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towards them pretty nearly as a chief of the staff stands towards an army in the field. It did not follow then, any more than it follows now, that the King's Secretary, or, as he came afterwards to be called, the Secretary at War, should be a professional soldier. Like the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, he has been just as often a civilian as a soldier, though in either case he was in times preceding the Revolution of 1688 the instrument through which the King communicated with his army. It is a noteworthy fact, looking to what came to pass, that Lord Palmerston made more than one attempt to recover this position for himself when Secretary at War. And it is not less curious to recollect that he was backed up in this endeavour by George IV., whose great ambition it was to stand before the world as the actual Generalissimo of the British army.1

Of the Secretary at War the Commissioners say only that "he had charge generally of the finance" of the army. This is scarcely a correct account of his responsibilities and duties. In the first place, he had charge of the finance of only a portion of the army, another functionary looking after that of the ordnance corps, and of all the expensive and complicated impedimenta with which modern armies are encumbered. And in the next, so much of the authority of the King's Secretary was left to the Secretary at War, that no de

tachment of troops could be transferred from one home station to another except by a warrant bearing his signature. The Secretary at War moved what were called the army estimates,-in other words, told the House of Commons how much money was required to keep the cavalry, infantry, and general staff efficient. He was a member of the Government, but as a general rule excluded, though neither necessarily nor universally, from the Cabinet.

3. The third functionary connected with the army long ago was the Secretary of State for the Home Department. His special charges were the yeomanry and the militia, as well as the volunteers, as they existed during the wars of the first French Revolution; and his standing in connection with the armed force of the country dates much farther back than that of any other member of the military hierarchy. The office of Commander-in-chief, of which we shall have presently to speak, was filled for the first time as a permanency by the Duke of York. The Secretary of State for War and the Colonies came into existence after England's colonial empire had begun to grow unwieldy, and to involve the mother country in frequent hostilities, first with foreigners, and by-and-by with the colonists themselves. The Home Secretary, as he is now called, to distinguish him from the Foreign and other secretaries, was once upon a time the sole Secretary of

1 To such an extent was this fancy carried, that on the death of the Duke of York, a parliamentary committee was appointed to inquire whether it would not be better to connect the army with the Crown by converting the Secretary at War into a King's Secretary, than to fill up the vacant office of Commander-inchief. The strong evidence against the wisdom of the scheme by a host of experienced officers, including the Duke of Wellington, scarcely sufficed to defeat the proposal.

State, and was intrusted as such by the Sovereign with the general control of what was then the sole constitutional force of the realm. But this control extended no further than to sign warrants for calling out regiments when needed, and their dispersion to their homes when the need passed away. He had nothing to do, except as one of the King's constitutional advisers, with the nomination of the lords-lieutenant of counties, or the appointment or promotion of militia officers. The commissions of these gentlemen were signed by the lords-lieutenant of the counties which furnished the militia regiments, whether of horse or foot; and the regiments themselves, when embodied, came under the command of generals of districts, just as these-after a standing army became one of the regular institutions of the country took their orders from headquarters in London.

4. The condition of the commissariat, prior to 1884, is correctly described by the Commission. It was a purely civil institution, the existence of which dates no farther back than the last years of the eighteenth century. To the late General Sir Willoughby Gordon belongs the merit of licking it into shape, and very useful it proved to be in checking abuses, not to speak of frauds in high quarters. Gentlemen proposing to serve the public as commissaries were entered when very young as clerks in the Treasury.

There

they learned how to keep accounts, and thence, when old enough and thoroughly instructed, they were sent out to take charge of the military chest in the colonies, or with armies in the field. For the uses to which the contents of the chest were turned-the purchase

of necessaries for the troops and their regular supply- they were answerable to the Treasury, and to the Treasury alone.

