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without union and distinction; the one prevents division, the other confusion. Union is maintained by speech and other signs of the inward dispositions of the heart; distinction is caused by the variety of countenances. And it is considerable that so few parts composing it, and in so small a compass, and always in the same situation, yet there is such a diversity of figures as of faces in the world. Seneca propounds this as a spectacle worthy of admiration, though the stoical pride, falsely esteemed greatness of mind, would scarce admire miracles.

And as the frame of man's body, so much more the rational soul, his eminent prerogative above all sensible beings, discovers the Deity. The superior faculties, the understanding and will, whereby he makes a judgment and choice of things in order to his happiness, declare it to be the living image and glory of a most wise and voluntary agent. The admirable composition of two things so disproportioned, a spiritual and material substance in the human nature, is an argument of his omnipotent skill, who united them in a manner inconceivable to us. the nature, qualities, and operations of the soul, shall be more distinctly considered afterwards. And by this short account of some parts of the world, we may sufficiently discover the perfections of the maker. We must pluck out our eyes, and extinguish common sense, not to see infinite wisdom, power and goodness shining in them, the proper marks of the Deity.

But

* In'er cætera propter quæ mirabile divini artifices ingenium est, hoc quoq existimo, quod in tanta copia rerum, nusquam in idem recidit ; etiam quæ similia videntur, cum contuleris diversa sint,

CHAP. IV.

The vanity of Epicurus' opinion of the world's original discovered, from the visible order in all the parts of it. Chance produces no regular effects. The constant natural course of things in the world proves that it is not framed nor conducted by uncertain chance. The world was not caused by the necessity of nature. In the search of causes the mind cannot rest till it comes to the first. Second causes are sustained and directed in all their workings by the first. The Creator, though invisible in his essence, is visible in his effects.

BEFORE I proceed to the other head of arguments, I will

briefly show the vanity of those opinions that attribute the production of the world to chance, or to the sole necessity of nature.

It was the extravagant fancy of Democritus, and Epicurus after him, that the original of the world was from the fortuitous encountering of atoms, that were in perpetual motion in an immense space, till at last a sufficient number met in such a conjunction as formed it in this order. It is strange to amazement, how so wild an opinion, never to be reconciled with reason, could find entertainment. Yet he left a numerous school, many followers tenacious of his doctrine, the heirs of his frenzy. It is very easy to show the vanity of this conceit, that supposes all, and proves nothing.

That these particles of matter should thus meet together, it is necessary they move: * now from whence is the principle of their motion, from an internal form, or an external agent? If they will be ingenuous and speak true, they must answer thus, from whence soever they have it, they have it: for if they did not move, their opinion cannot proceed a step further. But supposing their motion to be natural, what powerful cause made them rest? How are they so firmly united? Have they hooks that fasten, or birdlime, or pitch, or any glutinous matter, that by touching they cleave so fast together? They must grant something like this, otherwise they cannot unite and compound,

* Cum in rerum natura duo sint quærenda, unum quæ materia sit ex qua quæq; res efficiatur, alterum quæ vis sit quæ quidq; efficiat, de materia disseruerunt epicuræi, vim & causam efficientem reliquerunt. Tul. de, fin.

lib. 1.

and then the Epicurean opinion is presently dissipated. Suppo sing them triangular, circular, square, or of any other regular, or irregular figure, yet they can make no other compound, than a mass of sand, in which the several grains touch without firm union. So that it is very evident whether we suppose motion or rest to be originally in the nature of matter, there must be a powerful efficient to cause the contrary. Besides, by what art did so many meet and no more, and of such a figure and no other, and in that * just order as to form the world, a work so exact that by the most exquisite skill it cannot be made better? Add further; how could these minute bodies without sense, by motion produce it? This is to assert that a cause may act above the degree of its power.

