The Conceptual Link from Physical to MentalHow are truths about physical and mental states related? Physicalism entails that non-physical truths are redescriptions of a world specifiable in narrowly physical terms. In The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental Robert Kirk argues that physicalists must therefore hold that the physical truth 'logico-conceptually' entails the mental truth: it is impossible for broadly logical and conceptual reasons that the former should have held without the latter. 'Redescriptive physicalism' is a fresh approach to the physical-to-mental connection that he bases on these ideas. Contrary to what might have been expected, this connection does not depend on analytic truths: there are holistic but non-analytic conceptual links, explicable by means of functionalism—which, he argues, physicalism entails. Redescriptive physicalism should not be confused with 'a priori physicalism': although physicalists must maintain that phenomenal truths are logico-conceptually entailed by physical truths, they must deny that they are also entailed a priori. Kripke-inspired 'a posteriori physicalism', on the other hand, is too weak for physicalism, and the psycho-physical identity thesis is not sufficient for it. Though non-reductive, redescriptive physicalism is an excellent basis for dealing with the problems that mental causation raises for other non-reductive views. 'Cartesian intuitions' of zombies and transposed qualia may seem to raise irresistible objections; Kirk shows that the intuitions are false. As to the 'explanatory gap', there is certainly an epistemic gap, but it has a physicalistically acceptable explanation which deals effectively with the problem of how the physical and functional facts fix particular phenomenal facts. |
Contents
1 Introduction | 1 |
2 Redescription and logicoconceptual entailment | 7 |
3 Logicoconceptual entailment and other notions | 24 |
4 Supervenience | 47 |
5 Psychophysical identity and functionalism | 57 |
6 A posteriori physicalismbut not as we know it | 84 |
7 A priori versus redescriptive physicalism | 103 |
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Common terms and phrases
accept actually analytic appeal apply argued argument assume assumption base description basis behaviour causal cause Chalmers chapter claim commits component conceivable concepts connection consciousness consider consistent course definition depend described distinct distribution effects ensure entailment thesis epistemic example existence experience explain expressed facts false follows functional given headache hold idea identity identity thesis impossible individuals involved Jackson kind l-centailment thesis least logical logico-conceptual maintain matter means mental metaphysical nature necessary necessity non-physical notion objection pain particular performance phenomenal concepts phenomenal truths phenomenally conscious physicalists position possible possible world posteriori priori entailment processes properties psycho-physical identity pure redescription purely physical qualia question realizability reason redescriptive physicalism reduction reject relations relevant requires rules seems semantic sense specified statements sufficient suggest supervenience Suppose things true zombie