eral Hazen's column was crossing the road from what had been his position, moving up to check the enemy. [He] reported to Lieutenant Cockerill where he could get a good position. Battery H coming up at this time, they were posted so as to command an open space. The enemy checked at dark, had all the batteries in park ready to move. Batteries B and F were soon ordered to the line that was held by the Second Division on the 20th.

On the morning of 20th, got good position for Battery M. Colonel Grose's brigade being ordered on the reserve, placed H and M in reserve to the rear of Second Division. The Third Brigade, Colonel Grose, being ordered to support the left, Battery H moved with it [and] was soon hotly engaged. Lieutenant Cushing, not having a good position for his battery, retired, and reported the enemy on the left of the road in force, with a battery on the road. I sent to the reserve batteries of General Johnson's division, asking them to change front-to fire to the left. For some reason they did not. I then ordered Lieutenant Russell, Battery M, to change front and fire to the left, shell the woods to the left of the road, and silence the battery at the road, which was soon done. At this time [we were] getting a fire from front and rear from artillery, mostly passing over our position. Lieutenant Cushing reported his ammunition expended in his limbers; retired to his caissons; did not see him after that for the day. Soon afterward heard that the caissons had gone from where they had been. I went in search of them. General Brannan's division at this time was in full retreat. I was cut off from the division.

In going up the ridge I found the caissons of Battery B[and] one limber of caisson of Battery M. At this time General Negley ordered all to the rear, as he was going to form a new line on the ridge. Found three Parrott guns and carriages abandoned that I had limbered, one spare limber, and one on the rear of caisson of Battery B. To the right and near an old field saw one 12-pounder Napoleon [and] one 12-pounder howitzer. Sent a sergeant with his limber for [them], as he had lost his pieces. All of which were taken to Rossville.

The officers of the batteries and all of the men behaved with remarkable coolness and did their full duty, especially Lieutenants Russell and Butler, of Battery M; Lieutenants Cushing and Floyd, of Battery H (Lieutenant Floyd being wounded on the 19th); Lieutenants Baldwin and Throup, of Battery B; Lieutenants Cockerill, Osburn, Patton, and Lynch, of Battery F (Lieutenant Lynch was wounded and died on the 19th).

Casualties.-Battery M: Enlisted men killed, 2; enlisted men wounded, 6. Caissons abandoned, 3. Horses killed and abandoned, 14. Battery H: Commissioned officer wounded, 1; enlisted men killed, 5; enlisted men wounded, 16. One 12-pounder howitzer, carriage, and limber abandoned. Horses killed and abandoned, 23.

Battery B: Enlisted man killed, 1; enlisted men wounded, 8; enlisted men missing, 4-1 voluntarily. Six-pounder James rifles and gun carriages abandoned, 2. Horses killed and abandoned, 13.

Battery F: Commissioned officer killed, 1; enlisted man killed, 1; enlisted men wounded, 8; enlisted men missing, 2. Horses killed and abandoned, 12.

All of which I respectfully submit.

W. E. STANDART,

Captain Company B, First Ohio Vol. Arty., and Chief of Arty., 2d Div., 21st Army Corps. Capt. D. W. NORTON, Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Second Div.

No. 152.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft, U. S. Army, commanding First Brigade.

NEAR MATTHEWS' HOUSE, September 16, 1863. CAPTAIN: The fact of an attack by cavalry of the enemy on the picket guard of this brigade, which occurred on the 10th instant, near Pea Vine Creek, Ga. (on the road leading from Rossville to Ringgold), has been heretofore promptly reported, with a list of officers and men captured. The matter has been since more fully investigated than was possible at the time of the occurrence and a detailed report thereof is now respectfully submitted.

The brigade left Rossville on the morning of the 10th instant, at 6 a. m., in advance of the division column. On leaving camp an advance guard was detailed and properly posted, with skirmishers, road party, and reserve, to precede the column. This advance consisted of a battalion of four companies of the First Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, to wit, Companies B (Lieutenant Hammond commanding), D (Captain Jones commanding), G (Lieutenant Brown commanding), K (Lieutenant Hornung commanding), the whole under command of Maj. A. R. Hadlock. Lieut. John A. Wright, my aide-decamp, accompanied the party, and was charged with the execution of my instructions.

After crossing Missionary Ridge and the west fork of Chickamauga River, the road passed over a considerable range of hills, at the foot of which, on the east, was a valley of near 2 miles in width, through which ran Pea Vine Creek. When the head of the column reached the top of the hill, above the valley, it was halted, by command of Major-General Palmer (who happened to be riding with me at the time), for the purpose of exploring the valley. From this point a large portion of the valley could be overlooked, and something could be seen of the roads running through it. Dust was observed at points along these roads indicating movements of the enemy's cavalry. General Palmer furnished me with a small mounted force to precede the infantry battalion and explore the valley. This force consisted of a portion of the division escort (Lieutenant Shaw, Company C, Seventh Illinois Cavalry, commanding), and a portion of Company Fourth Michigan Cavalry (Captain commanding), in all numbering some 60 or 70 men. Captain Norton (and perhaps others), of General Palmer's staff, accompanied the cavalry. The battalion of the First Kentucky was ordered by me to follow the cavalry, and take post within supporting distance of it beyond Pea Vine Čreek, and there hold the road at all hazards. The skirmishing became quite spirited shortly after the cavalry crossed the creek, but the retiring reports of the carbines indicated that our men were driving the enemy. The brigade column passed down the hill, crossed the creek, and, in accordance with orders from General Palmer, was passing into camp. It had been expressly enjoined that the flanks of the camp should be well explored and speedily protected. A few hundred feet east of the creek the woods became dense. Along the margin of the woods two good roads intersected the main road nearly at right angles, the one on the left leading to Graysville, about 24 miles distant, that on the right southward toward La Fayette. At the time the column crossed the creek the firing at the front had diminished and soon altogether ceased.

A messenger was sent to the front, who speedily returned with the information that our cavalry had driven off the enemy (which was represented to be a few mounted men), and that the infantry guard was in position. Colonel Sedgewick, with the Second Kentucky, was ordered to reconnoiter the right-hand road for the distance of a mile, and there await further orders. Two companies were ordered up the Graysville road for half a mile, with similar instructions. After these dispositions, the Thirty-first Indiana and Ninetieth Ohio were placed in line of battle on the right of the main road, under cover of the woods, and the men kept to their arms. The battery was placed in position in rear of the line, with orders not to unhitch. It was intended that the Third Brigade (Colonel Grose commanding) should encamp on the left of the road, in prolongation of my line, and this brigade was following down to its position. Skirmishers had been detailed, and were being posted in front of my line. During the few moments occupied in making these dispositions the skirmish firing again commenced well to the front, but at such intervals in reports as not to call for any special attention or indicate any sharp work; straggling shots merely were being exchanged. Attracted, however, by this, I waited a few moments for the battery to get into position and then started to the front. Captain Norton met me a few yards from the cross-roads. He was returning with the cavalry. He reported, substantially, that he estimated the enemy's force at about 200, but that it was too strong for his party to skirmish with successfully. Something was said expressing an apprehension that the enemy had artillery. Captain Standart, coming up at this moment, was requested to go to the front with me. We had been started but a few moments when Lieutenant Wright was met returning. He stated the enemy were maneuvering in the front, with a force which he supposed to be 150 to 200, and which he thought might be easily repulsed with a section of artillery. Lieutenant Wright was ordered to return rapidly to the front, and generally look after things there, and to say to Major Hadlock that I had perfect confidence in his holding the road against any column of cavalry until re-enforcements could be brought up if needed. Captain Standart was directed to have a section of his battery ready to move at a moment's notice. He replied that such was the case already. Lieutenant Wright galloped away, and we followed more leisurely. After going a short distance Adjutant Atkinson, First Kentucky, rode rapidly back, and, meeting us, said the enemy were about charging the line, and asked for re-enforcements.

Simultaneously with this request, a volley of musketry was heard and some yelling, and a cloud of dust was seen about the place occupied by the battalion and drifting down the road. We soon saw our people running back and a few of the enemy's cavalry dashing down the road toward us. Captain Standart was ordered to put his guns in shape to rake the road. Orders were immediately sent to the two regiments standing in line to advance. Before reaching the flank of the line, however, two of the enemy's cavalry passed me, coming at full speed, one of them turning into the woods on the right; the other dashed up close to the battery, fired a shot, wheeled his horse, and turned to the Graysville road. Lieutenant Hill, of the battery, returned the shot from a pistol almost instantly, but apparently without effect. The Thirty-first Indiana and Ninetieth Ohio advanced rapidly in line, and were within musket range of the

point of attack within about five minutes after the volley, and the section of artillery followed them right up. The picket had all scattered, and no organized force could be seen in the road. The enemy had also all retired. The regiments were pushed immediately up to the place of attack and beyond, and the artillery planted on a commanding position, but no enemy could be seen. The line was halted for a few moments, during which Colonel Grose brought up a regiment (the Twenty-third Kentucky) of his command and reported to me. This was placed on the left of the road, prolonging my line.

