Objections to PhysicalismHoward Robinson Physicalism has, over the past twenty years, become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects, (such as numbers), and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical world itself is called into question. Both strong "reductionist" versions and weaker "supervenience" theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. Contributors include George Bealer, Peter Forrest, John Foster, Grant Gillett, Bob Hale, Michael Lockwood, George Myro, Nicholas Nathan, David Smith, Steven Wagner, Ralph Walker, and Richard Warner. |
Contents
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
A THINKING | 27 |
TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST PHYSICALISM | 61 |
Copyright | |
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Abstract Particulars accept argued argument aspect aware behaviour behaviouristic belief brains or bodies Cambridge causal Churchland claim cognitive complex intension concept conscious distinction dualism empirical empiricism entities epistemological example existence experience external reality F-ing fact folk psychology functionalist grade Hartry Field hologram inference instantiation intentional phenomena intrinsic introspection intuitive Kant knowledge lack laws logical Maddy manifest understanding material properties materialist mathematical mental ascriptions mental explanations mental properties metaphysically mind natural neural hologram nominalist nomological non-inferentially non-material mental property non-physical notion ontology Oxford Patricia Churchland perception phenomenal phenomenology phenomenon Philosophical physical objects physical world physicalist possible premisses principle problem propositional attitudes propositions psychological qualia qualities quantum mechanics question Quine Quine's rational realism reason recognize pain reductive relations relevant representations seems semantic sensation sense set theory sort spatio-temporal structure supervenience suppose thesis things thought tion true truth ultimate theory unity volitions