lih attempted a fettlement upon the island of St. Lucia, the French, whether justly or not, confidering it as neutral and forbidden to be occupied by either nation, immediately landed upon it, and deftroyed the houses, wafted the plantations, and drove or carried away the inhabitants. This was done in the time of peace, when mutual profeffions of friendship were daily exchanged by the two courts, and was not confidered as any violation of treaties, nor was any more than a very foft remonftrance made on our part.

The French therefore taught us how to act; but an Hanoverian quarrel with the houfe of Auftria for fome time induced us to court, at any expence, the alliance of a nation whofe very fituation makes them our enemies. We fuffered them to deftroy our fettlements, and to advance their own, which we had an equal right to attack. The time however came at laft, when we ventured to quarrel with Spain, and then France no longer fuffered the appearance of peace to fubfift between us, but armed in defence of her ally.

The events of the war are well known; we pleafed ourselves with a victory at Dettingen, where we left our wounded men to the care of our enemies, but our army was broken at Fontenoy and Val; and though after the difgrace which we fuffered in the Mediterranean, we had fome naval fuccefs, and an accidental dearth made peace necessary for the French, yet they prefcribed the conditions, obliged us to give hoftages, and acted as conquerors, though as conquerors of moderation.

In this war the Americans diftinguished themselves in a manner unknown and unexpected. The NewEnglish raised an army, and under the command of Pepperel took Cape-Breton, with the affiftance of the fleet. This is the most important fortrefs in America. We pleafed ourselves fo much with the acquifition, that we could not think of restoring it; and, among the arguments used to enflame the people against Charles Stuart, it was very clamouroufly urged, that if he gained the kingdom, he would give Cape-Breton back to the French.

The French however had a more eafy expedient to regain Cape Breton than by exalting Charles Stuart to the English throne. They took in their turn fort St. George, and had our Eaft-India Company wholly in their power, whom they restored at the peace to their former poffeffions, that they may continue to export our filver.

Cape-Breton therefore was reftored, and the French were re-established in America, with equal power and greater fpirit, having loft nothing by the war which they had before gained.

To the general reputation of their arms, and that habitual fuperiority which they derive from it, they owe their power in America, rather than to any real strength, or circumftances of advantage. Their numbers are yet not great; their trade, though daily improved, is not very extensive; their country is barren; their fortreffes, though numerous, are weak, and rather shelters from wild beasts, or favage nations, than places built for defence against bombs or cannons. Cape-Breton has been found not to be impregnable; nor, if we confider

the state of the places poffeffed by the two nations in America, is there any reafon upon which the French fhould have prefumed to moleft us, but that they thought our fpirit fo broken that we durft not refift them; and in this opinion our long forbearance eafily confirmed them.

We forgot, or rather avoided to think, that what we delayed to do must be done at last, and done with more difficulty, as it was delayed longer; that while we were complaining, and they were eluding, or answering our complaints, fort was rifing upon fort, and one invafion made a precedent for another.

This confidence of the French is exalted by fome real advantages. If they poffefs in thofe countries. lefs than we, they have more to gain, and lefs to hazard; if they are lefs numerous, they are better united.

The French compofe one body with one head. They have all the fame interest, and agree to pursue it by the fame means. They are fubject to a governor commiffioned by an abfolute monarch, and participating the authority of his mafter. Defigns are therefore formed without debate, and executed without impediment. They have yet more martial than mercantile ambition, and feldom fuffer their military fchemes to be entangled with collateral projects of gain: they have no wifh but for conqueft, of which they juftly confider riches as the confequence.

Some advantages they will always have as invaders. They make war at the hazard of their enemies the conteft being carried on in our ter

ritories,

ritories, we muft lofe more by a victory than they will fuffer by a defeat. They will fubfift, while they stay, upon our plantations; and perhaps deftroy them when they can ftay no longer. If we pursue them, and carry the war into their dominions, our difficulties will increafe every step as we advance, for we fhall leave plenty behind us, and find nothing in Canada but lakes and forefts barren and tracklefs; our enemies will fhut themfelves up in their forts, against which it is difficult to bring cannon through fo rough a country, and which, if they are provided with good magazines, will foon ftarve those who befiege them.

All these are the natural effects of their government and fituation; they are accidentally more formidable as they are lefs happy. But the favour of the Indians which they enjoy, with very few exceptions, among all the nations of the northern continent, we ought to confider with other thoughts; this favour we might have enjoyed, if we had been careful to deserve it. The French, by having these favage nations on their fide, are always supplied with fpies and guides, and with auxiliaries, like the Tartars to the Turks, or the Huffars to the Germans, of no great ufe against troops ranged in order of battle, but very well qualified to maintain a war among woods and rivulets, where much mischief may be done by unexpected onfets, and safety be obtained by quick retreats. They can waste a colony by fudden inroads, furprize the fraggling planters, frighten the inhabitants into towns, hinder the cultivation of lands, and starve those whom they are not able to conquer.

AN

INTRODUCTION

то THE

Political State of Great-Britain.

Written in the Year 1756.

TH

HE prefent fyftem of English politics may properly be faid to have taken rife in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. At this time the Proteftant religion was eftablished, which naturally allied us to the reformed ftate, and made all the popish powers our enemies.

We began in the fame reign to extend our trade, by which we made it neceffary to ourselves to watch the commercial progrefs of our neighbours; and, if not to incommode and obftruct their traffick, to hinder them from impairing ours.

We then likewife fettled colonies in America, which was become the great fcene of European ambition; for, fecing with what treafures the Spaniards were annually enriched from Mexico and Peru, every nation imagined, that an American conqueft or plantation would certainly fill the mother country with gold and filver. This produced a large extent of very diftant dominions, of which we, at this time, neither knew nor forefaw the advantage or incumbrance: