Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the PresentRalph Schumacher This book is about the nature of sensory perception. Contributions focus on five questions, i.e.: (1) What distinguishes sensory perception from other cognitive states? Is it true, for instance, that perceptual content, in contrast to the phenomenal content of sensations like pain, always depends on the perceivers conceptual resources? (2) How do we have to explain the intentionality of perceptual states? (3) What is the nature of perceptual content? (4) In which sense do the objects of sensory perception depend on the constitution of the perceiver? How, for instance, do secondary qualities like colours, sounds and smells depend on the perception of human subjects? (5) How can we account for the intentionality of misperceptions? These questions are addressed through the interpretation of classical historical texts as well as in the context of systematical reflections. With contributions by Margaret Atherton, Michael Ayers, Peter Baumann, Martha Brandt Bolton, Thomas Grundmann, Gary Hatfield, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Andreas Kemmerling, Bertram Kienzle, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Dominik Perler, Jay F. Rosenberg, Katia Saporiti, Ralph Schumacher, Gerald Vision, and Russell Wahl. |
Contents
HATCHGRAD | 8 |
Margaret Atherton | 16 |
Andreas Kemmerling | 43 |
Copyright | |
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according actuality-independent argument Arnauld Berkeley Berkeley's bodies brain Brandom Cartesian causal cause claim cognitive color corpuscles cube Descartes Descartes's direct realism distinction empiricism entities epistemic epistemology Essay essence explain external world fact George Berkeley green idea represents ideas of secondary ideas of sense idiom immediately perceivable intentional content intentional objects internalist judgments justified knowledge Locke Locke's Malebranche material world McDowell McDowell's means Meditations mental representation metaphysical mind misperception mode of existence Molyneux's question Müller-Lyer illusion nature neutral monism nondoxastic notion ontological particular perceptual beliefs phenomenal concepts Philosophy philosophy of mind picture primary qualities Principles of Philosophy properties propositional qualia rabbit reality refer relation representationalism secondary qualities Sellars sensations sense experience sense-data sense-datum sensible objects sensible qualities sensible things sensory ideas sensory perception simple ideas space of reasons supposed theory thought Toltec understanding Vision visual experience