Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory RepresentationWhile much has been written on Descartes' theory of mind and ideas, no systematic study of his theory of sensory representation and misrepresentation is currently available in the literature. Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Misrepresentation is an ambitious attempt to fill this gap. It argues against the established view that Cartesian sensations are mere qualia by defending the view that they are representational; it offers a descriptivist-causal account of their representationality that is critical of, and differs from, all other extant accounts (such as, for example, causal, teleofunctional and purely internalist accounts); and it has the advantage of providing an adequate solution to the problem of sensory misrepresentation within Descartes' internalist theory of ideas. In sum, the book offers a novel account of the representationality of Cartesian sensations; provides a panoramic overview, and critical assessment, of the scholarly literature on this issue; and places Descartes' theory of sensation in the central position it deserves among the philosophical and scientific investigations of the workings of the human mind. |
Contents
| 1 | |
| 11 | |
Cartesian Sensations as Qualia | 36 |
Causal Accounts | 67 |
Teleofunctional Accounts | 95 |
5 A DescriptivistCausal Account and the Solution of the Puzzle of Sensory Representation | 117 |
6 Objections and Replies | 162 |
Conclusion | 178 |
| 180 | |
| 187 | |
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Common terms and phrases
according to Descartes actually argue argument attribute aware brain called Cartesian sensations causal account causal connection cause Chapter claim clear and distinct cold color conclusion consists contain corporeal correct correspondence CSM II defend determined discussion distinct evidence example existence experience explain extensa external fact falsity follows formal function hence idea of cold ideas of sense ideas represent imply innate intellect internalist interpretation intrinsic judgment material materially false matter means Meditation Six mind misrepresentation modes nature Notice notion objective reality obscure and confused pain passage perceive positive possible presentational Principles problem properties of bodies purely puzzle qualities question reading reasons refer referential relation Replies representational content representationality resemble result role Schmaltz secondary qualities seems sensations represent sensory ideas sensory perception sensory representation similar Simmons suggests theory things Three tion true understanding union various Vinci virtue Wilson