5. The last of the sections in this complicated machine which is noticed by the Commissioners deserves a more elaborate account of its composition than it has received in their Report. They omit to mention that, when in full working order, it included a Lieutenant-General as well as a Master-General of the Ordnance, who, like his chief, was a soldier of recognised ability and experience, and, unlike his chief, was not liable to be changed at every change of Government. His functions were on all-fours with those of the Master-General, thus insuring continuity of policy in a great public department; in other words, retaining permanently at the head of the Board an officer who understood the objects for which the Ordnance Office existed, and the means by which they might most easily be attained. In a fit of mistaken economy a Liberal Government suppressed this most useful functionary, and thus condemned to certain decrepitude the whole department as often as a change of Ministers took place. For contemporaneously with the retirement of the Master-General came the resignation of all the other members of the Board, who, having seats in the House of Commons, kept the office in touch with Parliament, and had acquired some experience in the management of the branches over which they presided. Perhaps the Board of Ordnance might have sustained the shock of the Crimean war had Lord Raglan, whose appointment was not political, been left to direct its operations; it could not possibly have failed so utterly

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as did the commissariat under the mismanagement of Mr Trevelyan, the permanent Under-Secretary of the Treasury. But the Coalition Government took care that there should be in Pall Mall as perfect a muddle as in Parliament Street, by removing Lord Raglan to command the army abroad, and improvising a lieutenant in the shape of a gallant old Peninsular artillery officer, who knew no more about the intricate business he was appointed to conduct than the man in the street. Besides recalling public attention to these facts, it may be well to add that "the chief officers" of the Ordnance to whom the Report alludes, while separately they managed the special concerns intrusted to them, did so under instructions from the whole body assembled as a Board, over which the MasterGeneral, or, in his absence, the Lieutenant-General, presided. In like manner, each of them gave an account from time to time to the Board of the transactions in which he had been engaged, thereby enabling responsibility to be brought home to the right person, and rendering malversation next to impossible.

There is yet another member of this long-forgotten military hierarchy of whom it is necessary to say something, though of him the Royal Commissioners, for obvious reasons, say nothing. Fifty years ago the cavalry and infantry and general staff of the army took their orders, except in India, from the Commander-in-chief. He was a great power, and almost a greater influence, in the State. In his hands were both discipline and promotion, which he exercised without any reference to either the Minister of War or the Legislature. He took his instructions

on these points directly from the Sovereign, to whom he had free access, and whose adviser he was; and the knowledge that such were his privileges gave immense weight to whatever opinions he might express concerning other military departments. The extent to which this independent authority could be carried was shown early in the present century, when the Duke of York, indignant with the Ordnance Office for disputing his right to command the Engineers, applied for and obtained permission to create an Engineer corps of his own, and brought into existence the staff corps, which did excellent service during the Peninsular war, especially as bridge-makers.

Such was the system of military administration which carried England triumphant through the great wars of the first French Revolution, and which, like everything of the kind, could be rendered either effective or otherwise, according to the ability of the hands to which its working was intrusted. A forty years' peace had removed or superannuated almost all the public men reared in the rough school of a protracted struggle, and replaced them by gentlemen who might be competent administrators in ordinary times, but who were quite incapable of dealing with unlooked - for emergencies. On the public offices thus manned came the rupture with Russia, and with it the thousand and one blunders which distinguished the efforts made to meet the strain put thereby on the resources of the country. We cannot pretend to rest the suspicion on other grounds than by a reference from things present to things past; but remembering what Lord Palmerston desired to bring about in 1811, and Lord John Russell in 1837, it seems to

us that in 1855 one or other of these statesmen must have originated the idea of screening their colleagues from censure, by throwing the blame of their shortcomings on the system. Be this, however, as it may, we have hardly as yet recovered from our astonishment when we awoke one morning to discover that there was no longer to be a Master-General and Board of Ordnance, no longer a Commissariat responsible to the Treasury, no longer a militia in connection with the Home Department, nor, except in a moribund state, such a functionary as a Secretary at War. As to the Commander-in-chief, he had long subsided into a General Commanding-in-chief, with powers and influence, as well as emoluments, considerably reduced. And it seemed for the moment as if he alone in the military hierarchy was about But to regain his original status. this delusion, which rested solely on the transfer to him of what had heretofore been known as the

Ordnance corps, was soon dispelled when the fact came to light that the Ministry of War was to be separated from that of the Colonies, and that in this new Ministry should be concentrated all the powers heretofore exercised by the Board of Ordnance, the Treasury, the Secretary at War, and the Commander-in-chief. And this when the country was in the midst of a war, entered into without preparation, and of which there appeared to be little chance of its being brought to a speedy and successful end!

