest powers of the ftate, civil and military, almoft immediately after. Sir F. D'I. by no means clears up this difficulty; but, from certain facts which he has given, and the relation they bear to this great event, a probable fummary view of it may be given, which removes all these inconfiftencies.

The attempt to restore the falt duties, one of the great pretended grievances of the monarchy, fornithed L. Bonaparte. with an opportunity to render himself extremely popular. He oppofed it; and, to ingratiate himself ftill further with the multitude, propofed that it fhould be declared" as a fundamental principle, that articles of the first neceflity were liable to no impofts." P. 16. The Jacobins in this oppofition concurred with him, or rather took him for their leader; which produced the revolution of Prairial. He delivered the triumphal notification of it to the Council (p. 72) and this meafure gave him the confidence of Barras; he regarded him as an inftrument to fecure the general's attachment to him in future; and the part he took is a proof of its undiminished continuance. In this belief he continued till the very laft.

There was certainly no union of intereft, or communication of their greater plans, between Barras and Sieyes; but it admits no doubt, that each of them feparately faw the events which must follow the progreffive loan; that it would increafe the deficit, and produce another revolution. Each of them thought that he must take a leading part in it, or be its victim and repeated experiments had fhown both of them, that by the old conftitution government could not be carried on; and, therefore, that new powers must be created, as well as new men raised to power.

As the government was become effectively pretorian, this could not be effected without the confent of the army, which might be with moft facility fecured by fome general high in their eftimation; but they had no inducement to hold out to fuch an one, short of setting him abfolutely at the head of the new government.

For

For this purpofe, Bonaparte was fitteft in many respects; his afcendancy with the army continued higher than that of any other general; the withdrawing him from his command to concert measures with him, was more fafe, as he was in a manner unemployed, than the recal of any other great officer, who were each at the head of an army vigorously oppofed.

Barras and Sieyes, moft probably, each communicated their project to him, but privately; and each were favourably heard. The ill-fuccefs of the French arms in Europe gave to one of them a plaufible pretence, to move in the councils of the Directory to recal him by a fecret order into Europe, which the other craftily acceded to; each intending thereby to carry his private project into execution. If the order had not been fecret, the army of Egypt would have detained him by force; nor could it be avowed on his return. Each of the parties thought his prefence neceffary to complete their arrangements with him, and to enable him by his agents to gain over the troops of the interior: but if the fecret order had been made public, his not being fent off to the command of one of the greater armies, immediately after his arrival, could not have been accounted for; and each of thefe latent rivals, Syeyes and Barras, to cover his feparate views in the general's flay at Paris from the other, pretended to think that the change of fortune at the end of the campaign, the approach of winter, and an uncertainty where, on this change of circumstances, his prefence would ultimately be moft wanted, made it more prudent to defer the determination of his appointment.

Although Sieyes and Bonaparte affected great diftance at the return of the latter, the event of the revolution proves that they differed publicly, while, there was in private the most confilential communication between them and Barras had offered to divide the fupreme power with Bonaparte, who fuc ceeded in entirely deceiving them; for the treaty for that pur pofe was pending between them at the time the revolution took place. The double negociation of the general is therefore a certain point; and the fuppofition, that it commenced before his return from Egypt, removes moft of the great difficulties in the hiftory of the confular revolution.

He may have arrived in France, and remained there fome time, negociating with both the Directors feparately, without deciding for whofe offers he fhould determine; but it would have been unfafe to him to have concluded with Barras and the Jacobin party, as they, had determined to reftore the fyftem of terror, and had begun it by the introduction of the law of hoftages, in order to make the levy of the progreffive loan effective. Infurrections then prevailed in many quarters; this

would