The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person StanceWhat is it to occupy a first-person stance? Is the first-personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? The Self recommends a new way to approach those questions, finding inspiration in theories about consciousness and mind in first millennial India. These philosophers do not regard the first-person stance as in conflict with the natural—their idea of nature is not that of scientific naturalism, but rather a liberal naturalism non-exclusive of the normative. Jonardon Ganeri explores a wide range of ideas about the self: reflexive self-representation, mental files, and quasi-subject analyses of subjective consciousness; the theory of emergence as transformation; embodiment and the idea of a bodily self; the centrality of the emotions to the unity of self. Buddhism's claim that there is no self too readily assumes an account of what a self must be. Ganeri argues instead that the self is a negotiation between self-presentation and normative avowal, a transaction grounded in unconscious mind. Immersion, participation, and coordination are jointly constitutive of self, the first-person stance at once lived, engaged, and underwritten. And all is in harmony with the idea of the natural. |
Other editions - View all
The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance Jonardon Ganeri Limited preview - 2012 |
The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance Jonardon Ganeri No preview available - 2015 |
The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance Jonardon Ganeri No preview available - 2012 |
Common terms and phrases
Abhidharma analysis argue awareness base bodily Buddhist Ca¯rva¯ka capacity Cartesian causal causal powers cause Chapter claim cognition colour conceive of oneself concept consciousness constitutive desires Dharmakı¯rti Dicaearchus Digna¯ga distinct doctrine dynamical system elements embodied emergence emergentism emotion endorsement entity event existence experience explain first-person phenomena first-person stance human idea identify identity immersed Indian individual instantiation intentional involved Jayanta mental properties metaphysical naturalism naturalist notion Nya¯ya Nya¯ya-su¯tra Nya¯ya-Vaises.ika object one’s Ownership View P. F. Strawson pain participation particular perceived perception person phenomenal phenomenological philosophers philosophy of mind physical properties Place View pleasure possibility Prabha¯candra Prasastapa¯da 1994 present problem psychological pudgala qualia qualities Reductionist reference reflexively self-aware reflexivism relation role self-consciousness sense sensory sentience sort soul spatial stream subject-aspect supervenience theory of mind thesis things thinkers thought insertion tion trans tropes Uddyotakara unconscious unconscious mind Va¯tsya¯yana Vaises.ika Vasubandhu weak emergence Yoga¯ca¯ra