The Contents of Visual ExperienceWhat do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. She then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kinds of properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. She goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. Siegel's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision. |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
accuracy conditions argue Argument from Appearing ball ball’s landing bare particulars beliefs Causal Thesis claim cluster of properties cognitive color contents of experience contents of visual contrasting experience conveyed counterfactual discussion doll domain-specific model enal ence erties expe falsidical Franco being sad Franco’s twin Fregean hallucination illusions instantiated intentional objects Internalist introspection intuition involve John Malkovich K-properties looks sad method of phenomenal nomenal non-causal contents non-sensory nonsingular contents notion object-seeing objectually singular Odd experience one’s overall experience perceiver perspectivally phenom phenomenal character phenomenal contrast phenomenal difference phosphenes pine trees predicatively singular premise presented in experience proposal propositional attitude raw feel red cube represented in visual Rich Content View rience role seems singular contents specific standard Naïve Realism Strong Content View strongly veridical subject-independent suppose target experience theory things tion veridical with respect visual experience represents visual perceptual experiences visual phenomenal visual phenomenology weak veridicality what’s