Upon consultation, it was not deemed prudent to advance the line without looking to the Graysville road, which was a short distance from our left flank. At my request Colonel Grose ordered up another regiment of his brigade (Thirty-sixth Indiana) to cover the Graysville road. The lines then advanced over 1 mile, and some sharp skirmishing had with the enemy, who was finally driven off. The line remained in the latter position until about 4.15 p. m., when it was ordered back to camp. Colonel Rippey, of the Ninetieth Ohio, reports to have killed one of the enemy's cavalry in front of his skirmish line. There were no casualties on our part.

The attack on the battalion of the First Kentucky was made about 11 a. m. The battalion numbered 9 commissioned and non-commissioned officers and 144 effective men. The presence of the enemy in its immediate front was well known; the force was ample to resist the attack. The ground was unfavorable to cavalry, requiring any charge to be made in narrow column. There was not a steady resistance made, so far as can be learned. The attacking column consisted of about 80 volunteer troopers of General Pegram's command as is said by prisoners subsequently captured. The same author. ity states that his whole brigade was within supporting proximity. Be this as it may, but a small force was engaged or was seen. attacking party fired but a few straggling shots. The troopers of the enemy are reported to have had scarce any sabers. Our skirmishers do not appear to have fired on the advancing column, or at most but a shot or two. The reserve of two companies fired a single volley, which, though said to have been well delivered and at short range, proved so ineffectual as not to have injured the enemy in any

way.

The

In view of these facts, I have asked of the officers in charge of the guard a solution of the following queries:

First. How a force of 200 cavalry could break their line if posted as directed?

Second. How a volley could be fired at short range without hurting anybody?

Third. Why firing at will did not occur after the volley?

Fourth. How 58 men could be captured by cavalry without sabers in a narrow road with thick underbrush on each side?

Fifth. Why steady resistance with the bayonet was not made? These inquiries were propounded conversationally at an interview with the officers, and reports in writing subsequently ordered from each. I herewith hand you the reports of Major [LieutenantColonel] Hadlock commanding, Lieutenant Hammond, Lieutenant Brown, and Lieutenant Hornung, hereto appended and marked, respectively, A, B, C, and D.*

*See, respectively, pp. 742, 748, 749, and 750.

I also herewith submit the report of Lieutenant Wright, aide-decamp, accompanied with the plat of the locality where the affair occurred, marked E.*

I also append a corrected list of the 58 officers and men captured, marked F.

On the whole matter, it is difficult for me to express an opinion which may not unjustly reflect on those whom I esteem good soldiers, or on the other [hand] reflect harshly on companions in arms whom I believe to be good officers. The First Kentucky Regiment is one of the oldest in the service, and is composed of brave officers and men. Its record is good, and has been earned by bold acts on the battlefield. To account for the affair of the 10th, above reported on, we are forced to one of three conclusions, either that the officers and men were careless, that they became panic-stricken, or that there is some want of confidence between officers and men hitherto unsuspected.

Very respectfully, &c.,

Capt. J. R. MUHLEMAN,

CHARLES CRUFT, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Division.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,

In the Field, Chattanooga, Tenn., September 28, 1863. CAPTAIN: I herewith submit a summary report of the movements and operations of this brigade from the 3d to the 18th instant, inclusive.

Thursday, September 3.-The command was encamped on the Little Sequatchie, 5 miles north of Jasper. At 11 a. m. it took up line of march, following General Van Cleve's division, then passing. My orders were to march to mouth of Battle Creek and join the division and cross there. On arriving at Jasper, about 1.30 p. m., General Crittenden ordered a change in the direction of the march, and directed the brigade to cross the Tennessee at Shellmound. The column reached the river about 7 p. m. March of the day, 12 miles. The rear of Colonel Harker's brigade, of General Wood's division, was crossing on my arrival. The ferry was in charge of a detachment of the pioneer corps. It consisted of seven flats, and was well managed by the pioneer officer in charge. He was an accommodating, gentlemanly, and hard-working officer, and I regret to have forgotten his name.

My column commenced ferriage at 10 p. m. At 1 a. m. all the infantry and half the battery was in bivouac on the opposite shore. The passage of the rest of the battery, my escort, &c., consumed some two hours more. The whole passage of the river was effected in about five hours.

Friday, September 4.-Lay in bivouac at Shellmound all day. Saturday, September 5.-At 3 p. m. moved out on the Chattanooga road to near Whiteside's, and encamped for the night on Running Water Creek. Marched 9 miles.

Sunday, September 6.-Marched at 6 a. m. southward along Murphy's Valley road to the intersection of Nickajack road. Cut the felled timber out of the road at places where it had been obstructed