And here we are constrained to express over again our profound regret that the Royal Commissioners were forbidden to carry their researches beyond the practical results of the connection be

tween this leviathan Minister and the Ordnance Department of the War Office. These are described in terms so condemnatory, that, had permission been given to take a general survey of the working of the new system from its commencement, John Bull would have not only been furious on discovering how grossly he had been deceived, but might have insisted on getting rid at any cost of a machine as expensive as it is worthless. Just observe what the Commissioners say, after enumerating five of the great functions with which the Secretary of State for War is charged, "any one of which," they add, "would be sufficient to occupy the whole time of a man of firstrate industry, ability, and knowledge:".

"It is morally impossible that any one man should discharge these funcNo tions in a satisfactory manner. either the possess

one man

could

strength, or the time, or the knowledge which would be indispensable for that purpose; but even if such a physical and intellectual prodigy could be found, he would have to do his duty under disadvantages which would reduce him practically to impotence. The Secretary of State has such a precarious tenure of office, that, speaking generally, he can hardly have time to learn the leading details of the different heads of business under his charge in the time of his occupation of office. This is set in a striking light by what has actually occurred at the War Office since 1881. In August 1881 the office was held by Mr Childers. The Marquis of Hartington succeeded him in 1882. In 1885 Lord Hartington was succeeded by Mr W. H. Smith. In 1885 Mr Smith was succeeded by Mr Campbell-Banner

man.

In August 1886 Mr CampbellBannerman was succeeded by Mr Smith; and in January 1887 Mr Smith was succeeded by Mr Stanhope, who now holds the office. Thus there have been six changes of office in six years, three of the changes

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having been caused by changes of ministry, and two by internal changes in the ministry."

We cannot read the names of these six gentlemen without admitting that, so far as excellent abilities and high character qualify men for office, their fitness to serve the Crown anywhere except in Pall Mall does not admit of a doubt. The same may be said, with here and there an exception, of all who preceded them; yet what a mess have they not made of the military policy of the country! Nay, more, into what positive discredit was not the army thrown at an early stage in the existence of the new system, when there presided over the War Office a statesman who was gifted with no common measure of self-appreciation! Think of the mission of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch to the Crimea, and the Court of Inquiry in Chelsea Hospital that followed, and the effect on public opinion of the publication of the disclosures thus brought to light. We were indeed doing here what the Duke of Wellington would have described as washing our dirty linen abroad," and were rewarded by hearing our suffering warriors described as "C an army of lions commanded by asses." This was bad enough, but worse remains to be told. Had not Napoleon insisted on patching up a peace just as our army, thoroughly refitted, was prepared to enter on a campaign, a peremptory order from Pall Mall would have inflicted upon it a stain such as no display of courage and endurance by either men or officers would have sufficed to wipe out. Will it be believed that Sir Edward Codrington, on whom, after Lord Raglan's death and General Simpson's abrupt recall, the chief command de

volved, was directed to break up his army on the renewal of hostilities; to place Sir Colin Campbell with 20,000 men under the orders of Marshal Pelissier; and while Pelissier, thus strengthened, was to wage war in the open, Codrington, with whatever force remained to him, was to keep guard over the north side of Sebastopol, and prevent the garrison from escaping? Codrington, as might be expected, protested strongly against this arrangement, and pointed out how it would damage, if carried into effect, the prestige of the English army, and exalt that of the French. Codrington protested in vain; and had not Napoleon's policy prevailed, the British troops, which, in the opening of the Crimean war, showed the way to their allies, and were held by them in the greatest possible respect, would have come out of it reduced to some such humiliating position as that in which, fifty years previously, the Spanish and Portuguese contingents had stood towards their fathers.

We have noticed these solecisms on the part of a particular War Minister in order to show how enormous are the powers with which our modern Secretary of State is intrusted, and how fatal may be an unwise exercise of them to the honour as well as the best interests of the country. If we look, again, to what may be called smaller matters, the spectacle which meets our gaze is scarcely less humiliating. Remember that on the fiat of this one man depends the solution of a thousand different questions.

Remember that he brings to the solution of these questions no technical knowledge whatever. He never saw an army in the field. He has not the most remote conception of the arrange

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