Colours: Their Nature and RepresentationThe world as we experience it is full of colour. This book defends the radical thesis that no physical object has any of the colours we experience it as having. The author provides a unified account of colour that shows why we experience the illusion and why the illusion is not to be dispelled but welcomed. He develops a pluralist framework of colour-concepts in which other, more sophisticated concepts of colour are introduced to supplement the simple concept that is presupposed in our ordinary colour experience. The discussion draws on philosophical and scientific literature, both historical and modern, but it is not technical, and will appeal to a broad range of philosophers, cognitive scientists and historians of science. |
Contents
The representation of colour | 1 |
Colours as virtual properties | 25 |
The natural concept of colour | 26 |
What colours are essentially | 50 |
Essential definitions of colour | 58 |
the pluralist framework | 105 |
Objectivist accounts of colour | 115 |
The prospects for reductive realism | 130 |
The intensionalist account | 184 |
Misconceptions about qualia | 190 |
An argument for qualia | 193 |
A new argument from illusion | 195 |
The significance of the firstperson point of view | 197 |
Physicalist objections | 201 |
Conclusion | 205 |
The psychological reality of colour | 206 |
objectivist and dispositionalist | 149 |
Colour truths | 155 |
Colour constancy | 158 |
Objectivist views and appearances | 161 |
Modes of colour appearance | 164 |
Conclusion | 168 |
Colours and consciousness Introduction to Part III | 171 |
Colour qualia | 174 |
Qualia | 175 |
Qualia and functionalism | 177 |
Harman and the intrinsic quality of experience | 182 |
What are psychological primary colours? | 207 |
Culture and biology | 208 |
Wittgenstein and colour classification | 212 |
Phenomenal qualities and cultural diversity | 217 |
Virtual qualities and the Private Language Argument | 220 |
Phenomenal qualities and private language | 224 |
Intuitive and abstract knowledge | 230 |
Conclusion | 236 |
Bibliography | 237 |
| 243 | |
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Common terms and phrases
appear apply argued argument aware basis believe blue bodies called causal certain Chapter character characteristic claim clear concept of colour crucial defined depends Descartes describe developed discussion dispositional distinction distinguish effects essentially Evans example exist experience explain expressed fact functions give given gold green hold ideas identify important interest intrinsic involves judgements kind knowledge language least light Locke look means naive natural natural kinds normal objectivist observers pain perceivers perception person phenomenal philosophers physical objects physical property play position possible practices problem qualia qualities question reason recognise reference reflectance relationships represent representational requires respect role seems sensation sense shape similar space specific standard subjective surface theory thesis things thought tion true turn understanding virtual colours visual experiences yellow