Can we then rationally conceive that a confused rout of atoms of divers natures, and some so distant from others, should meet in such a fortunate manner, as to form an entire world, so vast in the bignesss, so distinct in the order, so united in the great diversities of natures, so regular in the variety of changes, so beautiful in the whole composure, though it were granted, that they did move, and that one of their possible conjunctions in some part of eternity were that we see at present? Could such a strict confederacy of the parts of the universe result from an accidental agreement of contrary principles? It is so evident by the universal experience of men, that regular effects are caused by the skill of a designing agent, that works for an end, that upon the sight of any such effects, there is not the least shadow of a suspicion in the mind, that it proceeded from blind and counselless chance. If we should hear one make a plea for a cause, with such powerful reasons and eloquence as are most proper to convince and persuade his judges to decide it for him, can we doubt whether he understands what he speaks, or casually moves the organs of speech? And yet if he did not move them by chance, one of the casual motions equally possible with any other, would be that performed at present. If a thousand brass wheels were thrown on a heap, would six or eight meet so fitly, as by their conjunction to organize a clock, that should distinguish the hours? Or, is a skilful hand requisite to join them, and direct their motion? And did the planets, those vast bodies,

* Si sensu carent nec coire tam disposite possint, quia non potest quicquam rationale perficere nisi ratio. Lact.

by chance ascend to the upper part of the world, and join in that order as to measure the time exactly for so many past ages? Who ever saw a dead statue formed in the veins of marble, or a well proportioned palacer with all rooms of convenience and state, arise out of a quarry of stones without a sculptor to fashion the one, and an architect to frame the other? Yet marble and stones are more disposed to make a statue, or a building, that are the materials of them, and only require skill and workmanship to give them form, than atoms mixed together are to make the world. Indeed * Pliny faintly tells a story of a fabulous ring of Pyrrhus, in which an agate was set, distinctly representing not by art, but pure hazard, Apollo with his harp in the midst of the nine muses. The first reporter was defective, that he did not oblige us to believe, that the sound of his harp was heard in concert with the muses. It would have been a wonderous fine miracle, and the belief as easy that a stone might be a musician, as a painter.

Now if the effects of art are not without an artificer, can the immense fabric of the world be other than the work of a most perfect understanding? Who fixed the foundations of the earth? Who laid the beautiful pavement we tread on? Who divided and adorned the chambers of the spheres? Who opened the windows to the light in the east? Who encompassed it with the immense vault of the starry heaven hanging in the air, and supporting itself? Could artless chance build it? No man, unless totally deserted of reason, can possibly have such a fancy. Let reason judge how could the world be otherwise than it is, supposing it framed by a designing cause? All things are disposed. divinely, that is, by perfect wisdom, as public necessity and ornament require. What the psalmist observes concerning the heavens, is equally true of all the other parts of nature, "Their line is gone out, to signify the exactness of their proportion." If this be the effect of chance, what is the product of design? Can reason distinguish between things artificial, wherein the felicity of invention appears, and things rude not done by rules in the works of the hands, and can it not discover the manifest prints of wisdom in the order of the universe? How much

* Fama est, & habuisse fertur, non arte, sed sponte naturæ, ita discurrentibus maculis, ut musis quoque singulis sua redderentur insignia.

+ Si est aliquid in rerum natura, quod hominis mens, quod ratio, quod vis,

more skill is evident in the frame of the world than in all the effects of human art, so much the less folly would it be to attribute the most curious works of art; than the production of the world to chance.

Add further; the established order of the parts of the world is an argument that excludes all doubt, that it is governed and was at first framed by unerring wisdom. For, if they were united by chance, would they continue in the same manner one day? Is it not most likely that one of the innumerable possible combinations should succeed, different from the same tenor of things that is but one? Especially if we consider that the parts of the world are never at rest: the heavens, the elements, mixed bodies are in perpetual motion. If chance ruled, is it within the confines of probability, that the sun that runs ten or twelve thousand leagues every day, should be now in the same part of the heavens, where it was in former years in such a day, when there are so many other places wherein by chance it might wander? Would the stars keep a perpetual course regularly in such appearing irregularities?

Nec quicquam est tanta magis mirabile mole,

Quam ratio, & certis quod legibus omnia parent;
Nusquam turba nocet, nihil illis partibus errat.

Manil. lib. 1. Astrom.

Or would the sowing of seed in the earth certainly produce such a determinate sort of grain? For the other possible mixtures are so vastly numerous, that it would be ten thousand to one but some other thing should spring up than what does. According to his hypothesis, it would be greater folly to believe that the natural course of things should be the same this year as in former times, than to assert that a gamester should to day throw the dice in the same order, and with the same points uppermost as he did yesterday. It is evident therefore that the Epicurean doctrine having not the least shadow of reason, had never been received with applause but as it is joined with impiety.

2. Some attribute the rise and course of things in the world to the sole necessity of nature. To this it may be replied.

quod potestas humana efficere non possit, est illud certe quod illud efficit homine melius. Id ante quid potius dixerim quam deum.

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